Majority dynamics with one nonconformist

We consider a system in which a group of agents represented by the vertices of a graph synchronously update their opinion based on that of their neighbours. If each agent adopts a positive opinion if and only if that opinion is sufficiently popular among his neighbours, the system will eventually settle into a fixed state or alternate between two states. If one agent acts in a different way, other periods may arise. We show that only a small number of periods may arise if natural restrictions are placed either on the neighbourhood structure or on the way in which the nonconforming agent may act; without either of these restrictions any period is possible

Chris Cannings: A Life in Games

Chris Cannings was one of the pioneers of evolutionary game theory. His early work was inspired by the formulations of John Maynard Smith, Geoff Parker and Geoff Price; Chris recognized the need for a strong mathematical foundation both to validate stated results and to give a basis for extensions of the models. He was responsible for fundamental results on matrix games, as well as much of the theory of the important war of attrition game, patterns of evolutionarily stable strategies, multiplayer games and games on networks. In this paper we describe his work, key insights and their influence on research by others in this increasingly important field. Chris made substantial contributions to other areas such as population genetics and segregation analysis, but it was to games that he always returned. This review is written by three of his students from different stages of his career