Game Theory Relaunched

The game is on. Do you know how to play? Game theory sets out to explore what can be said about making decisions which go beyond accepting the rules of a game. Since 1942, a well elaborated mathematical apparatus has been developed to do so; but there is more. During the last three decades game theoretic reasoning has popped up in many other fields as well - from engineering to biology and psychology. New simulation tools and network analysis have made game theory omnipresent these days. This book collects recent research papers in game theory, which come from diverse scientific communities all across the world; they combine many different fields like economics, politics, history, engineering, mathematics, physics, and psychology. All of them have as a common denominator some method of game theory. Enjoy

Practicing Safe Sects

In Practicing Safe Sects F. LeRon Shults provides scientific and philosophical resources for having “the talk” about religious reproduction: where do gods come from – and what are the costs of bearing them in our culturally pluralistic, ecologically fragile environment?; Readership: All interested in the promotion of peaceful and healthy societies, and anyone concerned with the role of religion in fostering superstition and segregation

Resource allocation in networks via coalitional games

The main goal of this dissertation is to manage resource allocation in network engineering problems and to introduce efficient cooperative algorithms to obtain high performance, ensuring fairness and stability. Specifically, this dissertation introduces new approaches for resource allocation in Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) wireless networks and in smart power grids by casting the problems to the coalitional game framework and by providing a constructive iterative algorithm based on dynamic learning theory.  Software Engineering (Software)Algorithms and the Foundations of Software technolog

Practicing Safe Sects

In Practicing Safe Sects F. LeRon Shults provides scientific and philosophical resources for having “the talk” about religious reproduction: where do gods come from – and what are the costs of bearing them in our culturally pluralistic, ecologically fragile environment?; Readership: All interested in the promotion of peaceful and healthy societies, and anyone concerned with the role of religion in fostering superstition and segregation

Contributions to Game Theory and Management. Vol. III. Collected papers presented on the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management.

The collection contains papers accepted for the Third International Conference Game Theory and Management (June 24-26, 2009, St. Petersburg University, St. Petersburg, Russia). The presented papers belong to the field of game theory and its applications to management. The volume may be recommended for researches and post-graduate students of management, economic and applied mathematics departments.

“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies

Researchers from across the social sciences have found consistent deviations from the predictions of the canonical model of self-interest in hundreds of experiments from around the world. This research, however, cannot determine whether the uniformity results from universal patterns of human behavior or from the limited cultural variation available among the university students used in virtually all prior experimental work. To address this, we undertook a cross-cultural study of behavior in ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games in a range of small-scale societies exhibiting a wide variety of economic and cultural conditions. We found, first, that the canonical model – based on self-interest – fails in all of the societies studied. Second, our data reveal substantially more behavioral variability across social groups than has been found in previous research. Third, group-level differences in economic organization and the structure of social interactions explain a substantial portion of the behavioral variation across societies: the higher the degree of market integration and the higher the payoffs to cooperation in everyday life, the greater the level of prosociality expressed in experimental games. Fourth, the available individual-level economic and demographic variables do not consistently explain game behavior, either within or across groups. Fifth, in many cases experimental play appears to reflect the common interactional patterns of everyday life

Shadow of the Leviathan: the Role of Dominance in the Evolution of Costly Punishment

Costly ‘altruistic’ punishment, where an individual intervenes to punish someone for behaving unfairly towards another or for violating a social norm, seems to be vital for large-scale cooperation. However, due to the costs involved, the evolution of this behaviour has remained a puzzle. The thesis initially describes why punishment is costly and explains why current theories do not sufficiently explain its evolution in the context of these costs. The thesis then offers a solution to this puzzle in the form of a dominance-based theory of the evolution of punishment. The theoretical underpinnings of this theory are discussed in reference to the previous literature, specifically how a dominant position provides sufficient heterogeneity in the cost and benefits of punishment to allow the behaviour to evolve at the individual-level of selection. Across 10 studies, the thesis empirically investigates the role dominance is theorised to play in costly punishment behaviour. First, the judgements observers make about punishers are investigated. It is demonstrated that punishers are perceived as dominant but, unlike individuals who engage in other aggressive behaviours, punishers are also well liked. While successful punishers are judged to be of the highest rank in a social group, the wider social judgements of punishers are dependent on the attempt at punishment only; successful and unsuccessful punishers are seen as equally dominant and well liked, suggesting that the willingness to attempt punishment can honestly signal both dominance and ones pro-sociality. However, additional studies show that observers a) perceive subordinate punishers will face a great deal of retaliation, b) show surprise when subordinates attempt to punish, and c) expect that dominants will punish and be successful, whereas subordinates are expected to never punish. Thus, while there are reputational benefits from punishment, only dominant individuals can actually access them. Second, the effect of a dominant position on punishment behaviour is investigated. Two studies sought to simulate the greater access to resources that dominants enjoy, and demonstrate that individuals who receive more resources from group-level cooperation will punish free-riding more frequently and more severely than those who receive less resources. Moreover, individuals who are in a stable dominant position, i.e. who can continually benefit to a greater degree than others from group cooperation, punish even more frequently and severely than when individuals receive additional resources alone. The results show that individuals only punish when it is cheap for them to do so and when investment in the public good (by punishing) can produce higher future returns for them. A dominant position provides the opportunity for both of these. Further studies demonstrate that individuals at the centre of a social network, an example of a ‘real life’ informal dominant position, are more sensitive to unfairness when making punishment decisions compared to those at the periphery of a group. However, when punishment decisions are public, and there are no economic incentives to punish, individuals behave in a similar manner regardless of social position. Taken together, the results of the empirical studies support the proposed dominance-theory of costly punishment. The theoretical implications of the dominance-theory of punishment are discussed in reference to both the proximate occurrence of punishment and its evolutionary origins in dominance and dominant behaviours. The practical implications of this theory will also be discussed, specifically in regard to when and why individuals will act in defence of the public good. While further investigation is necessary, a dominance-theory of punishment explains both results of this thesis and the findings of the wider literature, and as such provides a coherent and compelling explanation for the evolution of costly punishment and its associated emotions