120 research outputs found
Explointing FPGA block memories for protected cryptographic implementations
Modern Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are power packed with features to facilitate designers. Availability of features like huge block memory (BRAM), Digital Signal Processing (DSP) cores, embedded CPU makes the design strategy of FPGAs quite different from ASICs. FPGA are also widely used in security-critical application where protection against known attacks is of prime importance. We focus ourselves on physical attacks which target physical implementations. To design countermeasures against such attacks, the strategy for FPGA designers should also be different from that in ASIC. The available features should be exploited to design compact and strong countermeasures. In this paper, we propose methods to exploit the BRAMs in FPGAs for designing compact countermeasures. BRAM can be used to optimize intrinsic countermeasures like masking and dual-rail logic, which otherwise have significant overhead (at least 2X). The optimizations are applied on a real AES-128 co-processor and tested for area overhead and resistance on Xilinx Virtex-5 chips. The presented masking countermeasure has an overhead of only 16% when applied on AES. Moreover Dual-rail Precharge Logic (DPL) countermeasure has been optimized to pack the whole sequential part in the BRAM, hence enhancing the security. Proper robustness evaluations are conducted to analyze the optimization for area and security
On Borrowed Time -- Preventing Static Power Side-Channel Analysis
In recent years, static power side-channel analysis attacks have emerged as a
serious threat to cryptographic implementations, overcoming state-of-the-art
countermeasures against side-channel attacks. The continued down-scaling of
semiconductor process technology, which results in an increase of the relative
weight of static power in the total power budget of circuits, will only improve
the viability of static power side-channel analysis attacks. Yet, despite the
threat posed, limited work has been invested into mitigating this class of
attack. In this work we address this gap. We observe that static power
side-channel analysis relies on stopping the target circuit's clock over a
prolonged period, during which the circuit holds secret information in its
registers. We propose Borrowed Time, a countermeasure that hinders an
attacker's ability to leverage such clock control. Borrowed Time detects a
stopped clock and triggers a reset that wipes any registers containing
sensitive intermediates, whose leakages would otherwise be exploitable. We
demonstrate the effectiveness of our countermeasure by performing practical
Correlation Power Analysis attacks under optimal conditions against an AES
implementation on an FPGA target with and without our countermeasure in place.
In the unprotected case, we can recover the entire secret key using traces from
1,500 encryptions. Under the same conditions, the protected implementation
successfully prevents key recovery even with traces from 1,000,000 encryptions
Analysis and Mitigation of Remote Side-Channel and Fault Attacks on the Electrical Level
In der fortlaufenden Miniaturisierung von integrierten Schaltungen werden physikalische Grenzen erreicht, wobei beispielsweise Einzelatomtransistoren eine mögliche untere Grenze für Strukturgrößen darstellen.
Zudem ist die Herstellung der neuesten Generationen von Mikrochips heutzutage finanziell nur noch von groĂźen, multinationalen Unternehmen zu stemmen.
Aufgrund dieser Entwicklung ist Miniaturisierung nicht länger die treibende Kraft um die Leistung von elektronischen Komponenten weiter zu erhöhen.
Stattdessen werden klassische Computerarchitekturen mit generischen Prozessoren weiterentwickelt zu heterogenen Systemen mit hoher Parallelität und speziellen Beschleunigern.
Allerdings wird in diesen heterogenen Systemen auch der Schutz von privaten Daten gegen Angreifer zunehmend schwieriger.
Neue Arten von Hardware-Komponenten, neue Arten von Anwendungen und eine allgemein erhöhte Komplexität sind einige der Faktoren, die die Sicherheit in solchen Systemen zur Herausforderung machen.
Kryptografische Algorithmen sind oftmals nur unter bestimmten Annahmen ĂĽber den Angreifer wirklich sicher.
Es wird zum Beispiel oft angenommen, dass der Angreifer nur auf Eingaben und Ausgaben eines Moduls zugreifen kann, während interne Signale und Zwischenwerte verborgen sind.
In echten Implementierungen zeigen jedoch Angriffe über Seitenkanäle und Faults die Grenzen dieses sogenannten Black-Box-Modells auf.
Während bei Seitenkanalangriffen der Angreifer datenabhängige Messgrößen wie Stromverbrauch oder elektromagnetische Strahlung ausnutzt, wird bei Fault Angriffen aktiv in die Berechnungen eingegriffen, und die falschen Ausgabewerte zum Finden der geheimen Daten verwendet.
Diese Art von Angriffen auf Implementierungen wurde ursprünglich nur im Kontext eines lokalen Angreifers mit Zugriff auf das Zielgerät behandelt.
Jedoch haben bereits Angriffe, die auf der Messung der Zeit fĂĽr bestimmte Speicherzugriffe basieren, gezeigt, dass die Bedrohung auch durch Angreifer mit Fernzugriff besteht.
In dieser Arbeit wird die Bedrohung durch Seitenkanal- und Fault-Angriffe ĂĽber Fernzugriff behandelt, welche eng mit der Entwicklung zu mehr heterogenen Systemen verknĂĽpft sind.
Ein Beispiel fĂĽr neuartige Hardware im heterogenen Rechnen sind Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), mit welchen sich fast beliebige Schaltungen in programmierbarer Logik realisieren lassen.
Diese Logik-Chips werden bereits jetzt als Beschleuniger sowohl in der Cloud als auch in Endgeräten eingesetzt.
Allerdings wurde gezeigt, wie die Flexibilität dieser Beschleuniger zur Implementierung von Sensoren zur Abschätzung der Versorgungsspannung ausgenutzt werden kann.
Zudem können durch eine spezielle Art der Aktivierung von großen Mengen an Logik Berechnungen in anderen Schaltungen für Fault Angriffe gestört werden.
Diese Bedrohung wird hier beispielsweise durch die Erweiterung bestehender Angriffe weiter analysiert und es werden Strategien zur Absicherung dagegen entwickelt
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Memory-Based High-Level Synthesis Optimizations Security Exploration on the Power Side-Channel
High-level synthesis (HLS) allows hardware designers to think algorithmically and not worry about low-level, cycle-by-cycle details. This provides the ability to quickly explore the architectural design space and tradeoffs between resource utilization and performance. Unfortunately, security evaluation is not a standard part of the HLS design flow. In this article, we aim to understand the effects of memory-based HLS optimizations on power side-channel leakage. We use Xilinx Vivado HLS to develop different cryptographic cores, implement them on a Spartan-6 FPGA, and collect power traces. We evaluate the designs with respect to resource utilization, performance, and information leakage through power consumption. We have two important observations and contributions. First, the choice of resource optimization directive results in different levels of side-channel vulnerabilities. Second, the partitioning optimization directive can greatly compromise the hardware cryptographic system through power side-channel leakage due to the deployment of memory control logic. We describe an evaluation procedure for power side-channel leakage and use it to make best-effort recommendations about how to design more secure architectures in the cryptographic domain
Obfuscating Against Side-Channel Power Analysis Using Hiding Techniques for AES
The transfer of information has always been an integral part of military and civilian operations, and remains so today. Because not all information we share is public, it is important to secure our data from unwanted parties. Message encryption serves to prevent all but the sender and recipient from viewing any encrypted information as long as the key stays hidden. The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is the current industry and military standard for symmetric-key encryption. While AES remains computationally infeasible to break the encrypted message stream, it is susceptible to side-channel attacks if an adversary has access to the appropriate hardware. The most common and effective side-channel attack on AES is Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Thus, countermeasures to DPA are crucial to data security. This research attempts to evaluate and combine two hiding DPA countermeasures in an attempt to further hinder side-channel analysis of AES encryption. Analysis of DPA attack success before and after the countermeasures is used to determine effectiveness of the protection techniques. The results are measured by evaluating the number of traces required to attack the circuit and by measuring the signal-to-noise ratios
Power Profile Obfuscation using RRAMs to Counter DPA Attacks
Side channel attacks, such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA), denote a special class of attacks in which sensitive key information is unveiled through information extracted from the physical device executing a cryptographic algorithm. This information leakage, known as side channel information, occurs from computations in a non-ideal system composed of electronic devices such as transistors. Power dissipation is one classic side channel source, which relays information of the data being processed. DPA uses statistical analysis to identify data-dependent correlations in sets of power measurements.
Countermeasures against DPA focus on hiding or masking techniques at different levels of design abstraction and are typically associated with high power and area cost. Emerging technologies such as Resistive Random Access Memory (RRAM), offer unique opportunities to mitigate DPAs with their inherent memristor device characteristics such as variability in write time, ultra low power (0.1-3 pJ/bit), and high density (4F2).
In this research, an RRAM based architecture is proposed to mitigate the DPA attacks by obfuscating the power profile. Specifically, a dual RRAM based memory module masks the power dissipation of the actual transaction by accessing both the data and its complement from the memory in tandem. DPA attack resiliency for a 128-bit AES cryptoprocessor using RRAM and CMOS memory modules is compared against baseline CMOS only technology.
In the proposed AES architecture, four single port RRAM memory units store the
intermediate state of the encryption. The correlation between the state data and sets of power measurement is masked due to power dissipated from inverse data access on dual RRAM memory. A customized simulation framework is developed to design the attack scenarios using Synopsys and Cadence tool suites, along with a Hamming weight DPA attack module. The attack mounted on a baseline CMOS architecture is successful and the full key is recovered. However, DPA attacks mounted on the dual CMOS and RRAM based AES cryptoprocessor yielded unsuccessful results with no keys recovered, demonstrating the resiliency of the proposed architecture against DPA attacks
Active Fences against Voltage-based Side Channels in Multi-Tenant FPGAs
Dynamic and partial reconfiguration together with hardware parallelism make FPGAs attractive as virtualized accelerators. However, recently it has been shown that multi-tenant FPGAs are vulnerable to remote side-channel attacks (SCA) from malicious users, allowing them to extract secret keys without a logical connection to the victim core. Typical mitigations against such attacks are hiding and masking schemes, to increase attackers’ efforts in terms of side-channel measurements. However, they require significant efforts and tailoring for a specific algorithm, hardware implementation and mapping. In this paper, we show a hiding countermeasure against voltage-based SCA that can be integrated into any implementation, without requiring modifications or tailoring to the protected module. We place a properly mapped Active Fence of ring oscillators between victim and attacker circuit, enabled as a feedback of an FPGA-based sensor, leading to reduced side-channel leakage. Our experimental results based on a Lattice ECP5 FPGA and an AES-128 module show that two orders of magnitude more traces are needed for a successful key recovery, while no modifications to the underlying cryptographic module are necessary
Dynamic Polymorphic Reconfiguration to Effectively “CLOAK” a Circuit’s Function
Today\u27s society has become more dependent on the integrity and protection of digital information used in daily transactions resulting in an ever increasing need for information security. Additionally, the need for faster and more secure cryptographic algorithms to provide this information security has become paramount. Hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms provide the necessary increase in throughput, but at a cost of leaking critical information. Side Channel Analysis (SCA) attacks allow an attacker to exploit the regular and predictable power signatures leaked by cryptographic functions used in algorithms such as RSA. In this research the focus on a means to counteract this vulnerability by creating a Critically Low Observable Anti-Tamper Keeping Circuit (CLOAK) capable of continuously changing the way it functions in both power and timing. This research has determined that a polymorphic circuit design capable of varying circuit power consumption and timing can protect a cryptographic device from an Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA) attacks. In essence, we are effectively CLOAKing the circuit functions from an attacker
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