Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium and Cognitive Hierarchies

We explore an equilibrium model of games where players’ choice behavior is given by logit response functions, but their payoff responsiveness is heterogeneous. We extend the definition of quantal response equilibrium to this setting, calling it heterogeneous quantal response equilibrium (HQRE), and prove existence under weak conditions. We generalize HQRE to allow for limited insight, in which players can only imagine others with low responsiveness. We identify a formal connection between this new equilibrium concept, called truncated quantal response equilibrium (TQRE), and the Cognitive Hierarchy (CH) model. We show that CH can be approximated arbitrarily closely by TQRE. We report a series of experiments comparing the performance of QRE, HQRE, TQRE and CH. A surprise is that the fi of the models are quite close across a variety of matrix and dominance-solvable asymmetric information betting games. The key link is that in the QRE approaches, strategies with higher expected payoffs are chosen more often than strategies with lower expected payoff. In CH this property is not built into the model, but generally holds true in the experimental data

Quantal Response and Nonequilibrium Beliefs Explain Overbidding in Maximum-Value Auctions

We report an experiment on a simple common value auction to investigate the extent to which bidding can be explained by quantal response equilibrium, in combination with different assumptions about the structure of bidder beliefs|the cursed equilibrium model and models that posit levels of strategic sophistication. Using a structural estimation approach, we find a close correspondence between the theoretical predictions of those models and experimental behavior. The basic pattern of average bids in the data consists of a combination of overbidding for low signals, and value-bidding for higher signals. The logit QRE model with heterogeneous bidders fits this pattern reasonably well. Combining quantal response with either cursed beliefs (CE-QRE) or a level-k of strategic sophistication (LK-QRE, CH-QRE) leads to a close match with the data. All these variations on quantal response models predict minimal differences of average bidding behavior across different versions of the game, consistent with the experimental findings. Finally, we reanalyze data from an earlier experiment on the same auction by Ivanov, Levin and Niederle (2010). While their data exhibit much more variance compared with ours, nonetheless, we still find that these models also fit their data reasonably well, even in the presence of extreme overbidding observed in that experiment. Overall, our study indicates that the winner curse phenomenon in this auction is plausibly attributable to limits on strategic thinking combined with quantal response

On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k

This paper studies the relevance of equilibrium and nonequilibrium explanations of behavior, with respects to equilibrium refinement, as players gain experience. We investigate this experimentally using an incomplete information sequential move game with heterogeneous preferences and multiple perfect equilibria. Only the limit point of quantal response (the limiting logit equilibrium), and alternatively that of level-k reasoning (extensive form rationalizability), restricts beliefs off the equilibrium path. Both concepts converge to the same unique equilibrium, but the predictions differ prior to convergence. We show that with experience of repeated play in relatively constant environments, subjects approach equilibrium via the quantal response learning path. With experience spanning also across relatively novel environments, though, level-k reasoning tends to dominate

Inclusive Cognitive Hierarchy

Cognitive hierarchy theory, a collection of structural models of non-equilibrium thinking, in which players' best responses rely on heterogeneous beliefs on others' strategies including naive behavior, proved powerful in explaining observations from a wide range of games. We introduce an inclusive cognitive hierarchy model, in which players do not rule out the possibility of facing opponents at their own thinking level. Our theoretical results show that inclusiveness is crucial for asymptotic properties of deviations from equilibrium behavior in expansive games. We show that the limiting behaviors are categorized in three distinct types: naive, Savage rational with inconsistent beliefs, and sophisticated. We test the model in a laboratory experiment of collective decision-making. The data suggests that inclusiveness is indispensable with regard to explanatory power of the models of hierarchical thinking.Series: Department of Strategy and Innovation Working Paper Serie

Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

This paper reports data from a laboratory experiment on two-period moral hazard problems. The findings corroborate the contract-theoretic insight that even though the periods are technologically unrelated, due to incentive considerations principals can benefit from offering long-term contracts that exhibit memory

Against Game Theory

People make choices. Often, the outcome depends on choices other people make. What mental steps do people go through when making such choices? Game theory, the most influential model of choice in economics and the social sciences, offers an answer, one based on games of strategy such as chess and checkers: the chooser considers the choices that others will make and makes a choice that will lead to a better outcome for the chooser, given all those choices by other people. It is universally established in the social sciences that classical game theory (even when heavily modified) is bad at predicting behavior. But instead of abandoning classical game theory, those in the social sciences have mounted a rescue operation under the name of “behavioral game theory.” Its main tool is to propose systematic deviations from the predictions of game theory, deviations that arise from character type, for example. Other deviations purportedly come from cognitive overload or limitations. The fundamental idea of behavioral game theory is that, if we know the deviations, then we can correct our predictions accordingly, and so get it right. There are two problems with this rescue operation, each of them is fatal. (1) For a chooser, contemplating the range of possible deviations, as there are many dozens, actually makes it exponentially harder to figure out a path to an outcome. This makes the theoretical models useless for modeling human thought or human behavior in general. (2) Modeling deviations are helpful only if the deviations are consistent, so that scientists (and indeed decision makers) can make predictions about future choices on the basis of past choices. But the deviations are not consistent. In general, deviations from classical models are not consistent for any individual from one task to the next or between individuals for the same task. In addition, people’s beliefs are in general not consistent with their choices. Accordingly, all hope is hollow that we can construct a general behavioral game theory. What can replace it? We survey some of the emerging candidates