General use of UAS in EW environment--EW concepts and tactics for single or multiple UAS over the net-centric battlefield

With the development of technology, Electronic Warfare has been increasing for decades its importance in modern battles. It can even be referred to as the heart of today's net-centric battlefield. Unmanned Aerial Systems are gaining more importance every single day. Nations are working on more complex and more effective UAS in order to accomplish missions that are very difficult, or even impossible for manned aircraft. Electronic Warfare missions are often dangerous and risky. Mounting Electronic Warfare equipment on a UAS and using it to conduct the EW mission is the most rational solution, since it does not endanger human life. This thesis will examine the possible ways in which UAS can be paired with EW equipment. These two technologies can be integrated into a single mission over the net-centric battlefield. Furthermore, this thesis will try to explain the concepts and tactics required to use these integrated technologies more effectively. At the end of the thesis, a scenario will be run to help the reader understand the applicability of these tactics in the real environment.http://archive.org/details/generaluseofuasi109454512Turkish Air Force author.Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Looking towards the future: the changing nature of intrusive surveillance and technical attacks against high-profile targets

In this thesis a novel Bayesian model is developed that is capable of predicting the probability of a range of eavesdropping techniques deployed, given an attacker's capability, opportunity and intent. Whilst limited attention by academia has focused on the cold war activities of Soviet bloc and Western allies' bugging of embassies, even less attention has been paid to the changing nature of the technology used for these eavesdropping events. This thesis makes four contributions: through the analysis of technical eavesdropping events over the last century, technological innovation is shown to have enriched the eavesdropping opportunities for a range of capabilities. The entry barrier for effective eavesdropping is lowered, while for the well resourced eavesdropper, the requirement for close access has been replaced by remote access opportunities. A new way to consider eavesdropping methods is presented through the expert elicitation of capability and opportunity requirements for a range of present-day eavesdropping techniques. Eavesdropping technology is shown to have life-cycle stages with the technology exploited by different capabilities at different times. Three case studies illustrate that yesterday’s secretive government method becomes today’s commodity. The significance of the egress transmission path is considered too. Finally, by using the expert elicitation information derived for capability, opportunity and life-cycle position, for a range of eavesdropping techniques, it is shown that it is possible to predict the probability of particular eavesdropping techniques being deployed. This novel Bayesian inferencing model enables scenarios with incomplete, uncertain or missing detail to be considered. The model is validated against the previously collated historic eavesdropping events. The development of this concept may be scaled with additional eavesdropping techniques to form the basis of a tool for security professionals or risk managers wishing to define eavesdropping threat advice or create eavesdropping policies based on the rigour of this technological study.Open Acces

The Anglosphere Core as a Pluralistic Security Community

This thesis posits that in the post World War 2 era, a nexus of relationships has given rise to a transnational group of five states that form a Deutschian security community. This Anglospheric security community of the US, UK, Australia and NZ, is examined by utilising Adler and Barnett’s security community model. The model is adapted to give greater weight to the role of memes/culture. It finds that it is culture factors (meme-complexes) related to political values and social behaviour that inform the nature, and modus operandi of this Anglospheric security community. The Brexit debate on the UK’s future is found to have illuminated these issues by exposing aspects the contradictions between the competing meme-complexes of the wider Anglospheric community and the EU. The Anglospheric security community’s durability and progress is found to be directly related to notions of legitimacy. This conclusion is informed by revisiting Deutsch’s original writings on the difference between naturally developing communities and the dangers of policy-elites creating political constructs that run counter to cultural considerations. A values-based meme-complex found to provides not just a common identity but to inform the nature of the Anglospheric security community from which it accrues legitimacy. It is further posited that the Adler and Barnett model’s standard categorisations of pluralistic security community types do not adequately describe certain features of the Anglospheric security community. The research in this thesis has uncovered new institutions and fora and established that members do assist one another in conflict and confirms it to be a tightly-coupled version. However, the Anglospheric security community displays an actorship not implicit in Adler and Barnett’s categorisation. This thesis offers the terms ‘synergic’ and ‘hemiplegic’ to describe functional and dysfunctional communities. The Anglospheric security community is held to be synergic since it exhibits actorship on defence and security matters externally. In contrast the European Union is held up to be hemiplegic due to endemic problems to function cohesively on external defence issues

SECRET LIAISONS- A GROUNDED THEORY STUDY OF UNITED STATES INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION

Ph.DDOCTOR OF PHILOSOPH

Know your enemy: Implications of technology for intelligence standards in targeting under international humanitarian law

The law governing the methods and means of conflict was largely codified in 1977. Since that time the technology available for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance has advanced considerably. This research aims to establish how these technological developments have altered the intelligence standards expected for target verification. The three principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack are at the heart of this work and military doctrine has been investigated to further analyse state practice. In order to understand how different states approach the problem, the US, the UK and Germany have been used to compare and contrast approaches. Due to the highly secretive nature of targeting protocols, this project analyses several incidents of mistaken targeting from recent conflicts to establish how these have been investigated, what standards have been applied, and by whom. Through this process it has been possible to establish that there are disparities in how the standards are viewed by various groups which could create variation in understanding. I suggest that increased transparency in certain aspects of the rules governing forces in conflict would aid the development of customary law and provide better protection for civilians

World war I and the invention of American intelligence, 1878-1918

Intelligence changes as the nature of war changes. From the late 1870s, the United States military, as part of a broader reform process, began learning about intelligence in part from experience but more importantly by observing the practices of the great powers of Europe. The period of American involvement in World War I saw a rapid acceleration of this dev.elopment, with the United States continuing to learn from the United Kingdom and France. The war also saw intelligence spreading into fields that it had seldom if ever entered in the American experience. During the nineteen months of American belligerency American Intelligence agencies, notably the War Department's Military Intelligence Division and the Navy Department's Office of Naval Intelligence expanded greatly. In addition, the services started to adopt high technology tools such as aerial photography and signals intelligence. These new tools required the admission into the military departments and services of esoteric specialists who did not fit previous military stereotypes. The war also occasioned a vast expansion of domestic surveillance and intelligence, a result of the idea that the World War was a struggle not only of militaries but of entire societies. Espionage, too, grew in extent and sophistication and the moral stigma associated with it began to erode. Overseas, the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) in France grew its own large intelligence staff. All of these measures allowed General John J. Pershing, the AEF's commander, as well has other American leaders to be better informed than they had ever been during previous wars

Maritime airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in the High North - The role of anti-submarine warfare - 1945 to the present

There is mounting consensus among NATO allies that the resurgent Russian naval and submarine activity in the High North needs to be closely monitored and kept in check. And in spite of the rise of satellite technology and unmanned aircraft, the key instrument in that effort, at least for now, remains the Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) with its Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) capabilities. However, after three decades of focus on expeditionary and counterinsurgency (COIN) warfare, there has taken place an atrophy within the MPA community of knowledge, resources, experience and practice when it comes to the ASW aspects of maritime surveillance. This atrophy occurred just as the concept of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) came to play an increasingly important role in operational planning. The concept of ISR, however, is linked to expeditionary and COIN warfare, and it pays insufficient attention to the challenges of maritime airborne surveillance and the specific challenges of ASW. This thesis seeks to address this gap. It does so by analysing the past in order to find solutions for the future. The thesis examines the entwined evolution of airborne maritime surveillance by MPA and ASW in the High North, both during and after the Cold War, and focuses on the key NATO allies of Norway, the US, and the UK. The thesis further seeks to identify the fundamental building blocks’ and tenets of these historical surveillance operations that are then used to craft a novel theoretical framework for understanding the nature and function of maritime airborne ISR and its relationship to ASW. That framework is then applied to make recommendations for the future for maritime surveillance in the High North. The thesis’s key findings of this thesis are that: • Russian submarines as the capital ships of the Russia Navy. They have morphed from noisy, predictable vessels operating in known patrol areas, to superbly silent vessels operating in unpredictable patterns, carrying world-leading cruise missiles technology that constitute a renewed threat to both European and American targets; • the traditional airborne tool to meet the submarine threat, the MPA, is crucial but not adequate in a modern context. A multi-layered, international approach is required, which will benefit from utilizing artificial intelligence for complex acoustic sensor processing

Interception: law, media, and techniques

In 2013, Edward Snowden provided journalists with copies of classified documents detailing the operations of the National Security Agency of the United States and its allies; in particular, the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters. Snowden explained that he hoped to set the conditions for a new technical literacy that would alter understandings of the relationship between digital communications and law. This thesis asks whether or not law is capable of repaying Snowden’s faith. To that end, it offers a media-theoretical genealogy of the interception of communication in the UK. Interception is presented as an effect of different sets of technical operations, mediated and processed by communication devices and networks. The thesis traces interception techniques: from their beginnings in the General Post Office; in their evolution through the operations of technical media; to their reappearance in the operations of digital media that constitute the internet. The authorisation of interception, meanwhile, has always depended upon legal techniques mediated by interception warrants. A genealogy of the interception warrant is presented through an archival study of the distinctly different practices of document production that manufactured and programmed warrants in different media epochs; from the medieval Chancery and paper bureaucracies of state institutions to the graphical user interface, which mediates between interception techniques and law today. Finally, the thesis addresses the function of legislation as it in turn addresses warrants and interception techniques. Law and legislation, it is argued, are incapable of constraining technical operations of interception because, like interception, law is already an effect of media-technical operations. The law operates not by controlling interception, but by processing it, assigning meaning to it, and protecting the secrecy of ongoing interception operations

Domestic Surveillance in the United States: World War II to Vietnam

This dissertation examines archival documents as well as Congressional committee investigations and records to understand the scope and legality of domestic surveillance in the mid-twentieth century. Additionally, it works to understand how the intelligence agencies that carried out such surveillance were able to avoid meaningful punishment, even though their actions were often illegal. There has been a recent revival of concerns over the abilities of secret intelligence agencies to intercept and examine the communications of U.S. citizens. While the current revelations about domestic surveillance are certainly disconcerting, the reality is that domestic surveillance has a long and sordid history in the United States. With the advent and adoption of new technologies for communication, government access to the words and ideas of citizens proliferated in the twentieth century. This meant that surveillance could be carried out more broadly and efficiently than ever before. Such surveillance captured the communications of politicians, activists, workers, students, parents, teachers, Martin Luther King, Jr., and even Supreme Court Justices. The aim of this dissertation is two-fold. First, it seeks to understand how such surveillance impacts civil liberties, with special attention paid to First Amendment protections of speech, the press, and association, and Fourth Amendment protections against unwarranted search and seizure. This work finds that government surveillance has the consequences of chilling speech and stifling intellectual privacy. This study examines National Security Agency operations SHAMROCK and MINARET; Federal Bureau of Investigation Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) operations Communist Party USA, Socialist Workers Party, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, and New Left; and Central Intelligence Agency operations HTLINGUAL, CHAOS, MERRIMAC, and RESISTANCE. The examination of these operations concludes that the NSA, FBI, and CIA fundamentally violated the constitutional rights of countless citizens and these violations were carried out knowingly and repeatedly. The second aim of this dissertation is to investigate how these agencies were able to avoid meaningful punishment. To understand how they skirted punishment, it is necessary to think of the United States as a dual state. The dual state theory was developed in the 1930s by German legal scholar and political scientist Ernst Fraenkel. Fraenkel sought to understand the political, economic and legal changes taking place in Germany under the Third Reich. His theory suggests that in a dual state, there is Normative State, which is charged with enforcing normative laws such as contract and traffic law, and there is a Prerogative State, which arbitrarily applies laws to groups and individuals determined to be acting &ldquo;politically&rdquo; or in ways that threaten the current regime&mdash;in Germany, the Prerogative State was synonymous with the Gestapo. In much the same way, members of the American Prerogative State arbitrarily apply and suspend laws based on their perceptions of individual and group activities and ideologies. They can violate the constitutional rights of those people and organizations believed to threaten the government. Thus, the NSA, FBI, and CIA are not only members of the intelligence community, they are also members of the American Prerogative State and, as such, are able to violate laws with impunity. The dual state theory explains why these agencies were not punished for the illegal and unconstitutional surveillance practices that took place between World War II and the Vietnam War.</p

‘Secret Towns’ : British intelligence in Asia during the Cold War

The British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) remains one of the most obscure and elusive government agencies. Despite its rich and often tangled past, the SIS withstood various challenges in the twentieth century to become a vital instrument in Britain’s foreign policy, offering both traditional intelligence gathering, and a covert action capability. Despite recent revelations about its Cold War history, knowledge about this organisation is uneven at best, and this is particularly so in Asia. Despite Britain’s imperial history, which anchored informal intelligence gathering networks on a global scale, SIS’s presence in Asia is largely undiscovered. This thesis asks why this lacuna exists in SIS’s history; what was SIS activity in this region during the Cold War? Moreover, what was the value of this activity? Utilising a primarily archival methodology, this thesis sheds light on British intelligence activity in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Hanoi in the late 1960s. The strategic aims are twofold. Firstly, it explores the kinds of intelligence gathered, and the difficulties encountered from operating within the heart of a secure communist state in order to gauge an ‘enemy society’. In doing so, it challenges conventional definitions of intelligence, pointing to the notion of a dual identity diplomat-intelligence officer, that provided alternative means of acquiring intelligence within denied areas. In this way, it opens a window into a new dimension of SIS history, and, by extension, GCHQ, both of whom operated from the grey space between diplomacy and intelligence. Secondly, it examines this intelligence through the broader framework of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, given that these three case study countries were areas where the SIS operated, but where the CIA encountered real hindrances due to a lack of diplomatic premises. By tracing the path of British intelligence material, and analysing its reception by its American audience, it ultimately assesses the value of such intelligence. It argues that the granular detail afforded, and the insight on broader strategic relationships it provided, inverted the Special Relationship, rendering Britain a valued partner when it came to intelligence collection in this region and off-setting imbalances elsewhere