Structure Learning in a Sensorimotor Association Task

Learning is often understood as an organism's gradual acquisition of the association between a given sensory stimulus and the correct motor response. Mathematically, this corresponds to regressing a mapping between the set of observations and the set of actions. Recently, however, it has been shown both in cognitive and motor neuroscience that humans are not only able to learn particular stimulus-response mappings, but are also able to extract abstract structural invariants that facilitate generalization to novel tasks. Here we show how such structure learning can enhance facilitation in a sensorimotor association task performed by human subjects. Using regression and reinforcement learning models we show that the observed facilitation cannot be explained by these basic models of learning stimulus-response associations. We show, however, that the observed data can be explained by a hierarchical Bayesian model that performs structure learning. In line with previous results from cognitive tasks, this suggests that hierarchical Bayesian inference might provide a common framework to explain both the learning of specific stimulus-response associations and the learning of abstract structures that are shared by different task environments

Using Unobserved Causes to Explain Unexpected Outcomes: The Effect of Existing Causal Knowledge on Protection From Extinction by a Hidden Cause

People often rely on the covariation between events to infer causality. However, covariation between cues and outcomes may change over time. In the associative learning literature, extinction provides a model to study updating of causal beliefs when a previously established relationship no longer holds. Prediction error theories can explain both extinction and protection from extinction when an inhibitory (preventive) cue is present during extinction. In three experiments using the allergist causal learning task, we found that protection could also be achieved by a hidden cause that was inferred but not physically present, so long as that cause was a plausible preventer of the outcome. We additionally showed complete protection by a physically presented cue that was neutral rather than inhibitory at the outset of extinction. Both findings are difficult to reconcile with dominant prediction error theories. However, they are compatible with the idea of theory protection, where the learner attributes the absence of the outcome to the added cue (when present) or to a hidden cause, and therefore does not need to revise causal beliefs about A. Our results suggest that prediction error encourages changes in causal beliefs, but the nature of the change is determined by reasoning processes that incorporate existing knowledge of causal mechanisms and may be biased toward preservation of existing beliefs

How can I find what I want? Can children, chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys form abstract representations to guide their behavior in a sampling task?

Authors are grateful to the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland (RZSS) and the University of St Andrews for core financial support to the RZSS Edinburgh Zoo’s Living Links Research Centre, where this project was carried out. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No. [639072]). We acknowledge the support of the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC) [funding reference number 2016-05552].Abstract concepts are a powerful tool for making wide-ranging predictions in new situations based on little experience. Whereas looking-time studies suggest an early emergence of this ability in human infancy, other paradigms like the relational match to sample task often fail to detect abstract concepts until late preschool years. Similarly, non-human animals show difficulties and often succeed only after long training regimes. Given the considerable influence of slight task modifications, the conclusiveness of these findings for the development and phylogenetic distribution of abstract reasoning is debated. Here, we tested the abilities of 3 to 5-year-old children, chimpanzees, and capuchin monkeys in a unified and more ecologically valid task design based on the concept of “overhypotheses” (Goodman, 1955). Participants sampled high- and low-valued items from containers that either each offered items of uniform value or a mix of high- and low-valued items. In a test situation, participants should switch away earlier from a container offering low-valued items when they learned that, in general, items within a container are of the same type, but should stay longer if they formed the overhypothesis that containers bear a mix of types. We compared each species' performance to the predictions of a probabilistic hierarchical Bayesian model forming overhypotheses at a first and second level of abstraction, adapted to each species' reward preferences. Children and, to a more limited extent, chimpanzees demonstrated their sensitivity to abstract patterns in the evidence. In contrast, capuchin monkeys did not exhibit conclusive evidence for the ability of abstract knowledge formation.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Exploring the role of stimulus similarity on the summation effect in causal learning

Several contemporary models of associative learning anticipate that the higher responding to a compound of two cues separately trained with a common outcome than to each of the cues alone -a summation effect- is modulated by the similarity between the cues forming the compound. Here, we explored this hypothesis in a series of causal learning experiments with humans. Participants were presented with two visual cues that separately predicted a common outcome and later asked for the outcome predicted by the compound of the two cues. Importantly, cue similarity was varied between groups through changes in shape, spatial position, color, configuration and rotation. In variance with the predictions of these models, we observed similar and strong levels of summation in both groups across all manipulations of similarity (Experiments 1-5). The summation effect was significantly reduced by manipulations intended to impact assumptions about the causal independence of the cues forming the compound, but this reduction was independent of stimulus similarity (Experiment 6). These results are problematic for similarity-based models and can be more readily explained by rational approaches to causal learning

On the distinction between perceived duration and event timing: towards a unified model of time perception

Time is a fundamental dimension of human perception, cognition and action, as the perception and cognition of temporal information is essential for everyday activities and survival. Innumerable studies have investigated the perception of time over the last 100 years, but the neural and computational bases for the processing of time remains unknown. Extant models of time perception are discussed before the proposition of a unified model of time perception that relates perceived event timing with perceived duration. The distinction between perceived event timing and perceived duration provides the current for navigating contemporary approaches to time perception. Recent work has advocated a Bayesian approach to time perception. This framework has been applied to both duration and perceived timing, where prior expectations about when a stimulus might occur in the future (prior distribution) are combined with current sensory evidence (likelihood function) in order to generate the perception of temporal properties (posterior distribution). In general, these models predict that the brain uses temporal expectations to bias perception in a way that stimuli are ‘regularized’ i.e. stimuli look more like what has been seen before. As such, the synthesis of perceived timing and duration models is of theoretical importance for the field of timing and time perception

Bayesian time perception

Time is an elemental dimension of human perception, cognition and action. Innumerable studies have investigated the perception of time over the last 100 years, but the computational basis for the processing of temporal information remains unknown. This thesis aims to understand the mechanisms underlying the perceived timing of stimuli. We propose a novel Bayesian model of when stimuli are perceived that is consistent with the predictive coding framework – such a perspective to how the brain deals with temporal information forms the core of this thesis. We theorize that that the brain takes prior expectations about when a stimulus might occur in the future (prior distribution) and combines it with current sensory evidence (likelihood function) in order to generate a percept of perceived timing (posterior distribution). In Chapters 2-4, we use human psychophysics to show that the brain may bias perception such that slightly irregularly timed stimuli as reported as more regular. In Chapter 3, we show how an environment of irregularity can cause regularly timed sequences to be perceived as irregular whilst Chapter 4 shows how changes in the reliability of a signal can cause an increased attraction towards expectation

Constructing the world: Active causal learning in cognition

Humans are adept at constructing causal models of the world that can support prediction, explanation, simulation-based reasoning, planning and control. In this thesis I explore how people learn about the causal world interacting with it, and how they represent and modify their causal knowledge as they gather evidence. Over 10 experiments and modelling, I show that interventional and temporal cues, along with top-down hierarchical constraints, inform the gradual evolution and adaptation of increasingly rich causal representations. Chapters 1 and 2 develop a rational analysis of the problems of learning and representing causal structure, and choosing interventions, that perturb the world in ways that reveal its structure. Chapters 3--5 focus on structure learning over sequences of discrete trials, in which learners can intervene by setting variables within a causal system and observe the consequences. The second half of the thesis generalises beyond the discrete trial learning case, exploring interventional causal learning in situations where events occur in continuous time (Chapters 6 and 7); and in spatiotemporally rich physical "microworlds" (Chapter 8). Throughout the experiments, I find that both children and adults are robust active causal learners, able to deal with noise and complexity even as normative judgment and intervention selection become radically intractable. To explain their success, I develop scalable process level accounts of both causal structure learning and intervention selection inspired by approximation algorithms in machine learning. I show that my models can better explain patterns of behaviour than a range of alternatives as well as shedding light on the source of common biases including confirmatory testing, anchoring effects and probability matching. Finally, I propose a close relationship between active learning and active aspects of cognition including thinking, decision making and executive control