An FPTAS for Bargaining Networks with Unequal Bargaining Powers

Bargaining networks model social or economic situations in which agents seek to form the most lucrative partnership with another agent from among several alternatives. There has been a flurry of recent research studying Nash bargaining solutions (also called 'balanced outcomes') in bargaining networks, so that we now know when such solutions exist, and also that they can be computed efficiently, even by market agents behaving in a natural manner. In this work we study a generalization of Nash bargaining, that models the possibility of unequal 'bargaining powers'. This generalization was introduced in [KB+10], where it was shown that the corresponding 'unequal division' (UD) solutions exist if and only if Nash bargaining solutions exist, and also that a certain local dynamics converges to UD solutions when they exist. However, the bound on convergence time obtained for that dynamics was exponential in network size for the unequal division case. This bound is tight, in the sense that there exists instances on which the dynamics of [KB+10] converges only after exponential time. Other approaches, such as the one of Kleinberg and Tardos, do not generalize to the unsymmetrical case. Thus, the question of computational tractability of UD solutions has remained open. In this paper, we provide an FPTAS for the computation of UD solutions, when such solutions exist. On a graph G=(V,E) with weights (i.e. pairwise profit opportunities) uniformly bounded above by 1, our FPTAS finds an \eps-UD solution in time poly(|V|,1/\eps). We also provide a fast local algorithm for finding \eps-UD solution, providing further justification that a market can find such a solution.Comment: 18 pages; Amin Saberi (Ed.): Internet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Stanford, CA, USA, December 13-17, 2010. Proceedings

Majority dynamics on trees and the dynamic cavity method

A voter sits on each vertex of an infinite tree of degree $k$, and has to decide between two alternative opinions. At each time step, each voter switches to the opinion of the majority of her neighbors. We analyze this majority process when opinions are initialized to independent and identically distributed random variables. In particular, we bound the threshold value of the initial bias such that the process converges to consensus. In order to prove an upper bound, we characterize the process of a single node in the large $k$-limit. This approach is inspired by the theory of mean field spin-glass and can potentially be generalized to a wider class of models. We also derive a lower bound that is nontrivial for small, odd values of $k$.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/10-AAP729 the Annals of Applied Probability (http://www.imstat.org/aap/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org

On Distributed Computation in Noisy Random Planar Networks

We consider distributed computation of functions of distributed data in random planar networks with noisy wireless links. We present a new algorithm for computation of the maximum value which is order optimal in the number of transmissions and computation time.We also adapt the histogram computation algorithm of Ying et al to make the histogram computation time optimal.Comment: 5 pages, 2 figure

Efficient Bayesian Social Learning on Trees

We consider a set of agents who are attempting to iteratively learn the 'state of the world' from their neighbors in a social network. Each agent initially receives a noisy observation of the true state of the world. The agents then repeatedly 'vote' and observe the votes of some of their peers, from which they gain more information. The agents' calculations are Bayesian and aim to myopically maximize the expected utility at each iteration. This model, introduced by Gale and Kariv (2003), is a natural approach to learning on networks. However, it has been criticized, chiefly because the agents' decision rule appears to become computationally intractable as the number of iterations advances. For instance, a dynamic programming approach (part of this work) has running time that is exponentially large in \min(n, (d-1)^t), where n is the number of agents. We provide a new algorithm to perform the agents' computations on locally tree-like graphs. Our algorithm uses the dynamic cavity method to drastically reduce computational effort. Let d be the maximum degree and t be the iteration number. The computational effort needed per agent is exponential only in O(td) (note that the number of possible information sets of a neighbor at time t is itself exponential in td). Under appropriate assumptions on the rate of convergence, we deduce that each agent is only required to spend polylogarithmic (in 1/\eps) computational effort to approximately learn the true state of the world with error probability \eps, on regular trees of degree at least five. We provide numerical and other evidence to justify our assumption on convergence rate. We extend our results in various directions, including loopy graphs. Our results indicate efficiency of iterative Bayesian social learning in a wide range of situations, contrary to widely held beliefs.Comment: 11 pages, 1 figure, submitte

The size of the core in assignment markets

Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize the size of the core in such markets. Each agent has a randomly drawn productivity with respect to each type of agent on the other side. The value generated from a match between a pair of agents is the sum of the two productivity terms, each of which depends only on the type but not the identity of one of the agents, and a third deterministic term driven by the pair of types. We allow the number of agents to grow, keeping the number of agent types fixed. Let $n$ be the number of agents and $K$ be the number of types on the side of the market with more types. We find, under reasonable assumptions, that the relative variation in utility per agent over core outcomes is bounded as $O^*(1/n^{1/K})$, where polylogarithmic factors have been suppressed. Further, we show that this bound is tight in worst case. We also provide a tighter bound under more restrictive assumptions. Our results provide partial justification for the typical assumption of a unique core outcome in empirical studies