Incomplete Information and Small Cores in Matching Markets

We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.Matching Market, Incomplete Information, Small Core

School Choice and Information An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms

We present an experimental study where we analyze three well- known matching mechanisms - the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms - in three different informational set- tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug- gesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is as suc- cessful as the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un- der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truthtelling in lack of information about the others' payooffs - ignorance may be beneficial in this context - , the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.

Incomplete information and small cores in matching markets

We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences

Ramón y Cajal: Mediation and Meritocracy

The Ramón y Cajal Program promotes the hiring of top researchers in Spanish R&D centers and academic institutions. The centralized mechanism associated to the Program is analyzed. The paper models it as a two-sided matching market and studies if it provides the incentives to increase the quality of the researchers hired. We analyze the mechanism both under complete and incomplete information. The comparison of the theoretical findings with the available data points out that the mechanism provides poor incentives and does not prevent collusion between research departments and candidates in the hiring process.Matching Markets; Preagreements; Implementation.

School Choice and Information: An Experimental Study on Matching Mechanisms

We present an experimental study where we analyze three well-known matching mechanisms—the Boston, the Gale-Shapley, and the Top Trading Cycles mechanisms—in three different informational set¬tings. Our experimental results are consistent with the theory, sug-gesting that the TTC mechanism outperforms both the Boston and the Gale-Shapley mechanisms in terms of efficiency and it is as suc¬cessful as the Gale-Shapley mechanism regarding the proportion of truthful preference revelation, whereas manipulation is stronger un¬der the Boston mechanism. In addition, even though agents are much more likely to revert to truthtelling in lack of information about the others' payoffs—ignorance may be beneficial in this context—, the TTC mechanism results less sensitive to the amount of information that participants hold. These results therefore suggest that the use of the TTC mechanism in practice is more desirable than of the others.Financial support from the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia under grant SFRH/BD/5308/2001 and from the spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología under research grant BEC2002-02130. And financial support under the grant Beca de Postgrado para la Formación de Profesorado Universitario from the spanish Min¬isterio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte (Ref.: AP2001-0923)

Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets

We study ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truthtelling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observations of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preference

College admissions and the role of information: An experimental study

Three well-known matching mechanisms designed to solve the college admissions problems are analyzed in the experimental laboratory in different informational settings.We observe that when the level of information is significantly increased, the proportion of schools and teachers that submit their true preferences decreases. This affects largely the efficiency and stability of the Gale–Shapley and the Boston mechanisms. The TTC mechanism is less sensitive to information and outperforms the other two mechanisms in terms of efficiency and stability, and it is as successful as them in extracting private information.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

A Two-sided Matching System Design for Dynamic Labor Markets

This thesis designs an automatic two-sided matching system for dynamic labor markets with large scale of data. Such markets consist of a group of vacancies and applicants, a matching function, a set of events causing transitions of the state of the market. Due to the dynamic nature of the labor markets, matching systems based on the classical deferred acceptance algorithm are not sufficient for producing stable matching solutions. Therefore, the central theme of this thesis is to address the effectiveness and efficiency of generating matching results in dynamic large labor markets. The main contribution of this thesis consists of three dynamic matching algorithms and a agent-based matching system design. The dynamic matching algorithms are extensions of the classical deferred acceptance algorithm. The first algorithm generates a vacancyoptimal stable matching result without considering locking or break-up constrains. The second algorithm considers locking period constraints in the matching process and the third algorithm computes applicant-optimal stable matchings with the consideration of break-up penalties in dynamic environments. To verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed matching algorithms, theoretical proofs and experimental results are presented as well. The results indicate that the designed system can be used as an efficient and effective tool for recruitment management in today’s dynamic and internet based labor markets to reduce administrative work load of human resource departments and produce stable job allocations. ii