Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations on Air, Sea, Land

Unmanned Vehicle Systems & Operations On Air, Sea, Land is our fourth textbook in a series covering the world of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) and Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (CUAS). (Nichols R. K., 2018) (Nichols R. K., et al., 2019) (Nichols R. , et al., 2020)The authors have expanded their purview beyond UAS / CUAS systems. Our title shows our concern for growth and unique cyber security unmanned vehicle technology and operations for unmanned vehicles in all theaters: Air, Sea and Land – especially maritime cybersecurity and China proliferation issues. Topics include: Information Advances, Remote ID, and Extreme Persistence ISR; Unmanned Aerial Vehicles & How They Can Augment Mesonet Weather Tower Data Collection; Tour de Drones for the Discerning Palate; Underwater Autonomous Navigation & other UUV Advances; Autonomous Maritime Asymmetric Systems; UUV Integrated Autonomous Missions & Drone Management; Principles of Naval Architecture Applied to UUV’s; Unmanned Logistics Operating Safely and Efficiently Across Multiple Domains; Chinese Advances in Stealth UAV Penetration Path Planning in Combat Environment; UAS, the Fourth Amendment and Privacy; UV & Disinformation / Misinformation Channels; Chinese UAS Proliferation along New Silk Road Sea / Land Routes; Automaton, AI, Law, Ethics, Crossing the Machine – Human Barrier and Maritime Cybersecurity.Unmanned Vehicle Systems are an integral part of the US national critical infrastructure The authors have endeavored to bring a breadth and quality of information to the reader that is unparalleled in the unclassified sphere. Unmanned Vehicle (UV) Systems & Operations On Air, Sea, Land discusses state-of-the-art technology / issues facing U.S. UV system researchers / designers / manufacturers / testers. We trust our newest look at Unmanned Vehicles in Air, Sea, and Land will enrich our students and readers understanding of the purview of this wonderful technology we call UV.https://newprairiepress.org/ebooks/1035/thumbnail.jp

Military Innovation in the Third Age of U.S. Unmanned Aviation, 1991–2015

Military innovation studies have largely relied on monocausal accounts—rationalism, institutionalism, or culture—to explain technologically innovative and adaptive outcomes in defense organizations. None of these perspectives alone provided a compelling explanation for the adoption outcomes of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the U.S. military from 1991 to 2015. Two questions motivated this research: Why, despite abundant material resources, mature technology, and operational need, are the most-capable UAVs not in the inventory across the services? What accounts for variations and patterns in UAV innovation adoption? The study selected ten UAV program episodes from the Air Force and Navy, categorized as high-, medium-, and low-end cases, for within-case and cross-case analysis. Primary and secondary sources, plus interviews, enabled process tracing across episodes. The results showed a pattern of adoption or rejection based on a logic-of-utility effectiveness and consistent resource availability: a military problem to solve, and a capability gap in threats or tasks and consistent monetary capacity; furthermore, ideational factors strengthened or weakened adoption. In conclusion, the study undermines single-perspective arguments as sole determinants of innovation, reveals that military culture is not monolithic in determining outcomes, and demonstrates that civil-military relationships no longer operate where civilian leaders hold inordinate sway over military institutions.Lieutenant Colonel, United States Air ForceApproved for public release; distribution is unlimited

The drone question: Legality, ethics, and the need to recognize transnational armed conflict

This work focuses on the legality and ethics of targeted killings via drones conducted by the United States. The first section of this work looks at the use of drone strikes by the U.S. government as they fall outside of the traditional notion of a zone of armed conflict, that being one that can be defined geographically and temporally, and explores whether these strikes could be considered legal under international humanitarian law and the international law of self-defense. This work assumes that an armed conflict exists between the United States and the non-state armed actors that have been targeted by these drone strikes to explore whether the strikes could be considered legal under those two international legal regimes. The second section looks at these strikes from an ethics perspective. It explores if the ethical questions raised by drones are indeed novel, if drone strikes conducted by the United States satisfy the principles provided under Just War Theory, the impact drones have on the application of military ethics, and the ethical concerns raised by fully-autonomous weapon systems. This work argues that drones can be a legal and ethical weapon system, but the failure of international law to recognize a new, hybrid category of armed conflict has clouded the debate surrounding drones. The adoption of transnational armed conflict as a new type of conflict classification is presented as a solution to the problem posed by drones and contemporary conflict dynamics to better define and explain conflicts involving a state and a non-state armed actor that crosses and/or maintains bases of operations across international borders

Military Transformation and the Defense Industry after Next

Though still adjusting to the end of the Cold War, the defense industry is now confronted with the prospect of military transformation. Since the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, many firms have seen business improve in response to the subsequent large increase in the defense budget. But in the longer run, the defense sector\u27s military customers intend to reinvent themselves for a future that may require the acquisition of unfamiliar weapons and support systems.https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/usnwc-newport-papers/1016/thumbnail.jp

Russian Concept of War, Management and Use of Military Power : Conceptual Change

This publication consists primarily of articles presented in the annual Russia Seminar 2022 organised by the Department of warfare of the Finnish National Defence University (FNDU) and titled as “Russian Concept of War, Management and Use of Military Power – Conceptual Change”. The aim of the Seminar was to raise a discussion on Russian military policy and military power. The focus of the seminar was on the Russian concept of ”war” – that is – the use of lethal military force in order to achieve certain political objectives. It should be noted that the publication is not an exhaustive presentation of all the aspects related to the concept of war. This leaves room for themes and questions to be researched also in the future. The use of force is one of the two main functions of the Russian military power, the other one being deterrence, which was discussed at the Russia seminar 2021. The objective of deterrence is to influence the conciousness of the adversary - to change adversary’s behaviour and make it relinquish possible ideas of aggression or threat to use military power against Russia. In the 2021 seminar the main emphasis was on the military aspects and prerequisites of preventing a war. As we know now, at the time of writing these lines, in May-June 2022 – these aspects and methods of deterrence conducted by Russia and its military during the past year were not only aimed at preventing war, but also, they were actual preparations for a war. Furthermore, despite the fact that these means and capabilities were partly escalatory and threatening by nature, they did not enable Russia to achieve its political, military-political or military objectives. Regarding Ukraine, or more broadly the security structure of Europe, they were set by Russia, perhaps, intentionally on a level which was clearly unacceptable. In this manner Russia could justify to Russian people – after the launch of the operation – that there is no other solution than to conduct “a special military operation” in Ukraine. In this introductory chapter I will briefly introduce the articles or presentations of this report which were contributed in the seminar. All the presentations and discussion can be found on the FNDU YouTube-channel: https://www.youtube.com/watch?-v=ywyasBuw7vg&t=3263s.CONTENTS Klaus Ilmonen SPEECH BY MANAGING DIRECTOR OF THE MANNERHEIM FOUNDATION ON THE EVE OF THE SEMINAR Pentti Forsström 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE PUBLICATION Pentti Forsström 2. INTERPRETATIONS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN CONCEPT OF WAR Dima Adamsky 3. COMMAND AND CONTROL CULTURE À LA RUSSE Leonid Nersisyan 4. NEW RUSSIAN STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEMS – CHANGE OF THE BALANCE? Jukka Viitaniemi 5. STRATEGIC ACTIONS OF THE ARMED FORCES – CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS Jyrki Terva 6. SCHRÖDINGERS CAT IN EASTERN UKRAINE – HOW RUSSIA’S WAR IN UKRAINE CREATES AND DESCRIBES NEW RUSSIA-WEST CONFLICT Juha Wihersaari 7. EVGENY MESSNER’S THEORY OF SUBVERSION WAR VS. HYBRID WARFARE Oscar Jonsson (and Bryce Johnston - absent from the seminar) 8. RUSSIA’S REVOLUTION IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS Rod Thornton and Marina Miron 9. INTERFACE BETWEEN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CYBER. CREATING REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS? THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S UTILISATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TO ENHANCE ITS CYBER OPERATIONS: THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY Jonna Alava 10. REPRESENTATIONS OF WOMEN SOLDIERS IN RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES 2008–2021 Aristide M. LaVey 11. ADMIRAL USHAKOV: A STUDY OF RUSSIAN POWER PROJECTION Santeri Kytöneva 12. JUSTIFYING THE USE OF FORCE: RUSSIA’S SPIRITUAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY Justin Bronk 13. DEVELOPMENTS IN RUSSIAN COMBAT AIR SPENDING AND LIKELY OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS Lester W. Grau (and Charles K. Bartles) 14. RUSSIAN MANEUVER DEFENCE AND THEIR CONCEPT OF THE FRAGMENTED BATTLEFIELD Michael Kofman 15. ON PRESENT WAR IN UKRAINE - KEYNOTE

Applications, Evolutions, and Challenges of Drones in Maritime Transport

The widespread interest in using drones in maritime transport has rapidly grown alongside the development of unmanned ships and drones. To stimulate growth and address the associated technical challenges, this paper systematically reviews the relevant research progress, classification, applications, technical challenges, and possible solutions related to the use of drones in the maritime sector. The findings provide an overview of the state of the art of the applications of drones in the maritime industry over the past 20 years and identify the existing problems and bottlenecks in this field. A new classification scheme is established based on their flight characteristics to aid in distinguishing drones’ applications in maritime transport. Further, this paper discusses the specific use cases and technical aspects of drones in maritime rescue, safety, navigation, environment, communication, and other aspects, providing in-depth guidance on the future development of different mainstream applications. Lastly, the challenges facing drones in these applications are identified, and the corresponding solutions are proposed to address them. This research offers pivotal insights and pertinent knowledge beneficial to various entities such as maritime regulatory bodies, shipping firms, academic institutions, and enterprises engaged in drone production. This paper makes new contributions in terms of the comprehensive analysis and discussion of the application of drones in maritime transport and the provision of guidance and support for promoting their further development and integration with intelligent transport

After Action Report

Naval Warfare Studies Institute (NWSI)Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC)This Naval Warfare Studies Institute (NWSI), Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER), and Consortium for Intelligent Systems Education and Research (CISER) sponsored Warfare Innovation Continuum (WIC) workshop was held 21-24 September 2020 on the ‘Virtual Campus’ of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). The three-and-a-half-day experience allowed NPS students focused interaction with faculty, staff, fleet officers, and guest engineers from Navy labs, system commands and industry.Sponsored by the Naval Warfare Studies Institute (NWSI), the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems (CRUSER), and the Consortium for Intelligent Systems Education and Research (CISER