98,115 research outputs found
Incomplete Symbols - Definite Descriptions Revisited
We investigate incomplete symbols, i.e. definite descriptions with scope-operators. Russell famously introduced definite descriptions by contextual definitions; in this article definite descriptions are introduced by rules in a specific calculus that is very well suited for proof-theoretic investigations. That is to say, the phrase `incomplete symbols' is formally interpreted as to the existence of an elimination procedure. The last section offers semantical tools for interpreting the phrase `no meaning in isolation' in a formal way
Why Incomplete Definite Descriptions do not Defeat Russellâs Theory of Descriptions
For Russell, a simple sentence containing a description, the F, is true only if a single object satisfies F. Sentences containing incomplete descriptions pose problems because they are often used to express truths, even though more than one thing in the discourse satisfies F. It is argued (i) that non-Russellian analyses cannot solve these problems, and (ii) that Russellian analyses can, provided that a new conception of\ud
meaning and assertion is adopted. On this conception, the meaning of S is what is common to what is asserted by utterances of S in all normal contexts, and the propositions asserted by particular utterances are required to be pragmatic enrichments of the semantic content of S. These pragmatic enrichments are the propositions speakers primarily intend to assert. The proposition semantically expressed by S counts as asserted only when it is a necessary, a priori consequence of the speakerâs primary assertion, plus presuppositions of the conversation. The problem of incomplete descriptions is solved by noting that the false propositions semantically expressed are not consequences of the true, pragmatically enriched propositions the speaker asserts
Incomplete Descriptions and the Underdetermination Problem
The purpose of this paper is to discuss two phenomena related to the semantics of definite descriptions: that of incomplete uses of descriptions, and that of the underdetermination of referential uses of descriptions. The Russellian theorist has a way of accounting for incomplete uses of descriptions by appealing to an account of quantifier domain restriction, such as the one proposed in Stanley and SzabĂł (2000a). But, I argue, the Russellian is not the only one in a position to appeal to such an account of incomplete uses of descriptions. Proponents of other theories, such as the Fregean, which does not treat descriptions as quantifiers, might benefit from this account of domain restriction. In the second part of the paper I discuss referential uses of incomplete definite descriptions. Relative to such uses, Wettstein (1981) and others have argued that the Russellian theory faces a problem of underdetermination of semantic content. Neale (2004) has replied to this objection showing why it does not pose a threat to the Russellian theory. Again, I argue that not only the Russellian, but also the Fregean can subscribe to Nealeâs (2004) suggestion
The Real Distinction between Descriptions and Indexicals
Some contemporary semantic views defend an asymmetry thesis concerning definite descriptions and indexicals. Semantically, indexicals are devices of singular reference; they contribute objects to the contents of the speech acts made with utterances including them. Definite descriptions, on the other hand, are generalized quantifiers, behaving roughly the way Russell envisaged in âOn Denotingâ. The asymmetry thesis depends on the existence of a sufficiently clear-cut distinction between semantics and pragmatics, because indexicals and descriptions are often used in ways that apparently contradict the asymmetry thesis; the semantics/pragmatics distinction is invoked to see behind the appearances. The paper critically examines arguments by Schiffer against the asymmetry thesis, based on referential uses of incomplete descriptions
The semantics of ellipsis
There are four phenomena that are particularly troublesome for theories of ellipsis: the existence of sloppy readings when the relevant pronouns cannot possibly be bound; an ellipsis being resolved in such a way that an ellipsis site in the antecedent is not understood in the way it was there; an ellipsis site drawing material from two or more separate antecedents; and ellipsis with no linguistic antecedent. These cases are accounted for by means of a new theory that involves copying syntactically incomplete antecedent material and an analysis of silent VPs and NPs that makes them into higher order definite descriptions that can be bound into
Descriçþes Definidas
Descriçþes definidas sĂŁo expressĂľes da forma âo Fâ ou âa Fâ. A correta
interpretação de descriçþes definidas estå no centro de muitos debates
na filosofia da linguagem. Russellianos defendem que descriçþes defi- nidas sĂŁo expressĂľes de quantificação e que proferimentos de âO F ĂŠ
Gâ expressam proposiçþes gerais sobre o que quer que seja unicamente
F. Donnellanianos defendem que descriçþes definidas admitem usos
referenciais e que proferimentos de âO F ĂŠ Gâ tambĂŠm podem expres- sar proposiçþes singulares sobre a pessoa ou o objeto que o falante tem
em mente. Ambos russellianos e donnellanianos precisam acomodar a
existência de descriçþes definidas incompletas.Abstract
Definite descriptions are phrases of the form âthe Fâ. The correct interpretation
of definite descriptions is at the center of much debate in
the philosophy of language. Russellians argue that definite descriptions
are devices of quantification and that utterances of âThe F is Gâ express
general propositions about whatever is uniquely F. Donnellians argue
that definite descriptions admit referential uses and that utterances of
âThe F is Gâ may also express singular propositions about the person or
the object the speaker has in mind. Both Russellians and Donnellians
need to accomodate the existence of incomplete definite descriptions.Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Lisbo
A Quasi-Fregean Solution to âThe Concept Horseâ Paradox
In this paper I offer a conceptually tighter, quasi-Fregean solution to the
concept horse paradox based on the idea that the unterfallen relation is
asymmetrical. The solution is conceptually tighter in the sense that it retains the
Fregean principle of separating sharply between concepts and objects, it retains
Fregeâs conclusion that the sentence âthe concept horse is not a conceptâ is true,
but does not violate our intuitions on the matter. The solution is only âquasiâ-
Fregean in the sense that it rejects Fregeâs claims about the ontological import of
natural language and his analysis thereof
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