The false promise of the better argument

Effective argumentation in international politics is widely conceived as a matter of persuasion. In particular, the ‘logic of arguing’ ascribes explanatory power to the ‘better argument’ and promises to illuminate the conditions of legitimate normative change. This article exposes the self-defeating implications of the Habermasian symbiosis between the normative and the empirical force of arguments. Since genuine persuasion is neither observable nor knowable, its analysis critically depends on what scholars consider to be the better argument. Seemingly, objective criteria such as universality only camouflage such moral reification. The paradoxical consequence of an explanatory concept of arguing is that moral discourse is no longer conceptualized as an open-ended process of contestation and normative change, but has recently been recast as a governance mechanism ensuring the compliance of international actors with pre-defined norms. This dilemma can be avoided through a positivist reification of valid norms, as in socialization research, or by adopting a critical and emancipatory focus on the obstacles to true persuasion. Still, both solutions remain dependent on the ‘persuasion vs. coercion’ problem that forestalls an insight into successful justificatory practices other than rational communication. The conclusion therefore pleas for a pragmatic abstention from better arguments and points to the insights to be gained from pragmatist norms research in sociology

Certainty and uncertainty in criminal law and the ♭clarity of norms' doctrine

L

Recognition Within the Limits of Reason: Remarks on Pippin’s Hegel’s Practical Philosophy

Since the publication of Charles Taylor’s Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition in 1989,[1] the concept of recognition has re-emerged as a central if not dominant category of moral and political philosophy. [1] C. Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25-73

On Philosophical Intuitions

I will argue that the scientific investigation of philosophical intuition (\u27experimental philosophy\u27) is of philosophical interest. I will defend the significance of experimental philosophy against two important types of objection. I will term the first objection \u27eliminativism\u27 about intuitions: roughly, it is the claim that philosophical methodology does not in fact rely on intuition, and thus experimental philosophy\u27s investigation is ill-conceived—in the words of one such opponent, \u27a big mistake.\u27 I will then consider a second objection, the \u27expertise\u27 defence. The expertise defence argues that the expert intuitions of professional philosophers are distinct, and to be preferred to those of the \u27folk.\u27 Against the eliminativists, I will argue that an ineliminable mental component remains that can be subject of fruitful empirical investigation. Against the expertise defence I will argue that, at least in the context of philosophy of language, expertise is itself a potential source of bias. Since expertise is domain-specific, however, a general rebuttal will not be given. I will conclude that experimental philosophy has much to contribute

Internalism and the Nature of Justification

There are many important dimensions of epistemic evaluation, one of which is justification. We don’t just evaluate beliefs for truth, reliability, accuracy, and knowledge, but also for justification. However, in the epistemological literature, there is much disagreement about the nature of justification and how it should be understood. One of the controversies that has separated the contemporary epistemological discourse into two opposing camps has to do with the internalism-externalism distinction. Whereas internalists defend certain core assumptions about justification from the pre-Gettier tradition, externalists generally think that the traditional conception is untenable and should be replaced. In this compilation thesis, I argue for, defend, and develop a particular brand of internalism, both in general and with respect to specific sources of justification. In papers 1 and 2, I defend a couple of well-known arguments for mentalism and accessibilism. Moreover, I also point out how prominent versions of these theses are vulnerable to serious problems (e.g., about over-intellectualization and vicious regresses). Part of my goal in the first couple of papers is to figure out what commitments the internalist should take on in order to avoid the externalist's objections, while at the same time receiving support from considerations that have motivated internalism in the past. In papers 3 and 4, I start from the assumption that mentalism is true and attempt to answer the following questions: 1) which non-factive mental states can play a justification-conferring role with respect to empirical belief? And 2) why does this set of states play the epistemic role it does? In response to question 1, I argue that all and only one's beliefs and perceptual experiences have justificatory relevance. In response to question 2, I argue that one's beliefs and perceptual experiences are one's strongly representational states, and that strongly representational states necessarily provide support to certain empirical propositions. Having done so, I then defend mentalism about scientific evidence from a couple of prominent objections in the recent literature. Lastly, in papers 5 and 6, I argue for a particular brand of internalism about testimonial and memorial justification and show how that position has a dialectical advantage over its main competitors

Reflective Agreement: a Nonideal Approach to Political Justification

A Nonideal Account of Moral Justification. The Dilemma of Liberalism and Public Consensus. Reflective Agreement in Nonideal Theory. The Justification of Human Rights and the Same-sex Marriage Case.A Nonideal Account of Moral Justification. The Dilemma of Liberalism and Public Consensus. Reflective Agreement in Nonideal Theory. The Justification of Human Rights and the Same-sex Marriage Case.LUISS PhD Thesi

Excuses and exemptions

Abstract Excuses and exempting conditions aim to mitigate responsibility. This paper proposes a distinction between excuses and exemptions in terms of the distinctive kind of judgement each of them aims to respond. I argue that exemptions affect the explanatory relevance of the accused, while excuses fully or partially justify her, by affecting the evaluative claim involved in responsibility attributions. This distinction supports the claim that attributing responsibility is a two-step process, each of them corresponding to a different kind of responsibility-agential and moral-whose attribution is guided by two different although related cognitive and argumentative tasks: explaining an outcome, and evaluating its moral significance. Keywords: moral responsibility, explanatory judgements, excuses, exempting conditions. Resumen Las excusas y las condiciones eximentes tienen como finalidad mitigar la responsabilidad. Este artículo propone una distinción entre excusas y eximentes basada en el tipo distintivo de juicio que cada una trata de responder. Argumento que los eximentes afectan la relevancia causal del acusado, mientras que las excusas lo justifican total o parcialmente, porque afectan al juicio evaluativo implícito en las atribuciones de responsabilidad. Esta distinción apoya una concepción de las atribuciones de responsabilidad como un proceso en dos etapas, donde cad

Hume and practical reason: a non-sceptical interpretation

It has become increasingly common to interpret Hume as a ‘sceptic’ of practical reason. This means that Hume supposedly contests, not only the ability of reason to provide demonstrable truths, in the conventional rationalist sense, but also reason’s ability to guide our practical action. Proponents of this reading include Jean Hampton, Elijah Millgram and Christine Korsgaard. If this ‘sceptical reading’ of Hume is correct, he would lack the philosophical resources to justify his account of political justice. However, if examined further, this sceptical reading begins with deep-seated Kantian presuppositions about the role and function of practical reason. The paper critiques these presuppositions, arguing that they must be set aside in order to appreciate more fully how Hume does indeed have a proper theory of practical reason. Specifically, Hume believes practical reason encompasses the discursive articulation and evaluation of human character traits and moral values within the social context. These articulatory and intersubjective dimensions of practical reasoning emphasized in the Humean account could provide further theoretical inspiration for communitarian critiques of contemporary liberalism