An n-sided polygonal model to calculate the impact of cyber security events

This paper presents a model to represent graphically the impact of cyber events (e.g., attacks, countermeasures) in a polygonal systems of n-sides. The approach considers information about all entities composing an information system (e.g., users, IP addresses, communication protocols, physical and logical resources, etc.). Every axis is composed of entities that contribute to the execution of the security event. Each entity has an associated weighting factor that measures its contribution using a multi-criteria methodology named CARVER. The graphical representation of cyber events is depicted as straight lines (one dimension) or polygons (two or more dimensions). Geometrical operations are used to compute the size (i.e, length, perimeter, surface area) and thus the impact of each event. As a result, it is possible to identify and compare the magnitude of cyber events. A case study with multiple security events is presented as an illustration on how the model is built and computed.Comment: 16 pages, 5 figures, 2 tables, 11th International Conference on Risks and Security of Internet and Systems, (CRiSIS 2016), Roscoff, France, September 201

Toward least-privilege isolation for software

Hackers leverage software vulnerabilities to disclose, tamper with, or destroy sensitive data. To protect sensitive data, programmers can adhere to the principle of least-privilege, which entails giving software the minimal privilege it needs to operate, which ensures that sensitive data is only available to software components on a strictly need-to-know basis. Unfortunately, applying this principle in practice is dif- �cult, as current operating systems tend to provide coarse-grained mechanisms for limiting privilege. Thus, most applications today run with greater-than-necessary privileges. We propose sthreads, a set of operating system primitives that allows �ne-grained isolation of software to approximate the least-privilege ideal. sthreads enforce a default-deny model, where software components have no privileges by default, so all privileges must be explicitly granted by the programmer. Experience introducing sthreads into previously monolithic applications|thus, partitioning them|reveals that enumerating privileges for sthreads is di�cult in practice. To ease the introduction of sthreads into existing code, we include Crowbar, a tool that can be used to learn the privileges required by a compartment. We show that only a few changes are necessary to existing code in order to partition applications with sthreads, and that Crowbar can guide the programmer through these changes. We show that applying sthreads to applications successfully narrows the attack surface by reducing the amount of code that can access sensitive data. Finally, we show that applications using sthreads pay only a small performance overhead. We applied sthreads to a range of applications. Most notably, an SSL web server, where we show that sthreads are powerful enough to protect sensitive data even against a strong adversary that can act as a man-in-the-middle in the network, and also exploit most code in the web server; a threat model not addressed to date

Formally based semi-automatic implementation of an open security protocol

International audienceThis paper presents an experiment in which an implementation of the client side of the SSH Transport Layer Protocol (SSH-TLP) was semi-automatically derived according to a model-driven development paradigm that leverages formal methods in order to obtain high correctness assurance. The approach used in the experiment starts with the formalization of the protocol at an abstract level. This model is then formally proved to fulfill the desired secrecy and authentication properties by using the ProVerif prover. Finally, a sound Java implementation is semi-automatically derived from the verified model using an enhanced version of the Spi2Java framework. The resulting implementation correctly interoperates with third party servers, and its execution time is comparable with that of other manually developed Java SSH-TLP client implementations. This case study demonstrates that the adopted model-driven approach is viable even for a real security protocol, despite the complexity of the models needed in order to achieve an interoperable implementation

CyberGuarder: a virtualization security assurance architecture for green cloud computing

Cloud Computing, Green Computing, Virtualization, Virtual Security Appliance, Security Isolation

Formal Verification of Security Protocol Implementations: A Survey

Automated formal verification of security protocols has been mostly focused on analyzing high-level abstract models which, however, are significantly different from real protocol implementations written in programming languages. Recently, some researchers have started investigating techniques that bring automated formal proofs closer to real implementations. This paper surveys these attempts, focusing on approaches that target the application code that implements protocol logic, rather than the libraries that implement cryptography. According to these approaches, libraries are assumed to correctly implement some models. The aim is to derive formal proofs that, under this assumption, give assurance about the application code that implements the protocol logic. The two main approaches of model extraction and code generation are presented, along with the main techniques adopted for each approac

Defense in Depth of Resource-Constrained Devices

The emergent next generation of computing, the so-called Internet of Things (IoT), presents significant challenges to security, privacy, and trust. The devices commonly used in IoT scenarios are often resource-constrained with reduced computational strength, limited power consumption, and stringent availability requirements. Additionally, at least in the consumer arena, time-to-market is often prioritized at the expense of quality assurance and security. An initial lack of standards has compounded the problems arising from this rapid development. However, the explosive growth in the number and types of IoT devices has now created a multitude of competing standards and technology silos resulting in a highly fragmented threat model. Tens of billions of these devices have been deployed in consumers\u27 homes and industrial settings. From smart toasters and personal health monitors to industrial controls in energy delivery networks, these devices wield significant influence on our daily lives. They are privy to highly sensitive, often personal data and responsible for real-world, security-critical, physical processes. As such, these internet-connected things are highly valuable and vulnerable targets for exploitation. Current security measures, such as reactionary policies and ad hoc patching, are not adequate at this scale. This thesis presents a multi-layered, defense in depth, approach to preventing and mitigating a myriad of vulnerabilities associated with the above challenges. To secure the pre-boot environment, we demonstrate a hardware-based secure boot process for devices lacking secure memory. We introduce a novel implementation of remote attestation backed by blockchain technologies to address hardware and software integrity concerns for the long-running, unsupervised, and rarely patched systems found in industrial IoT settings. Moving into the software layer, we present a unique method of intraprocess memory isolation as a barrier to several prevalent classes of software vulnerabilities. Finally, we exhibit work on network analysis and intrusion detection for the low-power, low-latency, and low-bandwidth wireless networks common to IoT applications. By targeting these areas of the hardware-software stack, we seek to establish a trustworthy system that extends from power-on through application runtime

Langattoman tehtävädatansiirtojärjestelmän suunnittelu lentokoneympäristöön

This thesis is about designing wireless mission data transfer system for the Finnish Air Force's Grob 115E elementary training aircraft. This thesis explains the use case of the mission data system, and how the wireless implementation for the mission data transfer would change the operation. The target was to design a system that is capable of transferring data wirelessly between the ground station and the Grob aircraft. The biggest challenge for the implementation was the vast amount of data that was needed to be transferred from the aircraft to the ground station after the flight. Also, the time window during which the transfer had to be completed was very limited. Two WLAN standards, IEEE's 802.11ac and 802.11ax were considered as potential techniques for the implementation. In this thesis the WLAN security was also examined, and two additional methods outside of WLAN standards were suggested for gaining better security for the data transmission. Wireless system utilizing the 802.11ac standard was tested and OpenSSH and OpenVPN were examined as potential techniques to strengthen the communication security. The results showed that the 802.11ac standard performs well with the communication distances of the wireless mission data transfer system. 802.11ac however has one drawback that will reduce its potential as the communication standard for the task

Cyber Attack Surface Mapping For Offensive Security Testing

Security testing consists of automated processes, like Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) and Static Application Security Testing (SAST), as well as manual offensive security testing, like Penetration Testing and Red Teaming. This nonautomated testing is frequently time-constrained and difficult to scale. Previous literature suggests that most research is spent in support of improving fully automated processes or in finding specific vulnerabilities, with little time spent improving the interpretation of the scanned attack surface critical to nonautomated testing. In this work, agglomerative hierarchical clustering is used to compress the Internet-facing hosts of 13 representative companies as collected by the Shodan search engine, resulting in an average 89% reduction in attack surface complexity. The work is then extended to map network services and also analyze the characteristics of the Log4Shell security vulnerability and its impact on attack surface mapping. The results highlighted outliers indicative of possible anti-patterns as well as opportunities to improve how testers and tools map the web attack surface. Ultimately the work is extended to compress web attack surfaces based on security relevant features, demonstrating via accuracy measurements not only that this compression is feasible but can also be automated. In the process a framework is created which could be extended in future work to compress other attack surfaces, including physical structures/campuses for physical security testing and even humans for social engineering tests