Machine Assisted Proof of ARMv7 Instruction Level Isolation Properties

In this paper, we formally verify security properties of the ARMv7 Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) for user mode executions. To obtain guarantees that arbitrary (and unknown) user processes are able to run isolated from privileged software and other user processes, instruction level noninterference and integrity properties are provided, along with proofs that transitions to privileged modes can only occur in a controlled manner. This work establishes a main requirement for operating system and hypervisor verification, as demonstrated for the PROSPER separation kernel. The proof is performed in the HOL4 theorem prover, taking the Cambridge model of ARM as basis. To this end, a proof tool has been developed, which assists the verification of relational state predicates semi-automatically

Timing verification of dynamically reconfigurable logic for Xilinx Virtex FPGA series

This paper reports on a method for extending existing VHDL design and verification software available for the Xilinx Virtex series of FPGAs. It allows the designer to apply standard hardware design and verification tools to the design of dynamically reconfigurable logic (DRL). The technique involves the conversion of a dynamic design into multiple static designs, suitable for input to standard synthesis and APR tools. For timing and functional verification after APR, the sections of the design can then be recombined into a single dynamic system. The technique has been automated by extending an existing DRL design tool named DCSTech, which is part of the Dynamic Circuit Switching (DCS) CAD framework. The principles behind the tools are generic and should be readily extensible to other architectures and CAD toolsets. Implementation of the dynamic system involves the production of partial configuration bitstreams to load sections of circuitry. The process of creating such bitstreams, the final stage of our design flow, is summarized

A Survey of Symbolic Execution Techniques

Many security and software testing applications require checking whether certain properties of a program hold for any possible usage scenario. For instance, a tool for identifying software vulnerabilities may need to rule out the existence of any backdoor to bypass a program's authentication. One approach would be to test the program using different, possibly random inputs. As the backdoor may only be hit for very specific program workloads, automated exploration of the space of possible inputs is of the essence. Symbolic execution provides an elegant solution to the problem, by systematically exploring many possible execution paths at the same time without necessarily requiring concrete inputs. Rather than taking on fully specified input values, the technique abstractly represents them as symbols, resorting to constraint solvers to construct actual instances that would cause property violations. Symbolic execution has been incubated in dozens of tools developed over the last four decades, leading to major practical breakthroughs in a number of prominent software reliability applications. The goal of this survey is to provide an overview of the main ideas, challenges, and solutions developed in the area, distilling them for a broad audience. The present survey has been accepted for publication at ACM Computing Surveys. If you are considering citing this survey, we would appreciate if you could use the following BibTeX entry: http://goo.gl/Hf5FvcComment: This is the authors pre-print copy. If you are considering citing this survey, we would appreciate if you could use the following BibTeX entry: http://goo.gl/Hf5Fv

Trojans in Early Design Steps—An Emerging Threat

Hardware Trojans inserted by malicious foundries during integrated circuit manufacturing have received substantial attention in recent years. In this paper, we focus on a different type of hardware Trojan threats: attacks in the early steps of design process. We show that third-party intellectual property cores and CAD tools constitute realistic attack surfaces and that even system specification can be targeted by adversaries. We discuss the devastating damage potential of such attacks, the applicable countermeasures against them and their deficiencies

Bounded Quantifier Instantiation for Checking Inductive Invariants

We consider the problem of checking whether a proposed invariant $\varphi$ expressed in first-order logic with quantifier alternation is inductive, i.e. preserved by a piece of code. While the problem is undecidable, modern SMT solvers can sometimes solve it automatically. However, they employ powerful quantifier instantiation methods that may diverge, especially when $\varphi$ is not preserved. A notable difficulty arises due to counterexamples of infinite size. This paper studies Bounded-Horizon instantiation, a natural method for guaranteeing the termination of SMT solvers. The method bounds the depth of terms used in the quantifier instantiation process. We show that this method is surprisingly powerful for checking quantified invariants in uninterpreted domains. Furthermore, by producing partial models it can help the user diagnose the case when $\varphi$ is not inductive, especially when the underlying reason is the existence of infinite counterexamples. Our main technical result is that Bounded-Horizon is at least as powerful as instrumentation, which is a manual method to guarantee convergence of the solver by modifying the program so that it admits a purely universal invariant. We show that with a bound of 1 we can simulate a natural class of instrumentations, without the need to modify the code and in a fully automatic way. We also report on a prototype implementation on top of Z3, which we used to verify several examples by Bounded-Horizon of bound 1