Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations

International audienceWe introduce the logics E(G) for reasoning about probabilistic expectation over classes G of games with discrete polynomial payoff functions represented by finite-valued Lukasiewicz formulas and provide completeness and complexity results. In addition, we introduce a new class of games where players’ expected payoff functions are encoded by E(G)-formulas. In these games each player’s aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players’ expectations over an outcome as well as their own. We offer a logical and computational characterisation of this new class of games

Logics for Non-Cooperative Games with Expectations

We introduce the logics E(G) for reasoning about probabilistic expectation over classes G of games with discrete polynomial payoff functions represented by finite-valued Lukasiewicz formulas and provide completeness and complexity results. In addition, we introduce a new class of games where players' expected payoff functions are encoded by E(G)-formulas. In these games each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations over an outcome as well as their own. We offer a logical and computational characterisation of this new class of games.Godo acknowledges support from the Spanish projects EdeTRI (TIN2012-39348-C02-01) and AT (CONSOLIDER CSD 2007-0022). Marchioni acknowledges support from the Marie Curie Project NAAMSI (FP7-PEOPLE-2011-IEF).Peer Reviewe

Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations

We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria.Comment: In Proceedings SR 2014, arXiv:1404.041

When Europe encounters urban governance: Policy Types, Actor Games and Mechanisms of cites Europeanization

This paper examines European Union (EU) causal mechanisms and policy instruments affecting the urban domain throughout the lenses of the Europeanization approach. Instead of looking at EU instruments that are formally/legally consecrated to cities, we use theoretical public policy analysis to explore the arenas and the causal mechanisms that structure the encounters between the EU and urban systems of governance. Policy instruments are related to policy arenas and in turn to different mechanisms of transmission thus originating a typology of European Policy Modes. The paper focuses on four different EU instruments in the in the macro-area of sustainable development and proposes potential game-theoretical models for each of them. In the conclusions we highlight the differences between this approach and the traditional analysis of EU urban policy, and suggest avenues for future empirical research based on typologies of policy instruments and modes of Europeanization

Games for the Strategic Influence of Expectations

We introduce a new class of games where each player's aim is to randomise her strategic choices in order to affect the other players' expectations aside from her own. The way each player intends to exert this influence is expressed through a Boolean combination of polynomial equalities and inequalities with rational coefficients. We offer a logical representation of these games as well as a computational study of the existence of equilibria. © 2014 V. Bruyère, E. Filiot, M. Randour & J.-F. Raskin.Godo acknowledges support from the Spanish projects EdeTRI (TIN2012-39348-C02-01) and AT (CONSOLIDER CSD 2007-0022). Marchioni acknowledges support from the Marie Curie Intra-European Fellowship NAAMSI (FP7-PEOPLE-2011-IEF).Peer Reviewe

Childhoods and play: Facebook, exhibition and competition

L'objectif de ce document vise à explorer les relations entre le jeu et les enfants dans le contexte contemporain. L'article considère le jeu d'enfants comme pratique significative à partir des nouvelles technologies de l'information et de la communication. Comme les enfants associent Facebook aux jeux, Facebook représente le point central de cet article. Nous traitons les jeux auxquels les enfants jouent, les articulations les plus appropriées entre les enfants, la socialisation et Facebook. Nous proposons d'entrer dans l'univers où les enfants, les représentations, les médias et les adultes entrent en relation. Nous analysons Facebook comme la plate-forme contemporaine la plus importante à partir de laquelle la socialisation, l'exposition et la concurrence sont construites par les enfants.The objective of this paper is to explore the relationship between games, play and children in the contemporary context. The article begins with the consideration of children’s play as a meaningful practice focussing on new technologies of information and communication. Along the research, Facebook was identified as the most important place that children associated with games. That is why, the role that Facebook “plays” is one of the most important focusses of this paper: the uses that our informants report of the most used social network, the games they play and the most relevant articulations between children, socialization and Facebook. It is not our objective to analyse games thoroughly (we will analyse “Farmville” briefly), but to enter the universe in which children, representations, media and adults are related and intertwined. And in this path, we will analyse Facebook as the most important contemporary platform from which socialization, exhibition and competition are built by children as the main subjects of our research.Fil: Duek, Sara Carolina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires; Argentina. Université Catholique de Louvain; Bélgic

What Drives People's Choices in Turn-Taking Games, if not Game-Theoretic Rationality?

In an earlier experiment, participants played a perfect information game against a computer, which was programmed to deviate often from its backward induction strategy right at the beginning of the game. Participants knew that in each game, the computer was nevertheless optimizing against some belief about the participant's future strategy. In the aggregate, it appeared that participants applied forward induction. However, cardinal effects seemed to play a role as well: a number of participants might have been trying to maximize expected utility. In order to find out how people really reason in such a game, we designed centipede-like turn-taking games with new payoff structures in order to make such cardinal effects less likely. We ran a new experiment with 50 participants, based on marble drop visualizations of these revised payoff structures. After participants played 48 test games, we asked a number of questions to gauge the participants' reasoning about their own and the opponent's strategy at all decision nodes of a sample game. We also checked how the verbalized strategies fit to the actual choices they made at all their decision points in the 48 test games. Even though in the aggregate, participants in the new experiment still tend to slightly favor the forward induction choice at their first decision node, their verbalized strategies most often depend on their own attitudes towards risk and those they assign to the computer opponent, sometimes in addition to considerations about cooperativeness and competitiveness.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

The Israel-Palestine Question – A Case for Application of Neutrosophic Game Theory

In our present paper, we have explored the possibilities and developed arguments for an application of principles of neutrosophic game theory as a generalization of the fuzzy game theory model to a better understanding of the Israel-Palestine problem in terms of the goals and governing strategies of either side. We build on an earlier attempted justification of a game theoretic explanation of this problem by Yakir Plessner (2001) and go on to argue in favour of a neutrosophic adaptation of the standard 2x2 zero-sum game theoretic model in order to identify an optimal outcomeIsrael-Palestine conflict, Oslo Agreement, fuzzy games, neutrosophic semantic space

E-democracy as the frame of networked public discourse : information, consensus and complexity

The quest for democracy and the political reflection about its future are to be understood nowadays in the horizon of the networked information revolution. Hence, it seems difficult to speak of democracy without speaking of e-democracy, the key issue of which is the re-configuration of models of information production and concentration of attention, which are to be investigated both from a political and an epistemological standpoint. In this perspective, our paper aims at analyzing the multi-agent dimension of networked public discourse, by envisaging two competing models of structuring this discourse (those of dialogue and of claim) and by suggesting to endorse the epistemic idea of complementarity as a guidance principle for elaborating a form of partnership between traditional and electronic media