Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues

In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the strength of evidence as uncertain, (b) low coping potential and (c) negative anticipation along the lines of Damasio’s somatic marker hypothesis. At the same time, desire impacts the treatment of flattering evidence via dopamine. Our main proposal is that self-deception involves emotional mechanisms provoking a preference for immediate reward despite possible long-term negative repercussions. In the last part, we use this emotional model to revisit the philosophical paradoxes

Themes in linguistic understanding. Cognition and epistemology

[eng] In this thesis, I have presented and defended a series of claims regarding the nature and epistemic role of linguistic understanding. Firstly, I have argued that, besides the state- and disposition-sense of “linguistic under- standing,” quite commonly discussed in the philosophical debate, there is yet another, often overlooked, process-sense. I have argued that characterizing linguistic understanding as a process is not only justified from the philosophical point of view (linguistic understanding, just like other processes, unfolds over time) but also is very much in line with the current state of the art in empirical language sciences. Secondly, I have outlined a novel model of the representational structure of linguistic understanding. I have argued that this structure consists of at least three types of interdependent representations generated by a dual-stream process. The model I have offered establishes a middle ground between two popular accounts of the relation between comprehension and acceptance: Cartesian, on which we are free to either accept or reject comprehended information, and Spinozan, on which we automatically accept everything we comprehend. On my account, we automatically accept everything that passes the content-oriented filter (so-called validation ), i.e., everything that is not in obvious tension with our easily accessible background knowledge. Thirdly, I discussed the justification of comprehension-based beliefs, i.e., the beliefs about what other people say. I have argued that this justification is non-inferential, i.e., that it does not depend on the justification of other beliefs, such as the beliefs about what words the speaker uttered or what sounds they produced. Instead of defending the most common version of non-inferentialism about the justification of comprehension-based beliefs, i.e., a view on which these beliefs are prima facie justified by seemings that the speaker said so and so, I have offered a competitive account. On my account, which I call teleological comprehension-process reliabilism : (i) beliefs are prima facie justified if they are produced by a process that has forming true beliefs reliably as a function, and (ii) language comprehension is a process that has forming true comprehension-based beliefs reliably as a function. Fourthly, I have argued that despite what is assumed by many participants in the debate, we are not equipped with a mechanism that allows us to react discriminately to particular instances of untrustworthy testimony, i.e., to prevent the formation of beliefs based on such testimony. However, the fact that all, at least all adult members of our linguistic community are vigilant towards the signs of untrustworthiness, and that liars meet social retribution, brings the long-term benefit of decreasing the number of falsehoods and lies we encounter. This account of the psychosocial mechanisms involved in filtering of the comprehended content provides support for the strong anti-reductionism about testimonial entitlement, i.e., the view that we are prima facie entitled to believe whatever we are being told. Finally, together with the coauthors of Chapter 5: J. Adam Carter and Emma C. Gordon, I have argued that understanding a proposition, commonly identified with linguistic understanding, is a distinct phenomenon. More specifically, it is a type of objectual understanding, which is gradable, consistent with epistemic luck, and based on a subject’s grasping of the coherence-making relation between the elements of a given subject matter. Nevertheless, both linguistic understanding and understanding a proposition play an important role in our everyday communication. In typical cases of successful linguistic communication, we understand communicated thought, i.e., we understand both what proposition has been expressed by the use of a given utterance (linguistic understanding), and this proposition itself

The social brain: neural basis of social knowledge

Social cognition in humans is distinguished by psychological processes that allow us to make inferences about what is going on inside other people—their intentions, feelings, and thoughts. Some of these processes likely account for aspects of human social behavior that are unique, such as our culture and civilization. Most schemes divide social information processing into those processes that are relatively automatic and driven by the stimuli, versus those that are more deliberative and controlled, and sensitive to context and strategy. These distinctions are reflected in the neural structures that underlie social cognition, where there is a recent wealth of data primarily from functional neuroimaging. Here I provide a broad survey of the key abilities, processes, and ways in which to relate these to data from cognitive neuroscience

“Strategically wrong”: bias and argumentation

The brain is composed of mutually inconsistent modules that contain contradictory beliefs. What consequences could this view have on argumentation? In order to sketch an answer, first the family of concepts of what is called generalized deception is discussed; then, this discussion is applied to the problem of the social influence bias to observe both how the mind works strategically wrong and what kind of arguments are used within this mental design in a social argumentative context

Epistemic Vigilance: The Error Management of Source Memory and Belief

The studies reported here explore some of the cognitive contours of epistemic vigilance--that is, how the mind adaptively tracks and monitors information. These studies ask how the mind considers the source of new information when making epistemic judgments. Four experiments investigate the role of source information in modulating the truth bias : an automatic tendency to presume new information is true). An evolutionary hypothesis is advanced: that a support bias exists for sources with special coalitional relevance: e.g., a best friend) that interacts with the truth bias to produce supportive patterns of recall that are unique to that source. Results partially support this hypothesis. Participants who read statements ostensibly from a real best friend: identified by participants) show patterns of recall that differ from recall for statements from other sources, and these patterns are consistent with a support bias interpretation. These results may be influenced by valence; using sources who are positive and negative: but not coalitional) also elicit modified patterns of recall--but not at the level of automatic belief. Finally, when the communicated content is precautionary information, evidence for the truth bias and the support bias disappears. The need for additional study of source-processing, and its relationship to statement structure and content, is discussed

How the “Black Criminal” Stereotype Shapes Black People’s Psychological Experience of Policing: Evidence of Stereotype Threat and Remaining Questions

Cultural stereotypes that link Black race to crime in the U.S. originated in and are perpetuated by policies that result in the disproportionate criminalization and punishment of Black people. The scientific record is replete with evidence that these stereotypes impact perceivers’ perceptions, information processing, and decision-making in ways that produce more negative criminal legal outcomes for Black people than White people. However, relatively scant attention has been paid to understanding how situations that present a risk of being evaluated through the lens of crime-related stereotypes also directly affect Black people. In this article, I consider one situation in particular: encounters with police. I draw on social psychological research on stereotype threat generally as well as the few existing studies of crime-related stereotype threat specifically to illuminate how the cultural context creates psychologically distinct experiences of police encounters for Black people as compared to White people. I further consider the potential ramifications of stereotype threat effects on police officers’ judgments and treatment of Black people as well as for Black people’s safety and wellbeing in other criminal legal contexts and throughout their lives. Finally, I conclude with a call for increased scholarly attention to crime-related stereotype threat and the role it plays in contributing to racial disparities in policing outcomes, particularly with regard to diverse racial, ethnic, and intersectional identities and personal vulnerability factors and the systemic changes that might mitigate its deleterious effects

The Art and Science of Political Deception: The Political Artist and Neurobiological Mecamisms Underlying Human Vulnerability

Many politicians are highly successful in diverting citizens’ attention from their legitimate interests, silencing the voice of constituents and undermining interests of voters who have elected them. They restrict voting to prevent non-existent fraud. They deny medical services to protect seldom-existent consumer-provider relationships. They allow tax increases on the working class while preserving loopholes for wealthy corporate sponsors. Yet the same politicians are reelected by popular demand.This thesis uncovers a primary mechanism that underlies human susceptibility for such manipulation. The handles for deception are embedded in ancient reflexes that favored survival. Contemporary worldviews embody such ancient intuitions now integrated with modern vocabulary and narratives. These reflexes are grounded in neural networks that respond rapidly to present-day cues triggering ancient signals of threat, contamination and loss. Using such cues, polemicists often divert citizens’ efforts away from personal concerns to buttress business and ideological objectives of their patrons. In this thesis, neuronal circuitry dedicated to assessing the personal relevance of incoming information is described. Conditions for informing the worldview as opposed to censoring disagreeable information are elucidated. Examples in recent political discourse are provided. Constituent attempts to resist the process of diversion and information censure are explored. Constitutional and social impediments to reprogramming worldview are discussed. Evidence of weakening entanglements within some contemporary narratives from ancient intuitions is presented

Washington University Magazine, Fall 1991

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