Demand Estimation at Manufacturer-Retailer Duo: A Macro-Micro Approach

Abstract

This dissertation is divided into two phases. The main objective of this phase is to use Bayesian MCMC technique, to attain (1) estimates, (2) predictions and (3) posterior probability of sales greater than certain amount for sampled regions and any random region selected from the population or sample. These regions are served by a single product manufacturer who is considered to be similar to newsvendor. The optimal estimates, predictions and posterior probabilities are obtained in presence of advertising expenditure set by the manufacturer, past historical sales data that contains both censored and exact observations and finally stochastic regional effects that cannot be quantified but are believed to strongly influence future demand. Knowledge of these optimal values is useful in eliminating stock-out and excess inventory holding situations while increasing the profitability across the entire supply chain. Subsequently, the second phase, examines the impact of Cournot and Stackelberg games in a supply-chain on shelf space allocation and pricing decisions. In particular, we consider two scenarios: (1) two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at a single retailer, and (2) two manufacturers competing for shelf space allocation at two competing retailers, whose pricing decisions influence their demand which in turn influences their shelf-space allocation. We obtain the optimal pricing and shelf-space allocation in these two scenarios by optimizing the profit functions for each of the players in the game. Our numerical results indicate that (1) Cournot games to be the most profitable along the whole supply chain whereas Stackelberg games and mixed games turn out to be least profitable, and (2) higher the shelf space elasticity, lower the wholesale price of the product; conversely, lower the retail price of the product, greater the shelf space allocated for that product

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