18 research outputs found
In Defense of Imperative Inference
Abstract. âSurrender; therefore, surrender or fight â is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, âsince surrender â or âit follows that surrender or fightâ, and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions (âsurrender or fight â permits you to fight without surrendering, but âsurrender â does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing oneâs mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of âinferenceâ, some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing oneâs mind. 1. Introduction: Imperativ
Clause-Type, Force, and Normative Judgment in the Semantics of Imperatives
I argue that imperatives express contents that are both cognitively and semantically related to, but nevertheless distinct from, modal propositions. Imperatives, on this analysis, semantically encode features of planning that are modally specified. Uttering an imperative amounts to tokening this feature in discourse, and thereby proffering it for adoption by the audience. This analysis deals smoothly with the problems afflicting Portner's Dynamic Pragmatic account and Kaufmann's Modal account. It also suggests an appealing reorientation of clause-type theorizing, in which the cognitive act of updating on a typed sentence plays a central role in theorizing about both its semantics and role in discourse
Imperative Bilateralism
This paper provides a proof-theoretic account of imperative logical consequence by generalising Greg Restallâs multiple conclusion bilateralism for declarative logic. According to imperative bilateralism, a sequent Π⢠Πis valid iff jointly commanding all the imperatives ÎŚ â Î and prohibiting all the imperatives Ψ â Î clashes. This account has three main virtues: (1) it provides a proof-theoretic account of imperatives; (2) it does not rely on the controversial notion of imperative inference; and (3) it is neutral regarding cognitivism about imperatives
Imperatives, norms and truth
Antes de emprender el anĂĄlisis lĂłgico de las normas jurĂdicas constitucionales, o de las normas en
general, es preciso intentar resolver una cuestiĂłn previa que afecta a la posibilidad de existencia de una
lógica de las normas: el dilema de Jørgensen. Nuestra propuesta de solución de este dilema es la
siguiente: las normas son expresiones performativas. Al mismo tiempo, las expresiones performativas
son enunciados que tienen valor de verdad. AdemĂĄs, las normas jurĂdicas son enunciados del tipo âA
dice pâ, lo que explica que puedan existir normas verdaderas y, al mismo tiempo, contradictorias entre
sĂBefore embarking on the logical analysis of constitutional legal norms or norms in general, it is
necessary to try to resolve a previous question that affects the possibility of the existence of a logic of
norms: the Jørgensenâs dilemma. Our proposed solution to this dilemma is as follows: norms are
performative utterances. At the same time, performative utterances are statements that have truth value.
In addition, the legal norms are statements of type âA says pâ, which explains that there may be true
norms and, at the same time, contradictory to each other
Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality
Some arguments include imperative clauses. For example: âBuy me a drink; you canât buy me that drink unless you go to the bar; so, go to the bar!â How should we build a logic that predicts which of these arguments are good? Because imperatives arenât truth apt and so donât stand in relations of truth preservation, this technical question gives rise to a foundational one: What would be the subject matter of this logic? I argue that declaratives are used to produce beliefs, imperatives are used to produce intentions, and beliefs and intentions are subject to rational requirements. An argument will strike us as valid when anyone whose mental state satisfies the premises is rationally required to satisfy the conclusion. For example, the above argument reflects the principle that it is irrational not to intend what one takes to be the necessary means to oneâs intended ends. I argue that all intuitively good patterns of imperative inference can be explained using off-the-shelf formulations of our rational requirements. I then develop a formal-semantic theory embodying this view that predicts a range of data, including free-choice effects and Rossâs paradox. The resulting theory shows one way that our aspirations to rational agency can be discerned in the patterns of our speech, and is a case study in how the philosophy of language and the philosophy of action can be mutually illuminating