Logic and Topology for Knowledge, Knowability, and Belief - Extended Abstract

In recent work, Stalnaker proposes a logical framework in which belief is realized as a weakened form of knowledge. Building on Stalnaker's core insights, and using frameworks developed by Bjorndahl and Baltag et al., we employ topological tools to refine and, we argue, improve on this analysis. The structure of topological subset spaces allows for a natural distinction between what is known and (roughly speaking) what is knowable; we argue that the foundational axioms of Stalnaker's system rely intuitively on both of these notions. More precisely, we argue that the plausibility of the principles Stalnaker proposes relating knowledge and belief relies on a subtle equivocation between an "evidence-in-hand" conception of knowledge and a weaker "evidence-out-there" notion of what could come to be known. Our analysis leads to a trimodal logic of knowledge, knowability, and belief interpreted in topological subset spaces in which belief is definable in terms of knowledge and knowability. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic as well as its uni-modal belief fragment. We then consider weaker logics that preserve suitable translations of Stalnaker's postulates, yet do not allow for any reduction of belief. We propose novel topological semantics for these irreducible notions of belief, generalizing our previous semantics, and provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the corresponding logics.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.08250. The full version of this paper, including the longer proofs, is at arXiv:1612.0205

Argument-based Belief in Topological Structures

This paper combines two studies: a topological semantics for epistemic notions and abstract argumentation theory. In our combined setting, we use a topological semantics to represent the structure of an agent's collection of evidence, and we use argumentation theory to single out the relevant sets of evidence through which a notion of beliefs grounded on arguments is defined. We discuss the formal properties of this newly defined notion, providing also a formal language with a matching modality together with a sound and complete axiom system for it. Despite the fact that our agent can combine her evidence in a 'rational' way (captured via the topological structure), argument-based beliefs are not closed under conjunction. This illustrates the difference between an agent's reasoning abilities (i.e. the way she is able to combine her available evidence) and the closure properties of her beliefs. We use this point to argue for why the failure of closure under conjunction of belief should not bear the burden of the failure of rationality.Comment: In Proceedings TARK 2017, arXiv:1707.0825

Does the third law of black hole thermodynamics really have a serious failure?

The almost perfect correspondence between certain laws of classical black hole mechanics and the ordinary laws of thermodynamics is spoiled by the failure of the conventional back hole analogue of the third law. Our aim here is to contribute to the associated discussion by flashing light on some simple facts of black hole physics. However, no attempt is made to lay to rest the corresponding long lasting debate. Instead, merely some evidence is provided to make it clear that although the borderline between extremal and non-extremal black holes is very thin they are essentially different. Hopefully, a careful investigation of the related issues will end up with an appropriate form of the third law and hence with an unblemished setting of black hole thermodynamics.Comment: 6 pages, Latex. accepted for publication in Class. Quant. Gra

Examination of Bayesian belief network for safety assessment of nuclear computer-based systems

We report here on a continuation of work on the Bayesian Belief Network (BBN)model described in [Fenton, Littlewood et al. 1998]. As explained in the previous deliverable, our model concerns one part of the safety assessment task for computer and software based nuclear systems. We have produced a first complete, functioning version of our BBN model by eliciting a large numerical node probability table (NPT) required for our ‘Design Process Performance’ variable. The requirement for such large numerical NPTs poses some difficult questions about how, in general, large NPTs should be elicited from domain experts. We report about the methods we have devised to support the expert in building and validating a BBN. On the one hand, we have proceeded by eliciting approximate descriptions of the expert’s probabilistic beliefs, in terms of properties like stochastic orderings among distributions; on the other hand, we have explored ways of presenting to the expert visual and algebraic descriptions of relations among variables in the BBN, to assist the expert in an ongoing assessment of the validity of the BBN

On Many-Minds Interpretations of Quantum Theory

This paper is a response to some recent discussions of many-minds interpretations in the philosophical literature. After an introduction to the many-minds idea, the complexity of quantum states for macroscopic objects is stressed. Then it is proposed that a characterization of the physical structure of observers is a proper goal for physical theory. It is argued that an observer cannot be defined merely by the instantaneous structure of a brain, but that the history of the brain's functioning must also be taken into account. Next the nature of probability in many-minds interpretations is discussed and it is suggested that only discrete probability models are needed. The paper concludes with brief comments on issues of actuality and identity over time.Comment: 16 pages, plain TeX, no macros required. Revised following comments November 199