Minimizing food waste in grocery store operations: literature review and research agenda

Research on grocery waste in food retailing has recently attracted particular interest. Investigations in this area are relevant to address the problems of wasted resources and ethical concerns, as well as economic aspects from the retailer’s perspective. Reasons for food waste in retail are already well-studied empirically, and based on this, proposals for reduction are discussed. However, comprehensive approaches for preventing food waste in store operations using analytics and modeling methods are scarce. No work has yet systematized related research in this domain. As a result, there is neither any up-to-date literature review nor any agenda for future research. We contribute with the first structured literature review of analytics and modeling methods dealing with food waste prevention in retail store operations. This work identifies cross-cutting store-related planning areas to mitigate food waste, namely (1) assortment and shelf space planning, (2) replenishment policies, and (3) dynamic pricing policies. We introduce a common classification scheme of literature with regard to the depth of food waste integration and the characteristics of these planning problems. This builds our foundation to review analytics and modeling approaches. Current literature considers food waste mainly as a side effect in costing and often ignores product age dependent demand by customers. Furthermore, approaches are not integrated across planning areas. Future lines of research point to the most promising open questions in this field

Demand Estimation at Manufacturer-Retailer Duo: A Macro-Micro Approach

This dissertation is divided into two phases. The main objective of this phase is to use Bayesian MCMC technique, to attain (1) estimates, (2) predictions and (3) posterior probability of sales greater than certain amount for sampled regions and any random region selected from the population or sample. These regions are served by a single product manufacturer who is considered to be similar to newsvendor. The optimal estimates, predictions and posterior probabilities are obtained in presence of advertising expenditure set by the manufacturer, past historical sales data that contains both censored and exact observations and finally stochastic regional effects that cannot be quantified but are believed to strongly influence future demand. Knowledge of these optimal values is useful in eliminating stock-out and excess inventory holding situations while increasing the profitability across the entire supply chain. Subsequently, the second phase, examines the impact of Cournot and Stackelberg games in a supply-chain on shelf space allocation and pricing decisions. In particular, we consider two scenarios: (1) two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at a single retailer, and (2) two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at two competing retailers, whose pricing decisions influence their demand which in turn influences their shelf-space allocation. We obtain the optimal pricing and shelf-space allocation in these two scenarios by optimizing the profit functions for each of the players in the game. Our numerical results indicate that (1) Cournot games to be the most profitable along the whole supply chain whereas Stackelberg games and mixed games turn out to be least profitable, and (2) higher the shelf space elasticity, lower the wholesale price of the product; conversely, lower the retail price of the product, greater the shelf space allocated for that product

Competing for shelf space

This paper studies competition for shelf space in a multi-supplier retail point. We consider a retailer that seeks to allocate her shelf space to maximize her profit. Because products associated with larger profit margin are granted more shelf space, suppliers can offer the retailer financial incentives to obtain larger space allocations. We analyze the competitive dynamics arising from the scarcity of space, and show existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. We then demonstrate that the inefficiencies from decentralizing decision-making are limited to 6% with wholesale-price contracts, and that full coordination can be achieved with pay-to-stay fee contracts. We finally investigate how competition is distorted under the practice of category management.Game theory; Supply chain competition; Price of Anarchy; Pricing; Supply contracts;