Moving outside the box: Researching e-learning in disruptive times

Indexación: Scopus.The rise of technology’s influence in a cross-section of fields within formal education, not to mention in the broader social world, has given rise to new forms in the way we view learning, i.e. what constitutes valid knowledge and how we arrive at that knowledge. Some scholars have claimed that technology is but a tool to support the meaning-making that lies at the root of knowledge production while others argue that technology is increasingly and inextricably intertwined not just with knowledge construction but with changes to knowledge makers themselves. Regardless which side one stands in this growing debate, it is difficult to deny that the processes we use to research learning supported by technology in order to understand these growing intricacies, have profound implications. In this paper, my aim is to argue and defend a call in the research on ICT for a critical reflective approach to researching technology use. Using examples from qualitative research in e-learning I have conducted on three continents over 15 years, and in diverse educational contexts, I seek to unravel the means and justification for research approaches that can lead to closing the gap between research and practice. These studies combined with those from a cross-disciplinary array of fields support the promotion of a research paradigm that examines the socio-cultural contexts of learning with ICT, at a time that coincides with technology becoming a social networking facilitator. Beyond the examples and justification of the merits and power of qualitative research to uncover the stories that matter in these socially embodied e-learning contexts, I discuss the methodologically and ethically charged decisions using emerging affordances of technology for analyzing and representing results, including visual ethnography. The implications both for the consumers and producers of research of moving outside the box of established research practices are yet unfathomable but excitinghttp://www.ejel.org/volume15/issue1/p5

Joy and sorrow and the like in the poetic language of Klopstock, Schiller and Goethe

I . INTRODUCTION: 1. "Inner Form of Language" . 2. Study of synonyms. 3. Reasons for choice of words to be analysed- II. THE METHOD EMPLOYED AID ITS JUSTIFICATION: 4. Necessity of studying synonyms in definite particular contexts. 5. Connection between sound -body and meaning due to a trace. 6. Complexity of meaning. 7. Definiteness of meaning, illustrated by Goethe's "Jagers Abendlied". 8. "Intelligible" and "knowable" meaning. 9. Categories of analysis. III. TABLES OF ANALYSED WORDS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION: 10. Words of joy (in alphabetical order) . 11. Words of sorrow (do.) IV. CONCLUSION: 12. Change of meaning in general: creative act of speech, receptivity, intelligible and knowable meaning. 13. Particular changes of meaning and their causes. EDITIONS USED: Klopstock: Inselverlag. Schiller: Meyers Klassiker. (some poems: Sakularausgabe) + Goethe: Meyers Klassiker. (some poems: Jubilaumsausgabe; some poems: from West-Ust1, Divan,Ostl, Divan, only by title; Stella and Glavigo by acts).++ All quotations not taken from Mezers Klasiker are bracketed

Economic Action and Embeddedness: The Problem of the Structure of Action

In this article I attempt to contribute to the development of foundations for a sociological theory of economic action. Such a theory, it is argued here, has to make a substantial break with the teleological structure that informs both rational actor theory and normative theories of action. Informed by the tradition of American pragmatism I propose to base the understanding of action in economic contexts on a "non-teleological interpretation of intentionality" (Joas 1996). Such a theoretical conceptualization brings the interpretative acts of intentionally rational actors to the center. It finds its justification in the observation that the complexity and novelty inherent in economic contexts create an uncertain environment for actors which rules out optimizing decisions and provokes the question as to how actors make such an environment intelligible for intentionally rational decisions. I will argue that meaning and perceptions of rationality are established intersubjectively in the action process itself. Embeddedness then refers to the social structuration of meaning which is enacted based on interpretations, a process which is undetermined but not unstructured

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology\u27s mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study

Non-Metaphysical Realism: A Dummett-Inspired Implementation of Putnam’s Internal Realism

The amount of realist positions put forward by philosophers of religion and theologians is impressive. one can certainly doubt whether there is a need for yet another alternative. However, most realist positions employed in studies on religion fall prey to Hilary Putnam’s criticism against metaphysical realism. This gives rise to a dilemma that I aim at solving by introducing yet another realist position, namely non-metaphysical realism

On an Intuitionistic Logic for Pragmatics

We reconsider the pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic logic [21] regarded as a logic of assertions and their justications and its relations with classical logic. We recall an extension of this approach to a logic dealing with assertions and obligations, related by a notion of causal implication [14, 45]. We focus on the extension to co-intuitionistic logic, seen as a logic of hypotheses [8, 9, 13] and on polarized bi-intuitionistic logic as a logic of assertions and conjectures: looking at the S4 modal translation, we give a denition of a system AHL of bi-intuitionistic logic that correctly represents the duality between intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, correcting a mistake in previous work [7, 10]. A computational interpretation of cointuitionism as a distributed calculus of coroutines is then used to give an operational interpretation of subtraction.Work on linear co-intuitionism is then recalled, a linear calculus of co-intuitionistic coroutines is dened and a probabilistic interpretation of linear co-intuitionism is given as in [9]. Also we remark that by extending the language of intuitionistic logic we can express the notion of expectation, an assertion that in all situations the truth of p is possible and that in a logic of expectations the law of double negation holds. Similarly, extending co-intuitionistic logic, we can express the notion of conjecture that p, dened as a hypothesis that in some situation the truth of p is epistemically necessary

Situating Moral Justification: Rethinking the Mission of Moral Epistemology

This is the first of two companion articles drawn from a larger project, provisionally entitled Undisciplining Moral Epistemology. The overall goal is to understand how moral claims may be rationally justified in a world characterized by cultural diversity and social inequality. To show why a new approach to moral justification is needed, it is argued that several currently influential philosophical accounts of moral justification lend themselves to rationalizing the moral claims of those with more social power. The present article explains how discourse ethics is flawed just in this way. The article begins by identifying several conditions of adequacy for assessing reasoning practices designed to achieve moral justification and shows that, when used in contexts of cultural diversity and social inequality, discourse ethics fails these conditions. It goes on to argue that the failure of discourse ethics is rooted in its reliance on a broader conception of moral epistemology that is invidiously idealized. It concludes by pointing to the need to rethink both the mission and the method of moral epistemology

Offline and online data: on upgrading functional information to knowledge

This paper addresses the problem of upgrading functional information to knowledge. Functional information is defined as syntactically well-formed, meaningful and collectively opaque data. Its use in the formal epistemology of information theories is crucial to solve the debate on the veridical nature of information, and it represents the companion notion to standard strongly semantic information, defined as well-formed, meaningful and true data. The formal framework, on which the definitions are based, uses a contextual version of the verificationist principle of truth in order to connect functional to semantic information, avoiding Gettierization and decoupling from true informational contents. The upgrade operation from functional information uses the machinery of epistemic modalities in order to add data localization and accessibility as its main properties. We show in this way the conceptual worthiness of this notion for issues in contemporary epistemology debates, such as the explanation of knowledge process acquisition from information retrieval systems, and open data repositories

Are Eyebrows Going to Be Talked of in Connection with the Eye of God? Wittgenstein and Certainty in the Debate between Science and Religion

In this paper I will argue that we can chart such a middle course through an exploration of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s thought (particularly that advanced in On Certainty and Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief). I will use his thesis that meaning and certainty are context dependent to investigate how meaning is produced in science and in religion. I will start with the recognition that any system of thought must take certain basic propositions as criteria for further investigation and explore how Wittgenstein defines this idea. Next I will try to establish that religion and science do, indeed, function as two different systems or language games by illustrating their differing criteria for truth. In so doing I will reference both Wittgenstein’s works and that of some anthropologists of religion, whose work has explored a definition of religion through its use, which mirrors Wittgenstein’s location of meaning. I will then discuss how we can pick between systems within a given context by requiring that a system stand up to the criteria of justification set up for that situation