Inventory Games

AMS classifications: 90D12, 90B05.inventory management;information;cooperative games;proportional division

Carbon emissions Inventory Games

Carbon emissions reduction has been the center of attention in many organizations during the past few decades. Many international entities developed rules and regulations to monitor and control carbon emissions especially under supply chain context. Furthermore, researchers investigated techniques and methods on how reduce carbon emissions under operational adjustment which can be done by cooperation or coordination. The main contribution of this thesis is to measure to what extend cooperation can contribute to carbon emissions. Many research addresses the advantage of cooperation in reducing cost. However, there isn't a plenty of research addressing the effect of cooperation on carbon emissions when the incentive of the cooperation is to reduce cost only. The aim of this thesis is to show if joint replenishment leads to a reduction in carbon emissions and this to be considered as an advantage to be added to cooperation. Moreover, if a savings occur from cooperation, the aim will be to address the issue of allocating the savings among parties engaged in the coalition. The thesis methodology adapted and extended cooperative EOQ model and basic inventory model (EOQ) in order to formulate and build an adjusted model to measure carbon emissions. The adjusted model will be used to calculate carbon emission in centralized and decentralized systems with incentives to reduce cost and no incentives to reduce emission. The calculation shall yield the optimum ordering quantity which in turn yields the savings between the two systems. Finally core allocation principles will be leveraged to propose a fair allocation of savings. Furthermore, the model will be extended to consider some regulation and different environments to which it will cater for carbon-tax regulation and full Truckload system contexts. Findings indicate that applying inventory game theory leads to a reduction of carbon emissions along with cost. Additionally, the total carbon emissions in centralized system will always be less then decentralized system under all conditions. Moreover, the proposed proportional allocation which was proven to be a core allocation model will be based on the frequency of ordering and the amount of holding emissions

Production-inventory games and PMAS-games: characterizations of the Owen point

Production-inventory games were introduced in [Guardiola, L.A., Meca, A., Puerto, J. (2008). Production-Inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. Games Econom. Behav. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2007.02.003] as a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. From among all core-allocations, the Owen point was proposed as a specifically appealing solution. In this paper we study some relationships of the class of production-inventory games and other classes of new and known games. In addition, we propose three axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point. We use eight axioms for these characterizations, among those, inessentiality and additivity of players’ demands are used for the first time in this paper

Production-inventory games and pmas games: characterizations of the Owen point

Production-inventory games were introduced in Guardiola et al. (2007) as a new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. From among all core-allocations, the Owen point was proposed as a specifically appealing solution. In this paper we study some relationships of the class of production-inventory games and other classes of new and known games. In addition, we propose three axiomatic characterizations of the Owen point. We use eight axioms for these characterizations, among those, inessentiality and additivity of players' demands are used for the first time in this paper

Supply chain collaboration

In the past, research in operations management focused on single-firm analysis. Its goal was to provide managers in practice with suitable tools to improve the performance of their firm by calculating optimal inventory quantities, among others. Nowadays, business decisions are dominated by the globalization of markets and increased competition among firms. Further, more and more products reach the customer through supply chains that are composed of independent firms. Following these trends, research in operations management has shifted its focus from single-firm analysis to multi-firm analysis, in particular to improving the efficiency and performance of supply chains under decentralized control. The main characteristics of such chains are that the firms in the chain are independent actors who try to optimize their individual objectives, and that the decisions taken by a firm do also affect the performance of the other parties in the supply chain. These interactions among firms’ decisions ask for alignment and coordination of actions. Therefore, game theory, the study of situations of cooperation or conflict among heterogenous actors, is very well suited to deal with these interactions. This has been recognized by researchers in the field, since there are an ever increasing number of papers that applies tools, methods and models from game theory to supply chain problems