An essay on msic-systems

A theory of many-sorted implicative conceptual systems (abbreviated msic-systems) is outlined. Examples of msic-systems include legal systems, normative systems, systems of rules and instructions, and systems expressing policies and various kinds of scientific theories. In computer science, msic-systems can be used in, for instance, legal information systems, decision support systems, and multi-agent systems. In this essay, msic-systems are approached from a logical and algebraic perspective aiming at clarifying their structure and developing effective methods for representing them. Of special interest are the most narrow links or joinings between different strata in a system, that is between subsystems of different sorts of concepts, and the intermediate concepts intervening between such strata. Special emphasis is put on normative systems, and the role that intermediate concepts play in such systems, with an eye on knowledge representation issues. In this essay, normative concepts are constructed out of descriptive concepts using operators based on the Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions. An abstract architecture for a norm-regulated multi-agent system is suggested, containing a scheme for how normative positions will restrict the set of actions that the agents are permitted to choose from

Legal theory and epistemic values: against authoritarian interpretivism

In his new book, R. Dworkin advocates the unity of values thesis. He wants to circumscribe morality as a proper epistemological domain which is methodologically different from scientific inquiry. The epistemological independence of morality is supposed to be a consequence of the irreducible fact/value dichotomy. This paper sustains that unity of values thesis is methodologically correct; all moral reasoning must be a constructive interpretation of its meaning. However, that author fails to recognize that not every axiological interpretation implies moral consequences. From H. Putnam’s pragmatic realism, this paper intends to demonstrate that much of scientific inquiry relies on values interpretation, and that this kind of reasoning is morally neutral. Finally, it should be clear that epistemological choices in legal positivism – e.g. the decision on which aspects of social interaction are theoretically relevant – should not disturb the soundness of its argument nor should it be read as if it had moral implications. This paper concludes that positivist theories cannot be ruled out. Since the choice between descriptive and interpretative models requires a circular justification, legal theory is itself an activity governed by epistemic values interpretation. Likewise natural sciences, it can only be understood from an internal perspective. Accordingly, inclusive positivism holds the advantage of being more consilient than interpretivism, which is arguably parochial

What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?

In Re: Defining Securitization, Professor Jonathan Lipson attempts to define a “true” securitization transaction, ultimately characterizing it as “a purchase of primary payment rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so purchased.” There is much to admire in Lipson’s attempt but also much to question. Let me start with the admiration. Lipson’s article is by far the most systematic and thoughtful analysis of what securitization should mean. Importantly, he describes what he sees as the “essential elements of a securitization, its inputs (payment rights), structure (bankruptcy-proof legal isolation), and outputs (securities).” Dividing securitization into inputs, structure, and outputs is rhetorically, if not also conceptually, sensible. Indeed, in teaching courses about securitization I often have referred to the left-hand side of the structure--which Lipson more felicitously calls the inputs--and the right-hand side of the structure--which Lipson (again more felicitously) calls the outputs. To the extent such terminology is intuitively descriptive, it advances understanding. In future courses, I intend to refer to inputs and outputs. I would, however, make one change to Lipson’s use of the term “structure” to describe the portion of a securitization transaction between the inputs and the outputs. Because “structure” intuitively means an entire structure--which, in the case of securitization, would also include the inputs and outputs--I suggest using the term “intermediate structure” instead. Thus, I will refer to a securitization transaction’s inputs, intermediate structure, and outputs. Even with that change, I still have several concerns with Professor Lipson’s definition of securitization. This Article will next discuss those concerns, showing that the definition is overly restrictive and potentially inaccurat

What is Securitization? And for What Purpose?

In Re: Defining Securitization, Professor Jonathan Lipson attempts to define a “true” securitization transaction, ultimately characterizing it as “a purchase of primary payment rights by a special purpose entity that (1) legally isolates such payment rights from a bankruptcy (or similar insolvency) estate of the originator, and (2) results, directly or indirectly, in the issuance of securities whose value is determined by the payment rights so purchased.” There is much to admire in Lipson’s attempt but also much to question. Let me start with the admiration. Lipson’s article is by far the most systematic and thoughtful analysis of what securitization should mean. Importantly, he describes what he sees as the “essential elements of a securitization, its inputs (payment rights), structure (bankruptcy-proof legal isolation), and outputs (securities).” Dividing securitization into inputs, structure, and outputs is rhetorically, if not also conceptually, sensible. Indeed, in teaching courses about securitization I often have referred to the left-hand side of the structure--which Lipson more felicitously calls the inputs--and the right-hand side of the structure--which Lipson (again more felicitously) calls the outputs. To the extent such terminology is intuitively descriptive, it advances understanding. In future courses, I intend to refer to inputs and outputs. I would, however, make one change to Lipson’s use of the term “structure” to describe the portion of a securitization transaction between the inputs and the outputs. Because “structure” intuitively means an entire structure--which, in the case of securitization, would also include the inputs and outputs--I suggest using the term “intermediate structure” instead. Thus, I will refer to a securitization transaction’s inputs, intermediate structure, and outputs. Even with that change, I still have several concerns with Professor Lipson’s definition of securitization. This Article will next discuss those concerns, showing that the definition is overly restrictive and potentially inaccurat

Integrated management of hierarchical levels: towards a CAPE tool

The integration of decision-making procedures usually assigned to different hierarchical production systems requires the use of complex mathematical models and high computational efforts, in addition to the need of an extensive management of data and knowledge within the production systems. This work addresses this integration problem and proposes a comprehensive solution approach, as well as guidelines for Computer Aided Process Engineering (CAPE) tools managing the corresponding cyberinfrastructure. This study presents a methodology based on a domain ontology which is used as the connector between the introduced data, the different available formulations developed to solve the decision-making problem, and the necessary information to build the finally required problem instance. The methodology has demonstrated its capability to help exploiting different available decision-making problem formulations in complex cases, leading to new applications and/or extensions of these available formulations in a robust and flexible way.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

A Needs-Based Partial Theory of Human Injustice: Oppression, Dehumanization, Exploitation, and Systematic Inequality in Opportunities to Address Human Needs

The article presents an original needs-based partial theory of human injustice and shows its relationship to existing theories of human need and human liberation. The theory is based on an original typology of three social structural sources of human injustice, a partial theorization of the mechanisms of human injustice, and a needs-based theorization of the nature of human injustice, as experienced by individuals. The article makes a sociological contribution to normative social theory by clarifying the relationship of human injustice to human needs, human rights, and human liberation. The theory contends that human injustice is produced when oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation create systematic inequality in opportunities to address human needs, leading to wrongful need deprivation and the resulting serious harm. In one longer sentence, this needs-based partial theory of the sources, mechanisms, and nature of human injustice contends that three distinct social systemic sources—oppression, mechanistic dehumanization, and exploitation—produce unique and/or overlapping social mechanisms, which create systematic inequality in opportunities to address universal human needs in culturally specific ways, thus producing the nature of the human injustice theorized here: wrongfully unmet needs and serious harm

Epistemic Teleology: Synchronic and Diachronic

According to a widely held view of the matter, whenever we assess beliefs as ‘rational’ or ‘justified’, we are making normative judgements about those beliefs. In this discussion, I shall simply assume, for the sake of argument, that this view is correct. My goal here is to explore a particular approach to understanding the basic principles that explain which of these normative judgements are true. Specifically, this approach is based on the assumption that all such normative principles are grounded in facts about values, and the normative principles that apply to beliefs in particular are grounded in facts about alethic value––a kind of value that is exemplified by believing what is true and not believing what is false. In this chapter, I shall explain what I regard as the best way of interpreting this approach. In doing so, I shall also show how this interpretation can solve some problems that have recently been raised for approaches of this kind by Selim Berker, Jennifer Carr, Michael Caie, and Hilary Greaves