817 research outputs found
Analysis of multi-attribute multi-unit procurement auctions and capacity-constrained sequential auctions
This dissertation examines an iterative multi-attribute auction for multi-unit procurement in the first part. A multi-unit allocation problem that allows order split among suppliers is formulated to improve the market efficiency. Suppliers are allowed to provide discriminative prices over units based on their marginal costs. A mechanism called Iterative Multiple-attribute Multiple-unit Reverse Auction (IMMRA) is proposed based on the assumption of the modified myopic best-response strategies. Numerical experiment results show that the IMMRA achieves market efficiency in most instances. The inefficiency occurs occasionally on the special cases when cost structures are significantly different among suppliers. Numerical results also show that the IMMRA results in lower buyer payments than the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) payments in most cases. In the second part, two sequential auctions with the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism are proposed for two buyers to purchase multiple units of an identical item. The invited suppliers are assumed to have capacity constraints of providing the required demands. Three research problems are raised for the analysis of the sequential auctions: the suppliers\u27 expected payoff functions, the suppliers\u27 bidding strategies in the first auction, and the buyers\u27 procurement costs. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the problems, we limit our study to a duopoly market environment with two suppliers. Both suppliersâ dominant bidding strategies are theoretically derived. With numerical experiments, suppliersâ expected profits and buyersâ expected procurement costs are empirically analyzed
Analysis of multi-attribute multi-unit procurement auctions and capacity-constrained sequential auctions
This dissertation examines an iterative multi-attribute auction for multi-unit procurement in the first part. A multi-unit allocation problem that allows order split among suppliers is formulated to improve the market efficiency. Suppliers are allowed to provide discriminative prices over units based on their marginal costs. A mechanism called Iterative Multiple-attribute Multiple-unit Reverse Auction (IMMRA) is proposed based on the assumption of the modified myopic best-response strategies. Numerical experiment results show that the IMMRA achieves market efficiency in most instances. The inefficiency occurs occasionally on the special cases when cost structures are significantly different among suppliers. Numerical results also show that the IMMRA results in lower buyer payments than the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) payments in most cases. In the second part, two sequential auctions with the Vickrey-Clarke-Grove (VCG) mechanism are proposed for two buyers to purchase multiple units of an identical item. The invited suppliers are assumed to have capacity constraints of providing the required demands. Three research problems are raised for the analysis of the sequential auctions: the suppliers\u27 expected payoff functions, the suppliers\u27 bidding strategies in the first auction, and the buyers\u27 procurement costs. Because of the intrinsic complexity of the problems, we limit our study to a duopoly market environment with two suppliers. Both suppliersâ dominant bidding strategies are theoretically derived. With numerical experiments, suppliersâ expected profits and buyersâ expected procurement costs are empirically analyzed
Competition Between Auctions
Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions.auctions, bidding, competition, auction formats, auction houses
Solving a sealed-bid reverse auction problem by multiple-criterion decision-making methods
AbstractThis study presents a model for solving the sealed-bid, multiple-issue reverse auction problem, using multiple-criterion decision-making approaches, such that the interests of both the buyer and the supplier are satisfied. On the supplier side, the bid construction process is formulated as a fuzzy multiple-objective programming problem, and is solved using an exhausted enumeration algorithm which adjusts the production plan in accordance with the buyerâs demand, based on the current master production schedule (MPS) and the available-to-promise (ATP) inventory. The use of the information of MPS and ATP enables the supplier to make accurate estimates of the production costs associated with specific delivery dates, and thus facilitates the construction of a bid which is both profitable and likely to secure the contract. On the buyer side, the winner determination process is treated as a multiple-attribute decision-making problem, and is solved using the Technique for Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method. The validity of the proposed approach is demonstrated via an illustrative example
Ecosystem services auctions: the last decade of research
ReviewAuctions offer potential cost-effectiveness improvements over other mechanisms for
payments for ecosystem services (PES) contract allocation. However, evidence-based guidance for
matching design to application is scarce and research priorities are unclear. To take stock of the current
state of the art, we conducted a systematic review and thematic content analysis of 56 peer-reviewed
journal articles discussing ES auctions published in the last decade. Auctions were approached from
three overlapping perspectives: mechanism design, PES, and policy analysis. Five major themes
emerged: (1) performance, including measures like cost-effectiveness and PES criteria like additionality;
(2) information dynamics like price discovery and communication effects; (3) design innovations like
risk-integrating and spatially coordinated mechanisms; (4) contextual variables like policy context and
cultural values; and (5) participation factors. Additional attention from policymakers and continued
efforts to coordinate research in this diverse and interdisciplinary subfield may be beneficialinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Competition Between Auctions
Even though auctions are capturing an increasing share of commerce, they are typically treated in the theoretical economics literature as isolated. That is, an auction is typically treated as a single seller facing multiple buyers or as a single buyer facing multiple sellers. In this paper, we review the state of the art of competition between auctions. We consider three different types of competition: competition between auctions, competition between formats, and competition between auctioneers vying for auction traffic. We highlight the newest experimental, statistical and analytical methods in the analysis of competition between auctions
Combinatorial Auction-based Mechanisms for Composite Web Service Selection
Composite service selection presents the opportunity for the rapid development of complex applications using existing web services. It refers to the problem of selecting a set of web services from a large pool of available candidates to logically compose them to achieve value-added composite services. The aim of service selection is to choose the best set of services based on the functional and non-functional (quality related) requirements of a composite service requester. The current service selection approaches mostly assume that web services are offered as single independent entities; there is no possibility for bundling. Moreover, the current research has mainly focused on solving the problem for a single composite service. There is a limited research to date on how the presence of multiple requests for composite services affects the performance of service selection approaches. Addressing these two aspects can significantly enhance the application of composite service selection approaches in the real-world. We develop new approaches for the composite web service selection problem by addressing both the bundling and multiple requests issues. In particular, we propose two mechanisms based on combinatorial auction models, where the provisioning of multiple services are auctioned simultaneously and service providers can bid to offer combinations of web services. We mapped these mechanisms to Integer Linear Programing models and conducted extensive simulations to evaluate them. The results of our experimentation show that bundling can lead to cost reductions compared to when services are offered independently. Moreover, the simultaneous consideration of a set of requests enhances the success rate of the mechanism in allocating services to requests. By considering all composite service requests at the same time, the mechanism achieves more homogenous prices which can be a determining factor for the service requester in choosing the best composite service selection mechanism to deploy
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