Joint Determination of Internal Organizational Design: Decision-Making, Task Allocation, and Incentive Scheme,

This paper studies the issue of designing an optimal organizational form: design for sub-units' task allocation, decision-making structure, and incentive schemes for organizational members. Depending on the way tasks are allocated between the sub-units, and whether decision-making is centralized or not, organizations face a trade-off between coordination and information. Task allocation by production processes calls for coordination more strongly than the allocation by final products. Centralized decision-making serves for better coordination, whereas decentralization serves for better information. The coordinational benefit under centralization gets bigger as the organization's common uncertainty increases, and this benefit is magnified when the sub-units are functionally divided by production processes. The informational benefit under decentralization gets bigger as the organization's local uncertainty increases, and this benefit is magnified when the sub-units are designed autonomous. Thus, complementarily designed organizations tend to have centralized decision-making structures and fixed salary scheme, whereas less complementarily designed organizations tend to have decentralized decision-making and 'pay for performance' incentive contract.

A framework for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains

Since 2005 the EU food industry has primary legal responsibility for food safety control. This requires new responsibilities and relationships between government and industry, and between companies. This research presents a framework for incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains. It emphasizes key elements of food safety control from multiple perspectives and provides insights for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food safety control. An incentive system combines inter-company incentive mechanisms with intra-company decision making processes to control a hazard within the legal environment. Incentive mechanisms, which consist of a performance measure and a performance reward, induce companies to use control measures. The framework can be used to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative incentive systems in which companies have to cooperate with partners from other stages of the supply chain.Incentive mechanism, food safety, supply chain control., Agricultural and Food Policy,

The international stock pollutant control: a stochastic formulation with transfers

This paper provides a formulation of a stochastic dynamic game that arise in the real scenario of international environmental agreements on the transnational pollution control. More specifically, this agreements try to reduce the environmental damage caused by the stock pollutant that accumulates in the atmosphere, such as CO2. To improve the non-cooperative equilibrium among countries, we propose the criteria of the minimization of the expected discounted total cost with monetary transfers between the countries involved as an incentive to cooperation. Moreover, it considers the formulation of Stochastic Dynamic Games as Markov Decision Processes, using tools of Stochastic Optimal Control and Stochastic Dynamic Programming. The performance of the proposed schemes is illustrated by its application to such environmental problem.Environmental pollutant control, Markov decision processes, Stochastic dynamic programming, Stochastic dynamic games, Optimal abatement policies

Childcare Affordability Pilots (CAP09): 100% Costs Pilot: the importance of cost as a driver of family decisions about work and childcare: a data analysis report

"This pilot looked to assess whether increasing the childcare element of tax credits acted as an incentive for people to move into work. Data analysis in this evaluation shows that cost is not a single, critical, factor influencing family decisions as to whether to move into work and childcare. It may however have importance in terms of the childcare chosen and is certainly one of a number of factors a family will consider before making the decision to work. Where this data analysis report explains the bare numbers of what families did over the pilot period please also refer to the research element of the Childcare Affordability Pilot (CAP09) project which assesses the reasons behind their behaviours and provides clarity as to the decision processes families go through." - Page 2

Incentives, Teachers, and Gender at Work

Incentive pay programs have become panacea for a multitude of educational challenges. When aimed at teachers the assumption is that rewards entice them to work in particular ways or particular schools. However, the assumption is based on an economic formula that does not take into consideration the gendered nature of policy processes. This study examined ethnographically 10 teachers’ decision-making processes regarding whether to take up The Rural Program [La Ruralidad] in the Province of Buenos Aires, Argentina, which rewarded qualified educators with bonus pay to work in hard-to-staff schools, to address the question: How does gender mediate teachers’ decision-making process to take up an incentive reward? I isolate three conditions: safety, transportation, and community, to show how gendered relations, identities, and roles incentivize teachers. I argue that masculinities and femininities mediated teachers’ approach to taking up incentives. Rather than a simplistic, one-time-only decision, the study shows an on-going policy process that involves women and men in “rational economic decision making” mired by gender.  

Increased salience of gains versus decreased associative learning differentiate bipolar disorder from schizophrenia during incentive decision making

Background Abnormalities in incentive decision making, typically assessed using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), have been reported in both schizophrenia (SZ) and bipolar disorder (BD). We applied the Expectancy-Valence (E-V) model to determine whether motivational, cognitive and response selection component processes of IGT performance are differentially affected in SZ and BD. Method Performance on the IGT was assessed in 280 individuals comprising 70 remitted patients with SZ, 70 remitted patients with BD and 140 age-, sex-and IQ-matched healthy individuals. Based on the E-V model, we extracted three parameters, 'attention to gains or loses', 'expectancy learning' and 'response consistency', that respectively reflect motivational, cognitive and response selection influences on IGT performance. Results Both patient groups underperformed in the IGT compared to healthy individuals. However, the source of these deficits was diagnosis specific. Associative learning underlying the representation of expectancies was disrupted in SZ whereas BD was associated with increased incentive salience of gains. These findings were not attributable to non-specific effects of sex, IQ, psychopathology or medication. Conclusions Our results point to dissociable processes underlying abnormal incentive decision making in BD and SZ that could potentially be mapped to different neural circuits

ANALYZING NEGOTIATION APPROACHES IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT - A CASE STUDY OF CROP-LIVESTOCK CONFLICTS IN SRI LANKA

Participatory approaches in natural resource management are increasingly being criticized for their tendency to neglect power relations and conflicts of interests. Negotiation approaches have been proposed as a strategy to overcome such shortcomings. Using the case of negotiations on crop-livestock conflicts in Sri Lanka as an empirical example, this paper proposes to apply the concept of political capital in combination with game theoretical modeling for an analysis of negotiation processes in natural resource management. The model serves to analyze both the incentive structure of the resource users, who are motivated by economic incentives, and the incentive structure of political decision-makers, who are motivated by political interests. The crucial role that the public administration may play for the enforcement of a negotiation outcome is highlighted. The paper discusses potential extensions of the model and concludes that the concept of political capital, in combination with game theoretical modeling, provides a useful tool for the analysis of negotiation approaches in natural resource management.natural resource management, negotiation, political capital, extensive form game, Sri Lanka, Resource /Energy Economics and Policy, Q2,

Comparing legislative mechanisms for SEA screening and decision-making: Austrian and Australian experiences

Austrian and Australian approaches to strategic environmental assessment (SEA) are compared with particular emphasis upon the legal basis for the initial phase of agreement/screening and the final stage of SEA decision-making and implementation. In Austrian SEA, screening is compulsory and the outcome leads only to recommendations, meaning that the SEA results have to be considered, but are not binding for the approval decision. In Australia engagement in SEA is largely voluntary but the process results in legally binding conditions of approval that can be applied to relevant actions arising from an assessed policy, plan or programme; the incentive for proponents to participate voluntarily is that subsequent project level activities may be exempt from further assessment processes. Compulsory SEA in Australia also provides a legally certain outcome, a factor of benefit to proponents. Examples of SEAs are provided to demonstrate the operation of the respective stages in the two countries. In Austria compulsory screening results in a lot of energy being spent avoiding triggering a full SEA. Although Australian proponents have been somewhat cautious in volunteering for SEA of their activities, there are signs that this is changing. We argue that the regulatory framework characteristics are a key determinant of the behaviour of proponents and the competent authority in practice and subsequently of SEA potential and outcomes. Consideration of the construct of the regulatory framework for SEA screening and decision-making provides a useful point of reflection for practitioners attempting to understand the effectiveness of SEA processes in a given jurisdiction

Economic issues provokes hazardous landing decision-making by enhancing the activity of "emotional" neural pathways

The analysis of aeronautical accidents highlights the fact that some airline pilots demonstrate a trend to land whereas the approach is not well stabilized. This behavior seems to be the consequence of various factors, including financial issues. Our hypothesis is that financial constraints modulate the brain circuitry of emotion and reward, in particular via the interactions between two prefrontal structures: the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex(DLPFC), main center of the executive functions (EFs), high level cognitive abilities, and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), structure linked with the limbic system, major substratum of emotional processes. In our experiment, participants performed a simplified task of landing in which the level of uncertainty and the financial incentive were manipulated. A preliminary behavioral experiment (n = 12) was conducted. A similar second experiment using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is in progress and a case study only is reported here. The behavioral data showed that the participants made more risky decision to land in the financial incentive condition in comparison to the neutral condition, where no financial incentive was delivered. This was particularly true when the uncertainty was high. The functional neuroimaging results showed that the reasoning performed in neutral condition resulted in enhanced activity in DLPFC. On the contrary, under the influence of the financial incentive, VMPFC activity was increased. These results showed the effectiveness of the financial incentive to bias decision-making toward a more risky and less rational behavior from a safety point of view. Functional neuroimaging data showed a shift from cold to hot reasoning in presence of the financial incentive, suggesting that pilot erroneous trend to land could be explained by a temporary perturbation of the decision-making process due to the negative emotional consequences associated with the go-around