Automated Negotiation Among Web Services

Software as a service is well accepted software deployment and distribution model that is grown exponentially in the last few years. One of the biggest benefits of SaaS is the automated composition of these services in a composite system. It allows users to automatically find and bind these services, as to maximize the productivity of their composed systems, meeting both functional and non-functional requirements. In this paper we present a framework for modeling the dependency relationship of different Quality of Service parameters of a component service. Our proposed approach considers the different invocation patterns of component services in the system and models the dependency relationship for optimum values of these QoS parameters. We present a service composition framework that models the dependency relations ship among component services and uses the global QoS for service selection

Coordination of Supply Webs Based on Dispositive Protocols

A lot of curricula in information systems, also at master level, exists today. However, the strong need in new approaches and new curricula still exists, especially, in European area. The paper discusses the modern curriculum in information systems at master level that is currently under development in the Socrates/Erasmus project MOCURIS. The curriculum is oriented to the students of engineering schools of technical universities. The proposed approach takes into account integration trends in European area as well as the transformation of industrial economics into knowledge-based digital economics The paper presents main characteristics of the proposed curriculum, discuses curriculum development techniques used in the project MOCURIS, describes the architecture of the proposed curriculum and the body of knowledge provided by it

Engineering coordination : eine Methodologie für die Koordination von Planungssystemen

Planning problems, like real-world planning and scheduling problems, are complex tasks. As an efficient strategy for handing such problems is the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy has been identified. Each sub problem is then solved independently. Typically the sub problems are solved in a linear way. This approach enables the generation of sub-optimal plans for a number of real world problems. Today, this approach is widely accepted and has been established e.g. in the organizational structure of companies. But existing interdependencies between the sub problems are not sufficiently regarded, as each problem are solved sequentially and no feedback information is given. The field of coordination has been covered by a number of academic fields, like the distributed artificial intelligence, economics or game theory. An important result is, that there exist no method that leads to optimal results in any given coordination problem. Consequently, a suitable coordination mechanism has to be identified for each single coordination problem. Up to now, there exists no process for the selection of a coordination mechanism, neither in the engineering of distributed systems nor in agent oriented software engineering. Within the scope of this work the ECo process is presented, that address exactly this selection problem. The Eco process contains the following five steps. • Modeling of the coordination problem • Defining the coordination requirements • Selection / Design of the coordination mechanism • Implementation • Evaluation Each of these steps is detailed in the thesis. The modeling has to be done to enable a systemic analysis of the coordination problem. Coordination mechanisms have to respect the given situation and the context in which the coordination has to be done. The requirements imposed by the context of the coordination problem are formalized in the coordination requirements. The selection process is driven by these coordination requirements. Using the requirements as a distinction for the selection of a coordination mechanism is a central aspect of this thesis. Additionally these requirements can be used for documentation of design decisions. Therefore, it is reasonable to annotate the coordination mechanisms with the coordination requirements they fulfill and fail to ease the selection process, for a given situation. For that reason we present a new classification scheme for coordination methods within this thesis that classifies existing coordination methods according to a set of criteria that has been identified as important for the distinction between different coordination methods. The implementation phase of the ECo process is supported by the CoPS process and CoPS framework that has been developed within this thesis, as well. The CoPS process structures the design making that has to be done during the implementation phase. The CoPS framework provides a set of basic features software agents need for realizing the selected coordination method. Within the CoPS process techniques are presented for the design and implementation of conversations between agents that can be applied not only within the context of the coordination of planning systems, but for multiagent systems in general. The ECo-CoPS approach has been successfully validated in two case studies from the logistic domain.Reale Planungsprobleme, wie etwa die Produktionsplanung in einer Supply Chain, sind komplex Planungsprobleme. Eine übliche Strategie derart komplexen Problemen zu lösen, ist es diese Probleme in einfachere Teilprobleme zu zerlegen und diese dann separat, meist sequentiell, zu lösen (divide-and-conquer Strategie). Dieser Ansatz erlaubt die Erstellung von (suboptimalen) Plänen für eine Reihe von realen Anwendungen, und ist heute in den Organisationsstrukturen von größeren Unternehmen institutionalisiert worden. Allerdings werden Abhängigkeiten zwischen den Teilproblemen nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt, da die Partialprobleme sequentiell ohne Feedback gelöst werden. Die erstellten Teillösungen müssen deswegen oft nachträglich koordiniert werden. Das Gebiet der Koordination wird in verschiedenen Forschungsgebieten, wie etwa der verteilten Künstlichen Intelligenz, den Wirtschaftswissenschaften oder der Spieltheorie untersucht. Ein zentrales Ergebnis dieser Forschung ist, dass es keinen für alle Situationen geeigneten Koordinationsmechanismus gibt. Es stellt sich also die Aufgabe aus den zahlreichen vorgeschlagenen Koordinationsmechanismen eine Auswahl zu treffen, die für die aktuelle Situation den geeigneten Mechanismus identifiziert. Für die Auswahl eines solchen Mechanismus existiert bisher jedoch kein strukturiertes Verfahren für die Entwicklung von verteilten Systems und insbesondere im Bereich der Agenten orientierter Softwareentwicklung. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird genau hierfür ein Verfahren vorgestellt, der ECo-Prozess. Mit Hilfe dieses Prozesses wird der Auswahlprozess in die folgenden Schritte eingeteilt: • Modellierung der Problemstellung und des relevante Kontextes • Formulierung von Anforderungen an einen Koordinationsmechanismus (coordination requirements) • Auswahl/Entwurf eines Koordinationsmechanismuses • Implementierung des Koordinationsverfahrens • Evaluation des Koordinationsverfahrens Diese Schritte werden im Rahmen der vorliegenden Arbeit detailliert beschrieben. Die Modellierung der Problemstellung stellt dabei den ersten Schritt dar, um die Problemstellung analytisch zugänglich zu machen. Koordinationsverfahren müssen die Gegebenheiten, den Kontext und die Domäne, in der sie angewendet werden sollen hinreichend berücksichtigen um anwendbar zu sein. Dieses kann über Anforderungen an den Koordinationsprozess formalisiert werden. Der von den Anforderungen getrieben Auswahlprozess ist ein Kernstück der hier vorgestellten Arbeit. Durch die Formulierung der Anforderungen und der Annotation eines Koordinationsmechanismus bezüglich der erfüllten und nicht erfüllten Anforderungen werden die Motive für Designentscheidungen dieses Verfahren expliziert. Wenn Koordinationsverfahren anhand dieser Anforderungen klassifiziert werden können, ist es weiterhin möglich den Auswahlprozess (unabhängig vom ECo-Ansatz) zu vereinfachen und zu beschleunigen. Im Rahmen dieser Arbeit wird eine Klassifikation von Koordinationsansätzen anhand von allgemeinen Kriterien vorgestellt, die die Identifikation von geeigneten Kandidaten erleichtern. Diese Kandidaten können dann detaillierter untersucht werden. Dies wurde in den vorgestellten Fallstudien erfolgreich demonstriert. Für die Unterstützung der Implementierung eines Koordinationsansatzes wird in dieser Arbeit zusätzlich der CoPS Prozess vorgeschlagen. Der CoPS Prozess erlaubt einen ganzheitlichen systematischen Ansatz für den Entwurf und die Implementierung eines Koordinationsverfahrens. Unterstürzt wird der CoPS Prozess durch das CoPS Framework, das die Implementierung erleichtert, indem es als eine Plattform mit Basisfunktionalität eines Agenten bereitstellt, der für die Koordination von Planungssystemen verantwortlich ist. Im Rahmen des CoPS Verfahrens werden Techniken für den Entwurf und die Implementierung von Konversation im Kontext des agenten-orientiertem Software Engineerings ausführlich behandelt. Der Entwurf von Konversationen geht dabei weit über Fragestellung der Formatierung von Nachrichten hinaus, wie dies etwa in den FIPA Standards geregelt ist, und ist für die Implementierung von agentenbasierten Systemen im Allgemeinen von Bedeutung. Die Funktionsweise des ECo-CoPS Ansatzes wird anhand von zweierfolgreich durchgeführten Fallstudien aus dem betriebswirtschaftlichen Kontext vorgestellt

Decentralized and Dynamic Home Health Care Resource Scheduling Using an Agent-Based Model

The purpose of this thesis is to design an agent-based scheduling system, simulated in a dynamic environment that will reduce home healthcare service costs. The study focuses on situations where a health care agency needs to assign home visits among a group of independent healthcare practitioners. Each practitioner has different skill sets, time constraints, and cost structures, given the nature, time and location of each home visit. Each expects reasonable payment commensurate with their skill levels as well as the costs incurred. The healthcare agency in turn needs all planned visits performed by qualified practitioners while minimizing overall service costs. Decisions about scheduling are made both before and during the scheduling period, requiring the health care agency to respond to unexpected situations based on the latest scheduling information. This problem is examined in a multi-agent system environment where practitioners are modeled as self-interested agents. The study first analyzes the problem for insights into the combinatorial nature of such a problem occurring in a centralized environment, then discusses the decentralized and dynamic challenges. An iterated bidding mechanism is designed as the negotiation protocol for the system. The effectiveness of this system is evaluated through a computational study, with results showing the proposed multi-agent scheduling system is able to compute high quality schedules in the decentralized home healthcare environment. Following this, the system is also implemented in a simulation model that can accommodate unexpected situations. We presents different simulation scenarios which illustrate the process of how the system dynamically schedules incoming visits, and cost reduction can be observed from the results

Combinatorial Auction-based Mechanisms for Composite Web Service Selection

Composite service selection presents the opportunity for the rapid development of complex applications using existing web services. It refers to the problem of selecting a set of web services from a large pool of available candidates to logically compose them to achieve value-added composite services. The aim of service selection is to choose the best set of services based on the functional and non-functional (quality related) requirements of a composite service requester. The current service selection approaches mostly assume that web services are offered as single independent entities; there is no possibility for bundling. Moreover, the current research has mainly focused on solving the problem for a single composite service. There is a limited research to date on how the presence of multiple requests for composite services affects the performance of service selection approaches. Addressing these two aspects can significantly enhance the application of composite service selection approaches in the real-world. We develop new approaches for the composite web service selection problem by addressing both the bundling and multiple requests issues. In particular, we propose two mechanisms based on combinatorial auction models, where the provisioning of multiple services are auctioned simultaneously and service providers can bid to offer combinations of web services. We mapped these mechanisms to Integer Linear Programing models and conducted extensive simulations to evaluate them. The results of our experimentation show that bundling can lead to cost reductions compared to when services are offered independently. Moreover, the simultaneous consideration of a set of requests enhances the success rate of the mechanism in allocating services to requests. By considering all composite service requests at the same time, the mechanism achieves more homogenous prices which can be a determining factor for the service requester in choosing the best composite service selection mechanism to deploy

What to bid and when to stop

Negotiation is an important activity in human society, and is studied by various disciplines, ranging from economics and game theory, to electronic commerce, social psychology, and artificial intelligence. Traditionally, negotiation is a necessary, but also time-consuming and expensive activity. Therefore, in the last decades there has been a large interest in the automation of negotiation, for example in the setting of e-commerce. This interest is fueled by the promise of automated agents eventually being able to negotiate on behalf of human negotiators.Every year, automated negotiation agents are improving in various ways, and there is now a large body of negotiation strategies available, all with their unique strengths and weaknesses. For example, some agents are able to predict the opponent's preferences very well, while others focus more on having a sophisticated bidding strategy. The problem however, is that there is little incremental improvement in agent design, as the agents are tested in varying negotiation settings, using a diverse set of performance measures. This makes it very difficult to meaningfully compare the agents, let alone their underlying techniques. As a result, we lack a reliable way to pinpoint the most effective components in a negotiating agent.There are two major advantages of distinguishing between the different components of a negotiating agent's strategy: first, it allows the study of the behavior and performance of the components in isolation. For example, it becomes possible to compare the preference learning component of all agents, and to identify the best among them. Second, we can proceed to mix and match different components to create new negotiation strategies., e.g.: replacing the preference learning technique of an agent and then examining whether this makes a difference. Such a procedure enables us to combine the individual components to systematically explore the space of possible negotiation strategies.To develop a compositional approach to evaluate and combine the components, we identify structure in most agent designs by introducing the BOA architecture, in which we can develop and integrate the different components of a negotiating agent. We identify three main components of a general negotiation strategy; namely a bidding strategy (B), possibly an opponent model (O), and an acceptance strategy (A). The bidding strategy considers what concessions it deems appropriate given its own preferences, and takes the opponent into account by using an opponent model. The acceptance strategy decides whether offers proposed by the opponent should be accepted.The BOA architecture is integrated into a generic negotiation environment called Genius, which is a software environment for designing and evaluating negotiation strategies. To explore the negotiation strategy space of the negotiation research community, we amend the Genius repository with various existing agents and scenarios from literature. Additionally, we organize a yearly international negotiation competition (ANAC) to harvest even more strategies and scenarios. ANAC also acts as an evaluation tool for negotiation strategies, and encourages the design of negotiation strategies and scenarios.We re-implement agents from literature and ANAC and decouple them to fit into the BOA architecture without introducing any changes in their behavior. For each of the three components, we manage to find and analyze the best ones for specific cases, as described below. We show that the BOA framework leads to significant improvements in agent design by wining ANAC 2013, which had 19 participating teams from 8 international institutions, with an agent that is designed using the BOA framework and is informed by a preliminary analysis of the different components.In every negotiation, one of the negotiating parties must accept an offer to reach an agreement. Therefore, it is important that a negotiator employs a proficient mechanism to decide under which conditions to accept. When contemplating whether to accept an offer, the agent is faced with the acceptance dilemma: accepting the offer may be suboptimal, as better offers may still be presented before time runs out. On the other hand, accepting too late may prevent an agreement from being reached, resulting in a break off with no gain for either party. We classify and compare state-of-the-art generic acceptance conditions. We propose new acceptance strategies and we demonstrate that they outperform the other conditions. We also provide insight into why some conditions work better than others and investigate correlations between the properties of the negotiation scenario and the efficacy of acceptance conditions.Later, we adopt a more principled approach by applying optimal stopping theory to calculate the optimal decision on the acceptance of an offer. We approach the decision of whether to accept as a sequential decision problem, by modeling the bids received as a stochastic process. We determine the optimal acceptance policies for particular opponent classes and we present an approach to estimate the expected range of offers when the type of opponent is unknown. We show that the proposed approach is able to find the optimal time to accept, and improves upon all existing acceptance strategies.Another principal component of a negotiating agent's strategy is its ability to take the opponent's preferences into account. The quality of an opponent model can be measured in two different ways. One is to use the agent's performance as a benchmark for the model's quality. We evaluate and compare the performance of a selection of state-of-the-art opponent modeling techniques in negotiation. We provide an overview of the factors influencing the quality of a model and we analyze how the performance of opponent models depends on the negotiation setting. We identify a class of simple and surprisingly effective opponent modeling techniques that did not receive much previous attention in literature.The other way to measure the quality of an opponent model is to directly evaluate its accuracy by using similarity measures. We review all methods to measure the accuracy of an opponent model and we then analyze how changes in accuracy translate into performance differences. Moreover, we pinpoint the best predictors for good performance. This leads to new insights concerning how to construct an opponent model, and what we need to measure when optimizing performance.Finally, we take two different approaches to gain more insight into effective bidding strategies. We present a new classification method for negotiation strategies, based on their pattern of concession making against different kinds of opponents. We apply this technique to classify some well-known negotiating strategies, and we formulate guidelines on how agents should bid in order to be successful, which gives insight into the bidding strategy space of negotiating agents. Furthermore, we apply optimal stopping theory again, this time to find the concessions that maximize utility for the bidder against particular opponents. We show there is an interesting connection between optimal bidding and optimal acceptance strategies, in the sense that they are mirrored versions of each other.Lastly, after analyzing all components separately, we put the pieces back together again. We take all BOA components accumulated so far, including the best ones, and combine them all together to explore the space of negotiation strategies.We compute the contribution of each component to the overall negotiation result, and we study the interaction between components. We find that combining the best agent components indeed makes the strongest agents. This shows that the component-based view of the BOA architecture not only provides a useful basis for developing negotiating agents but also provides a useful analytical tool. By varying the BOA components we are able to demonstrate the contribution of each component to the negotiation result, and thus analyze the significance of each. The bidding strategy is by far the most important to consider, followed by the acceptance conditions and finally followed by the opponent model.Our results validate the analytical approach of the BOA framework to first optimize the individual components, and then to recombine them into a negotiating agent

Essays in Competition and Externalities

This dissertation consists of three papers. A common feature of these papers is the interest in how externalities affect consumers and firms’ behavior. In the first paper, I study one type of contractual externalities called exclusive dealing, whereby one firm cannot deal with the competitors of the other. More specifically, I propose and estimate an empirical structural model to investigate the effects on prices of upstream mergers in markets with exclusive dealing contracts. The second paper is concerned with markets for a good with network externalities, i.e. a good that generates higher utility the higher the number of consumers purchasing it. The third paper studies externalities of investments on quality improvement. When more than one firm is active, the product improvement externality occurs because as firms chose different quality levels, competition is relaxed and consumers get some consumer surplus from product variety. In the case of winner-take-all markets, the business-stealing externality occurs because as one firm invests in quality upgrade, the competitors become more likely to lose all customers. The first chapter examines the incentives for price increase in upstream mergers when the supplier has a network of exclusive dealers (ED). The incentives explored in this paper come from changes in the threat point of the bargaining between the supplier and exclusive retailers. The bargaining power of the exclusive dealer comes from local market power of the dealer or due to reputation aspects (when dealers know that the supplier behaves opportunistically after the ED contract is signed, they will be reluctant in becoming exclusive of that supplier or renewing the contract). The change in the threat point post merger is due to the larger network of exclusive retailers, which enables the merged supplier to recapture a larger portion of the consumers that will be diverted from any specific exclusive dealer in case of disagreement on the wholesale price negotiation. The empirical application explored in this paper uses a unique and comprehensive dataset from the Brazilian fuel industry, with information that includes retail and wholesale prices as well as quantities at the station level. Aside from the good quality, this dataset is adequate for the intended analysis because in Brazil fuel stations can either operate independently (in which case they can purchase from any distributor) or sign an ED contract, when they can only purchase from a specific distributor. Moreover, the data spam a period that includes an important merger. I estimate the model using pre-merger data and simulate the effects of combining the networks of exclusive dealers of the merging companies. The simulation shows that the incentives for price increase are sizable, and the mechanism studied in the paper captures a large fraction of the actual price increase observed in the data. The second chapter, joint with Ilwoo Hwang, studies adoption and pricing when consumers can delay their purchase of a good with network effects. In those cases, price alone does not convey sufficient information for consumers to make their purchase decision and they need to infer about current and future adoption in order to make their decisions. This feature implies that some consumers might find optimal to delay their purchases in order to make their decisions better informed about the success of the network. The multiplicity of equilibria that is typical in the coordination game played by consumers implies that the demand is not well defined for a given price, creating a problem for the firm's pricing decision. We consider a two-period model in which a monopolist sets prices and consumers can delay their purchases to the second period when they will receive information about early adoption. The dynamic coordination problem with endogenous delayed purchases is modeled as a global game, for which we derive conditions for uniqueness of equilibrium. The model is capable of exploring many issues in the economics of network effects such as introductory pricing and early critical mass for platform survival. Our specification nests the pure durables goods and herding models. Numerical results illustrate the amplitude of possible outcomes in the dynamic model with delay. Substantial differences can arise in terms of pricing, adoption and profits when we compare the full specification with multiple benchmarks. In the third chapter, joint with Michael Riordan, we develop a duopoly model of product quality competition that focuses on how information structure determines equilibrium outcomes. When we introduce private and correlated signals about the fundamental uncertainty about quality differences, each firm can form a more educated guess about what the opponent must be doing, which is the key for uniqueness of equilibria. Equilibrium product improvement decisions are unique if and only if market uncertainty is sufficiently high relative to strategic uncertainty, except in a non-generic special case. A unique equilibrium takes the form of threshold strategies, whereby each firm improves its product upon receiving a sufficiently favorable signal of brand advantage. We show that the unique equilibrium depends on the fundamentals as well as on investment costs and that the probability of miscoordination vanishes as strategic uncertainty decreases. In the type of competition studied here, firms have no incentive to choose the same quality as the competition arising in the marketplace would bring prices to equalize marginal cost. Interestingly, this information structure alleviates substantially the problem of miscoordination observed in the no “information game” and also dominates the complete information game for a large range of parameters in the model

Strategic Technology Maturation and Insertion (STMI): a requirements guided, technology development optimization process

This research presents a Decision Support System (DSS) process solution to a problem faced by Program Managers (PMs) early in a system lifecycle, when potential technologies are evaluated for placement within a system design. The proposed process for evaluation and selection of technologies incorporates computer based Operational Research techniques which automate and optimize key portions of the decision process. This computerized process allows the PM to rapidly form the basis of a Strategic Technology Plan (STP) designed to manage, mature and insert the technologies into the system design baseline and identify potential follow-on incremental system improvements. This process is designated Strategic Technology Maturation and Insertion (STMI). Traditionally, to build this STP, the PM must juggle system performance, schedule, and cost issues and strike a balance of new and old technologies that can be fielded to meet the requirements of the customer. To complicate this juggling skill, the PM is typically confronted with a short time frame to evaluate hundreds of potential technology solutions with thousands of potential interacting combinations within the system design. Picking the best combination of new and established technologies, plus selecting the critical technologies needing maturation investment is a significant challenge. These early lifecycle decisions drive the entire system design, cost and schedule well into production The STMI process explores a formalized and repeatable DSS to allow PMs to systematically tackle the problems with technology evaluation, selection and maturation. It gives PMs a tool to compare and evaluate the entire design space of candidate technology performance, incorporate lifecycle costs as an optimizer for a best value system design, and generate input for a strategic plan to mature critical technologies. Four enabling concepts are described and brought together to form the basis of STMI: Requirements Engineering (RE), Value Engineering (VE), system optimization and Strategic Technology Planning (STP). STMI is then executed in three distinct stages: Pre-process preparation, process operation and optimization, and post-process analysis. A demonstration case study prepares and implements the proposed STMI process in a multi-system (macro) concept down select and a specific (micro) single system design that ties into the macro design level decision

Auction based scheduling for distributed systems

Cataloged from PDF version of article.Businesses deal with huge databases over a geographically distributed supply network. When this is combined with scheduling and planning needs, it becomes too difficult to handle. Recently, Fast Consumer Goods sector tends to consolidate their manufacturing facilities on a single supplier serving to a distributed customer network. This decentralized structure causes imperfect information sharing between customers and the supplier. We model this problem as a single machine distributed scheduling problem with job agents representing the customers and the machine agent representing the supplier. For benchmarking purpose, we analyzed the problem under three different scenarios: decentralized utility case (realistic case), centralized utility case, centralized cost case (classical single machine early/tardy problem). We developed Auction Based Algorithm by exploiting the opportunity to use game theoretic approach to solve the problem in the decentralized utility case. We used optimization techniques (Lagrangean Relaxation and Branch-and-Bound) for the centralized cases. Results of our extensive computational experiments indicate that Auction Based Algorithm converges to the upper bound found for the total utility measure.Zarifoğlu, EmrahM.S