Strategic negotiation and trust in diplomacy - the DipBlue approach

The study of games in Artificial Intelligence has a long tradition. Game playing has been a fertile environment for the development of novel approaches to build intelligent programs. Multi-agent systems (MAS), in particular, are a very useful paradigm in this regard, not only because multi-player games can be addressed using this technology, but most importantly because social aspects of agenthood that have been studied for years by MAS researchers can be applied in the attractive and controlled scenarios that games convey. Diplomacy is a multi-player strategic zero-sum board game, including as main research challenges an enormous search tree, the difficulty of determining the real strength of a position, and the accommodation of negotiation among players. Negotiation abilities bring along other social aspects, such as the need to perform trust reasoning in order to win the game. The majority of existing artificial players (bots) for Diplomacy do not exploit the strategic opportunities enabled by negotiation, focusing instead on search and heuristic approaches. This paper describes the development of DipBlue, an artificial player that uses negotiation in order to gain advantage over its opponents, through the use of peace treaties, formation of alliances and suggestion of actions to allies. A simple trust assessment approach is used as a means to detect and react to potential betrayals by allied players. DipBlue was built to work with DipGame, a MAS testbed for Diplomacy, and has been tested with other players of the same platform and variations of itself. Experimental results show that the use of negotiation increases the performance of bots involved in alliances, when full trust is assumed. In the presence of betrayals, being able to perform trust reasoning is an effective approach to reduce their impact. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Identifying Dis/Misinformation on Social Media: A Policy Report for the Diplomacy Lab Strategies for Identifying Mis/Disinformation Project

Dis/misinformation was a major concern in the 2016 U.S. presidential election and has only worsened in recent years. Even though domestic actors often spread dis/misinformation, actors abroad can use it to spread confusion and push their agenda to the detriment of American citizens. Even though this report focuses on actors outside the United States, the methods they use are universal and can be adapted to work against domestic agents. A solid understanding of these methods is the first step in combating foreign dis/misinformation campaigns and creating a new information literacy paradigm. This report highlights the primary mechanisms of dis/misinformation: multimedia manipulation, bots, astroturfing, and trolling. These forms of dis/misinformation were selected after thorough research about common pathways dis/misinformation are spread online. Multimedia manipulation details image, video, and audio dis/misinformation in the form of deepfakes, memes, and out-of-context images. Bots are automated social media accounts that are not managed by humans and often contribute to dis/misinformation campaigns. Astroturfing and trolls use deception to sway media users to join false grassroots campaigns and utilize emotionally charged posts to provoke a response from users. This policy report also defines case studies of disinformation in China, Russia, and Iran, outlining common patterns of dis/misinformation specific to these countries. These patterns will allow for more accurate and quick identification of dis/misinformation from the outlined countries by State Department Watch Officers. Recommendations have also been provided for each type of disinformation and include a list of what individuals should look for and how to make sure that the information they receive is accurate and from a reputable source. The addendum at the end of the paper lists all of the recommendations in one place so that individuals do not have to search the paper for the recommendation they are looking for. This report intends to aid State Department Watch Officers as they work to identify foreign developments accurately. Still, researchers may find this information useful in anticipating future developments in foreign dis/misinformation campaigns

International Twitter Comments About 2016 U.S. Presidential Candidates Trump And Clinton: Agenda-Building Analysis In The U.S., U.K., Brazil, Russia, India and China

Based on agenda-building theory, this study performs content analysis on 6,019 international Twitter comments about Trump and Clinton in the 10 days prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Even excluding bots and trolls, the preponderance of Twitter comments were positive about Trump and negative about Clinton, in the U.S., Russia, India and China. In the U.K. and Brazil, Twitter comments were largely negative about both candidates. Twitter sources and topics were also identified and explored to expand knowledge about the evolving role and effect of agenda-building in six nations, and around the world

New realities in foreign affairs: diplomacy in the 21st century

Modern diplomacy is currently experiencing fundamental changes at an unprecedented rate, which affect the very character of diplomacy as we know it. These changes also affect aspects of domestic and international politics that were once of no great concern to diplomacy. Technical develop­ments, mainly digitization, affect how the work of the diplomat is understood; the number of domestic and international actors whose activity implicates (or is a form of) diplomacy is increasing; the public is more sen­sitive to foreign policy issues and seeks to influence diplomacy through social media and other platforms; the way exchange between states, as well as the interchange between government and other domestic actors, pro­gresses is influencing diplomacy’s ability to act legitimately and effectively; and finally, diplomats themselves do not necessarily need the same attri­butes as they previously did. These trends, reflecting general societal devel­opments, need to be absorbed by diplomacy as part of state governance. Ministries of Foreign Affairs, diplomats and governments in general should therefore be proactive in four areas: 1. Diplomats must understand the tension between individual needs and state requirements, and engage with that tension without detriment to the state. 2. Digitization must be employed in such a way that gains in efficiency are not at the expense of efficacy. 3. Forms of mediation should be developed that reconcile the interests of all sides allowing governments to operate as sovereign states, and yet simul­taneously use the influence and potential of other actors. 4. New and more open state activities need to be advanced that respond to the ways in which emotionalized publics who wish to participate in govern­ance express themselves. (author's abstract

Conceptualization of Information Operations in Modelling the Understanding of a Security Environment

Defining the security environment, which is a prerequisite for the process of defining security policies, is based on gathering and evaluating information on the political, economic, military, security, social and other characteristics of a given environment. The process of gathering and evaluating information is increasingly susceptible to external influences and manipulations via information operations of state and non-state actors, particularly with the development of information technologies. The hypothesis of this paper is that information operations influence the understanding of a security environment and as a consequence, the process of defining security policies. Based on the described hypothesis, the paper conceptualizes information operations in the modelling of the understanding of a security environment and consequently the determination of security policies, using an analysis of certain aspects of information operations and their influence on the information and information systems of the adversary.</p

The European Union versus External Disinformation Campaigns in the Midst of Information Warfare: Ready for the Battle? College of Europe EU Diplomacy Paper 01/2019

As a result of increased globalisation and digitalisation, new security challenges emerge such as the rise of online disinformation which undermines democracy and people’s trust in mainstream media and public authorities. The 2016 United States presidential elections, the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the 2017 French presidential elections have all been disturbed by external interference coming from Russia, including massive disinformation campaigns which were disseminated on social media to influence citizens’ opinion. This paper studies the European Union’s (EU) strategy to counter external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace, i.e. the campaigns that are diffused online by foreign actors, such as Russia, within the EU’s territory. To what extent is the EU strategically prepared to counter external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace? The EU has adopted a defensive strategy to deal with disinformation. It has delivered several strategic documents, including an Action Plan in December 2018, that provides a promising basis for action. The work done by the East StratCom Task Force, which detects and debunks Russian narratives, is a strong asset for the EU. The major online platforms are currently trying to implement a Code of Practice that the European Commission has set up with the aim of curbing disinformation spreading on social networks. Having a long-term perspective in mind, the EU rightly implements measures to enhance societal resilience and improve media literacy among its citizens. However, the financial resources dedicated to counter disinformation are not commensurate with the threat it represents. Furthermore, the EU’s approach is not focusing enough on artificial intelligence tools that can significantly influence how disinformation is carried out and disseminated but can, on the other hand, also help fact-checking activities. Hence, the EU is not entirely prepared to counter external disinformation campaigns in cyberspace. Moreover, disinformation should be looked at in the wider framework of hybrid warfare and should therefore be considered as a cybersecurity matter