Towards an alternative to Benner’s theory of expert intuition in nursing: A discussion paper

Several authors have highlighted the role of intuition in expertise. In particular, a large amount of data has been collected about intuition in expert nursing, and intuition plays an important role in the influential theory of nursing expertise developed by Benner (1984). We discuss this theory, and highlight both data that support it and data that challenge it. Based on this assessment, we propose a new theory of nursing expertise and intuition, which emphasizes how perception and conscious problem solving are intimately related. In the discussion, we propose that this theory opens new avenues of enquiry for research into nursing expertise

Expertise and intuition: A tale of three theories

Several authors have hailed intuition as one of the defining features of expertise. In particular, while disagreeing on almost anything that touches on human cognition and artificial intelligence, Hubert Dreyfus and Herbert Simon agreed on this point. However, the highly influential theories of intuition they proposed differed in major ways, especially with respect to the role given to search and as to whether intuition is holistic or analytic. Both theories suffer from empirical weaknesses. In this paper, we show how, with some additions, a recent theory of expert memory (the template theory) offers a coherent and wide-ranging explanation of intuition in expert behaviour. It is shown that the theory accounts for the key features of intuition: it explains the rapid onset of intuition and its perceptual nature, provides mechanisms for learning, incorporates processes showing how perception is linked to action and emotion, and how experts capture the entirety of a situation. In doing so, the new theory addresses the issues problematic for Dreyfus’s and Simon’s theories. Implications for research and practice are discussed

Attention mechanisms in the CHREST cognitive architecture

In this paper, we describe the attention mechanisms in CHREST, a computational architecture of human visual expertise. CHREST organises information acquired by direct experience from the world in the form of chunks. These chunks are searched for, and verified, by a unique set of heuristics, comprising the attention mechanism. We explain how the attention mechanism combines bottom-up and top-down heuristics from internal and external sources of information. We describe some experimental evidence demonstrating the correspondence of CHREST’s perceptual mechanisms with those of human subjects. Finally, we discuss how visual attention can play an important role in actions carried out by human experts in domains such as chess

Computational Modelling of Mental Imagery in Chess: A Sensitivity Analysis

An important aim of cognitive science is to build computational models that account for a large number of phenomena but have few free parameters, and to obtain more veridical values for the models’ parameters by successive approximations. A good example of this approach is the CHREST model (Gobet & Simon, 2000), which has simulated numerous phenomena on chess expertise and in other domains. In this paper, we are interested in the parameter the model uses for shifting chess pieces in its mind’s eye (125 ms per piece), a parameter that had been estimated based on relatively sparse experimental evidence. Recently, Waters and Gobet (2008) tested the validity of this parameter in a memory experiment that required players to recall briefly presented positions in which the pieces were placed on the intersections between squares. Position types ranged from game positions to positions where both the piece distribution and location were randomised. CHREST, which assumed that pieces must be centred back to the middle of the squares in the mind’s eye before chunks can be recognized, simulated the data fairly well using the default parameter for shifting pieces. The sensitivity analysis presented in the current paper shows that the fit was nearly optimal for all groups of players except the grandmaster group for which, counterintuitively, a slower shifting time gave a better fit. The implications for theory development are discussed

CHREST+: A simulation of how humans learn to solve problems using diagrams.

This paper describes the underlying principles of a computer model, CHREST+, which learns to solve problems using diagrammatic representations. Although earlier work has determined that experts store domain-specific information within schemata, no substantive model has been proposed for learning such representations. We describe the different strategies used by subjects in constructing a diagrammatic representation of an electric circuit known as an AVOW diagram, and explain how these strategies fit a theory for the learnt representations. Then we describe CHREST+, an extended version of an established model of human perceptual memory. The extension enables the model to relate information learnt about circuits with that about their associated AVOW diagrams, and use this information as a schema to improve its efficiency at problem solving

Herbert Simon's decision-making approach: Investigation of cognitive processes in experts

This is a post print version of the article. The official published can be obtained from the links below - PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved.Herbert Simon's research endeavor aimed to understand the processes that participate in human decision making. However, despite his effort to investigate this question, his work did not have the impact in the “decision making” community that it had in other fields. His rejection of the assumption of perfect rationality, made in mainstream economics, led him to develop the concept of bounded rationality. Simon's approach also emphasized the limitations of the cognitive system, the change of processes due to expertise, and the direct empirical study of cognitive processes involved in decision making. In this article, we argue that his subsequent research program in problem solving and expertise offered critical tools for studying decision-making processes that took into account his original notion of bounded rationality. Unfortunately, these tools were ignored by the main research paradigms in decision making, such as Tversky and Kahneman's biased rationality approach (also known as the heuristics and biases approach) and the ecological approach advanced by Gigerenzer and others. We make a proposal of how to integrate Simon's approach with the main current approaches to decision making. We argue that this would lead to better models of decision making that are more generalizable, have higher ecological validity, include specification of cognitive processes, and provide a better understanding of the interaction between the characteristics of the cognitive system and the contingencies of the environment

Intelligence and chess

The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate the evidence supporting the hypothesis that innate talent (for example a higher level of intelligence) may account for aspects of chess skill. We start by giving some standard definitions of intelligence, and then present empirical data on chessplayers’ intelligence, both with children and adults. In the second part of this paper, we discuss Geschwind and Galaburda’s (1985) influential theory of the neurobiology of talent in music, mathematics, and visual arts, and review evidence of its applicability for explaining chess expertise. For that purpose, we will present empirical data based on brain lesions, brain-imaging studies, and handedness. In the conclusion, we will attempt to reconcile the strand of research emphasising practice and the role of the environment with that emphasising the role of innate talent

Up the nose of the beholder? Aesthetic perception in olfaction as a decision-making process

Is the sense of smell a source of aesthetic perception? Traditional philosophical aesthetics has centered on vision and audition but eliminated smell for its subjective and inherently affective character. This article dismantles the myth that olfaction is an unsophisticated sense. It makes a case for olfactory aesthetics by integrating recent insights in neuroscience with traditional expertise about flavor and fragrance assessment in perfumery and wine tasting. My analysis concerns the importance of observational refinement in aesthetic experience. I argue that the active engagement with stimulus features in perceptual processing shapes the phenomenological content, so much so that the perceptual structure of trained smelling varies significantly from naive smelling. In a second step, I interpret the processes that determine such perceptual refinement in the context of neural decision-making processes, and I end with a positive outlook on how research in neuroscience can be used to benefit philosophical aesthetics

Emotional Justification

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties