Bayesian Inference Semantics: A Modelling System and A Test Suite

We present BIS, a Bayesian Inference Seman- tics, for probabilistic reasoning in natural lan- guage. The current system is based on the framework of Bernardy et al. (2018), but de- parts from it in important respects. BIS makes use of Bayesian learning for inferring a hy- pothesis from premises. This involves estimat- ing the probability of the hypothesis, given the data supplied by the premises of an argument. It uses a syntactic parser to generate typed syn- tactic structures that serve as input to a model generation system. Sentences are interpreted compositionally to probabilistic programs, and the corresponding truth values are estimated using sampling methods. BIS successfully deals with various probabilistic semantic phe- nomena, including frequency adverbs, gener- alised quantifiers, generics, and vague predi- cates. It performs well on a number of interest- ing probabilistic reasoning tasks. It also sus- tains most classically valid inferences (instan- tiation, de Morgan’s laws, etc.). To test BIS we have built an experimental test suite with examples of a range of probabilistic and clas- sical inference patterns

Metasemantics and fuzzy mathematics

The present thesis is an inquiry into the metasemantics of natural languages, with a particular focus on the philosophical motivations for countenancing degreed formal frameworks for both psychosemantics and truth-conditional semantics. Chapter 1 sets out to offer a bird's eye view of our overall research project and the key questions that we set out to address. Chapter 2 provides a self-contained overview of the main empirical findings in the cognitive science of concepts and categorisation. This scientific background is offered in light of the fact that most variants of psychologically-informed semantics see our network of concepts as providing the raw materials on which lexical and sentential meanings supervene. Consequently, the metaphysical study of internalistically-construed meanings and the empirical study of our mental categories are overlapping research projects. Chapter 3 closely investigates a selection of species of conceptual semantics, together with reasons for adopting or disavowing them. We note that our ultimate aim is not to defend these perspectives on the study of meaning, but to argue that the project of making them formally precise naturally invites the adoption of degreed mathematical frameworks (e.g. probabilistic or fuzzy). In Chapter 4, we switch to the orthodox framework of truth-conditional semantics, and we present the limitations of a philosophical position that we call "classicism about vagueness". In the process, we come up with an empirical hypothesis for the psychological pull of the inductive soritical premiss and we make an original objection against the epistemicist position, based on computability theory. Chapter 5 makes a different case for the adoption of degreed semantic frameworks, based on their (quasi-)superior treatments of the paradoxes of vagueness. Hence, the adoption of tools that allow for graded membership are well-motivated under both semantic internalism and semantic externalism. At the end of this chapter, we defend an unexplored view of vagueness that we call "practical fuzzicism". Chapter 6, viz. the final chapter, is a metamathematical enquiry into both the fuzzy model-theoretic semantics and the fuzzy Davidsonian semantics for formal languages of type-free truth in which precise truth-predications can be expressed

Standpoint Logic: A Logic for Handling Semantic Variability, with Applications to Forestry Information

It is widely accepted that most natural language expressions do not have precise universally agreed definitions that fix their meanings. Except in the case of certain technical terminology, humans use terms in a variety of ways that are adapted to different contexts and perspectives. Hence, even when conversation participants share the same vocabulary and agree on fundamental taxonomic relationships (such as subsumption and mutual exclusivity), their view on the specific meaning of terms may differ significantly. Moreover, even individuals themselves may not hold permanent points of view, but rather adopt different semantics depending on the particular features of the situation and what they wish to communicate. In this thesis, we analyse logical and representational aspects of the semantic variability of natural language terms. In particular, we aim to provide a formal language adequate for reasoning in settings where different agents may adopt particular standpoints or perspectives, thereby narrowing the semantic variability of the vague language predicates in different ways. For that purpose, we present standpoint logic, a framework for interpreting languages in the presence of semantic variability. We build on supervaluationist accounts of vagueness, which explain linguistic indeterminacy in terms of a collection of possible interpretations of the terms of the language (precisifications). This is extended by adding the notion of standpoint, which intuitively corresponds to a particular point of view on how to interpret vague terminology, and may be taken by a person or institution in a relevant context. A standpoint is modelled by sets of precisifications compatible with that point of view and does not need to be fully precise. In this way, standpoint logic allows one to articulate finely grained and structured stipulations of the varieties of interpretation that can be given to a vague concept or a set of related concepts and also provides means to express relationships between different systems of interpretation. After the specification of precisifications and standpoints and the consideration of the relevant notions of truth and validity, a multi-modal logic language for describing standpoints is presented. The language includes a modal operator for each standpoint, such that \standb{s}\phi means that a proposition $\phi$ is unequivocally true according to the standpoint $s$ --- i.e.\ $\phi$ is true at all precisifications compatible with $s$. We provide the logic with a Kripke semantics and examine the characteristics of its intended models. Furthermore, we prove the soundness, completeness and decidability of standpoint logic with an underlying propositional language, and show that the satisfiability problem is NP-complete. We subsequently illustrate how this language can be used to represent logical properties and connections between alternative partial models of a domain and different accounts of the semantics of terms. As proof of concept, we explore the application of our formal framework to the domain of forestry, and in particular, we focus on the semantic variability of `forest'. In this scenario, the problematic arising of the assignation of different meanings has been repeatedly reported in the literature, and it is especially relevant in the context of the unprecedented scale of publicly available geographic data, where information and databases, even when ostensibly linked to ontologies, may present substantial semantic variation, which obstructs interoperability and confounds knowledge exchange

Typicality, graded membership, and vagueness

This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address arguments advanced by Osherson and Smith (1997), and Kamp and Partee (1995), that the two notions of degree of membership and typicality must relate to fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations. A version of prototype theory—the Threshold Model—is proposed to counter these arguments and three possible solutions to the problems of logical selfcontradiction and tautology for vague categorizations are outlined. In the final section graded membership is related to the social construction of conceptual boundaries maintained through language use

Vagueness in mathematics talk

The Cockcroft Report claimed that "mathematics provides a means of communication which is powerful, concise and unambiguous". Such precision in language may be a conventional aim of mathematics, particularly when communicated in writing. Nonetheless, as this thesis demonstrates, vagueness is commonplace when people talk about mathematics. In this thesis, I examine the circumstances in which vagueness arises in mathematics talk, and consider the practical purposes which speakers achieve by means of vague utterances in this context. The empirical database, which is considered in Chapters 4 to 7, consists almost entirely of transcripts of mathematical conversations between adult interviewers (including myself) and one or two children. The data were collected from clinical interviews focused on a small number of tasks, and from fragments of teaching. For the most part, the pupils involved in the study were aged between 9 and 12, although the age-range in Chapter 7 extends from 4 to 25. I draw on a number of approaches to discourse associated with 'pragmatics' -a field of linguistics - to analyse the motives and communicative effectiveness of speakers who deploy vagueness in mathematics talk. I claim that, for these speakers, vagueness fulfills a number of purposes, especially 'shielding', i. e. self-protection against accusation of being wrong. Another purpose is to give approximate information; sometimes to achieve shielding, but also to provide the level of detail that is deemed to be appropriate in a given situation. A different purpose, associated with a particular form of vagueness (of reference), is to compensate for lexical gaps in pursuit of effective communication of concepts and ideas. I show, in particular, how speakers use the pronouns 'it' and 'you' in mathematics talk to communicate concepts and generalisations. Some consideration is given to the intentions of 'expert speakers of mathematics when they deploy vague language. Their purposes include some of those identified for novices. Teachers also use vagueness as a means of indirectness in addressing pupils; this strategy is associated with the redress of 'face threatening acts'. My thesis is that vagueness can be viewed and presented, not as a disabling feature of language, but as a subtle and versatile device which speakers can and do deploy to make mathematical assertions with as much precision, accuracy or as much confidence as they judge is warranted by both the content and the circumstances of their utterances. I report on the validation and generalisation of my findings by an Informal Research Group of school teachers, who transcribed and analysed their own classroom interactions using the methods I had developed

Knowledge, lies and vagueness : a minimalist treatment

Minimalism concerning truth is the view that that all there is to be said concerning truth is exhausted by a set of basic platitudes. In the first part of this thesis, I apply this methodology to the concept of knowledge. In so doing, I develop a model of inexact knowledge grounded in what I call minimal margin for error principles. From these basic principles, I derive the controversial result that epistemological internalism and internalism with respect to self-knowledge are untenable doctrines. In the second part of this thesis, I develop a minimal theory of vagueness in which a rigorous but neutral definition of vagueness is shown to be possible. Three dimensions of vagueness are distinguished and a proof is given showing how two of these dimensions are equivalent facets of the same phenomenon. From the axioms of this minimal theory one can also show that there must be higher-order vagueness, contrary to what some have argued. In the final part of this thesis, I return to issues concerning the credentials of truth-minimalism. Is truth-minimalism compatible with the possibility of truth-value gaps? Is it right to say that truth-minimalism is crippled by the liar paradox? With respect to the former question, I develop a novel three-valued logical system which is both proof-theoretically and truth-theoretic ally well-motivated and compatible with at least one form of minimalism. With respect to the second question, a new solution to the liar paradox is developed based on the claim that while the liar sentence is meaningful, it is improper to even suppose that this sentence has a truth-status. On that basis, one can block the paradox by restricting the Rule of Assumptions in Gentzen-style presentations of the sentential sequent calculus. The first lesson of the liar paradox is that not all assumptions are for free. The second lesson of the liar is that, contrary to what has been alleged by many, minimalism concerning truth is far better placed than its rival theories to solve the paradox