Toward a probability theory for product logic: states, integral representation and reasoning

The aim of this paper is to extend probability theory from the classical to the product t-norm fuzzy logic setting. More precisely, we axiomatize a generalized notion of finitely additive probability for product logic formulas, called state, and show that every state is the Lebesgue integral with respect to a unique regular Borel probability measure. Furthermore, the relation between states and measures is shown to be one-one. In addition, we study geometrical properties of the convex set of states and show that extremal states, i.e., the extremal points of the state space, are the same as the truth-value assignments of the logic. Finally, we axiomatize a two-tiered modal logic for probabilistic reasoning on product logic events and prove soundness and completeness with respect to probabilistic spaces, where the algebra is a free product algebra and the measure is a state in the above sense.Comment: 27 pages, 1 figur

Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable

In the paper [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136] a hierarchy of modal logics have been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to Medvedev's logic of (in)finite problems it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case remained open. In this paper we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces (these cover probability spaces that occur in most of the applications) is also not finitely axiomatizable

Standard Bayes logic is not finitely axiomatizable

In the paper [http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/14136] a hierarchy of modal logics have been defined to capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in that hierarchy were distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to Medvedev's logic of (in)finite problems it has been shown that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable. However, the infinite case remained open. In this paper we prove that the modal logic of Bayesian belief revision determined by standard Borel spaces (these cover probability spaces that occur in most of the applications) is also not finitely axiomatizable

Measures induced by units

The half-open real unit interval (0,1] is closed under the ordinary multiplication and its residuum. The corresponding infinite-valued propositional logic has as its equivalent algebraic semantics the equational class of cancellative hoops. Fixing a strong unit in a cancellative hoop -equivalently, in the enveloping lattice-ordered abelian group- amounts to fixing a gauge scale for falsity. In this paper we show that any strong unit in a finitely presented cancellative hoop H induces naturally (i.e., in a representation-independent way) an automorphism-invariant positive normalized linear functional on H. Since H is representable as a uniformly dense set of continuous functions on its maximal spectrum, such functionals -in this context usually called states- amount to automorphism-invariant finite Borel measures on the spectrum. Different choices for the unit may be algebraically unrelated (e.g., they may lie in different orbits under the automorphism group of H), but our second main result shows that the corresponding measures are always absolutely continuous w.r.t. each other, and provides an explicit expression for the reciprocal density.Comment: 24 pages, 1 figure. Revised version according to the referee's suggestions. Examples added, proof of Lemma 2.6 simplified, Section 7 expanded. To appear in the Journal of Symbolic Logi

The Baire closure and its logic

The Baire algebra of a topological space $X$ is the quotient of the algebra of all subsets of $X$ modulo the meager sets. We show that this Boolean algebra can be endowed with a natural closure operator, resulting in a closure algebra which we denote ${\bf Baire}(X)$. We identify the modal logic of such algebras to be the well-known system $\sf S5$, and prove soundness and strong completeness for the cases where $X$ is crowded and either completely metrizable and continuum-sized or locally compact Hausdorff. We also show that every extension of $\sf S5$ is the modal logic of a subalgebra of ${\bf Baire}(X)$, and that soundness and strong completeness also holds in the language with the universal modality

Modal logic S4 as a paraconsistent logic with a topological semantics

In this paper the propositional logic LTop is introduced, as an extension of classical propositional logic by adding a paraconsistent negation. This logic has a very natural interpretation in terms of topological models. The logic LTop is nothing more than an alternative presentation of modal logic S4, but in the language of a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, LTop is a logic of formal inconsistency in which the consistency and inconsistency operators have a nice topological interpretation. This constitutes a new proof of S4 as being "the logic of topological spaces", but now under the perspective of paraconsistency

The modal logic of Bayesian belief revision

In Bayesian belief revision a Bayesian agent revises his prior belief by conditionalizing the prior on some evidence using Bayes’ rule. We define a hierarchy of modal logics that capture the logical features of Bayesian belief revision. Elements in the hierarchy are distinguished by the cardinality of the set of elementary propositions on which the agent’s prior is defined. Inclusions among the modal logics in the hierarchy are determined. By linking the modal logics in the hierarchy to the strongest modal companion of Medvedev’s logic of finite problems it is shown that the modal logic of belief revision determined by probabilities on a finite set of elementary propositions is not finitely axiomatizable