Fish Wars: Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Approaches

Mirman (1979) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) suggested a simple two person multistage game-theoretical model which sheds some light on the economic implications inherent in the fishing conflicts where the decisions of the competitors have an effect on the evolution of the fish population and so, on the future expected profit of the competitors. In this paper we consider a generalization of the Levhari and Mirman Fish War Game for the case of n participants of the conflict for different scenarios of hierarchical and coalition structures of countries. We derive the equilibrium and its steady-state behavior for all these scenarios and analyze the impact which the hierarchical and coalition structures can have on fishery and ecology.Nash equilibrium, multistage game, fish war game, cooperative behavior

The role of war game in educating and training the commanders

The war game is considered to be the most effective means of military training due to the fact that it simulates the reality since it provides a semi-real picture of the weapons and equipment used in the training. Consequently, it provides the trainee with the appropriate environment to freely deal with such weapons as well as military equipment which in turn help the trainee become acquainted with all aspects of use and significantly instill confidence in him when such equipment are actually needed in war. More importantly, war game provides environment similar to what is going on in the actual battlefields allowing the commanders to exercise the training as if they were in a real war. Based on this perspective, the war game has emerged as an advanced training means which provides an analogy of the battle atmosphere to a great extent and gives commanders the opportunity to make decisions. It also helps in providing the commanders with a future view which enables them to plan their future and to deal with any challenges they might encounter. In fact, the role of war play is not only limited to training, but also extends to the aspects of military education, preparation, and development. The notion of war game is not only a means for the commander to have knowledge about the war before it occurs so as to be able to realize whether the decisions taken are right or wrong, but also it has become an effective means on which the armies depend when they train and polish the commanders' capabilities as well as skills. In fact, the concept of war play is not exclusive to the military field but also it is employed by all agencies and departments that require a future vision in training or planning. This paper sheds some light on the notion of war game and its role in training and educating the commanders and staff

How This War of Mine Creates Empathy for Virtual Characters

Is it possible to empathize with virtual characters? Are game characters just a means for game and story progress or can we develop a strong emotional connection with them? In this research essay, I analysis This War of Mine, a game about surviving a worn torn city where food is limited, and the player must make difficult moral decisions survive. The player controls a small group of characters who all need to be feed, get enough sleep, may need medical care, and other human needs. To look how This War of Mine creates empathy for the virtual characters, I will analysis how humanized characters and difficult dilemmas encourage empathy

Structural Adjustment and Endogenous Worker Recall Probabilities

In this paper we investigate the incentives of unemployed workers to wait for a recall when recall probabilities are endogenously determined by the waiting decisions of others. Because of a positive externality that arises when workers seek new employment, an excessive number of workers choose to wait for a recall, and structural adjustment is slow. We also find that a small reduction in the unemployment benefits, or introducing a small cash bonus for workers that get a new job, may have no e.ect on unemployment in some cases, while eradicating significant levels of unemployment in other cases. Our analysis suggests that the government may face a Samaritan’s Dilemma if it can influence the recall probability of workers, and that multiple equilibria may exist in a game involving both workers and an unemployment-averse government. Furthermore, we explore a link to the war of attrition literature, showing that the Bulow and Klemperer (1999) ”one too many”-result may not hold if there is uncertainty concerning when the game ends.structural adjustment,unemployment, recalls, search, war of attrition.

Structural adjustment and endogenous worker recall probabilities

In this paper we investigate the incentives of unemployed workers to wait for a recall when recall probabilities are endogenously determined by the waiting decisions of others. Because of a positive externality that arise when workers seek new employment, an excessive number of workers choose to wait for a recall, and structural adjustment is slow. We also find that a small reduction in the unemployment benefits, or introducing a small cash bonus for workers that get a new job, may have no effect on unemployment in some cases, while eradicating significant levels of unemployment in other cases. Our analysis suggests that the government my face a Samaritan’s Dilemma if it can influence the recall probability of workers, and that multiple equilibria may exist in a game involving both workers and an unemployment-averse government. Furthermore, we explore a link to the war of attrition literature, showing that the Bulow and Klemperer (1999) ”one too many”-result may not hold if there is uncertainty concerning when the game ends.Structural adjustment; unemployment; recalls; search; war of attrition.

Automatic reasoning in the Planet Wars game

An artificial intelligence algorithm for a computer game competition organised by Google and University ofWaterloo is presented. It competes with others by reasoning, evaluating of a situation and taking decisions in a war simulation

On Bid Disclosure in OCS Wildcat Auctions

I study a game in which two players first bid for offshore tracts (below which oil and gas may be present) and next time their drilling decisions. High types bid more aggressively if the auctioneer discloses bids as this gives them useful information about the profitability of drilling. A low type fears that the disclosure of her "low" bid reduces the other player's incentive to drill. Hence, they bid more aggressively if the auctioneer does not disclose bids. If players are sufficiently patient, it is optimal to disclose bids. Otherwise, it may be optimal not to disclose them.Information Externality, Oil Exploration, Waiting, War of attrition

Changing DoD’s Analysis Paradigm

War gaming and military modeling have a well documented history covering over two centuries, a period that coincides with the inception and evolution of formal professional development for military officers. The term war game used here refers to “a warfare model or simulation that does not involve the operations of actual forces, in which the flow of events affects and is affected by decisions made during the course of those events by players representing opposing sides.

Cyber Technology and the Arms Race

Cyber technology represents digital military capability with the purpose of causing damage to the military strength of a potential enemy. War using conventional weapons may be preceded by or combined with a strike using cyber technology. This paper introduces such technology into the theory of conflicts. The cost of war relative to the payoff from victory turns out to be crucial for the results on armament decisions. In the war game, two types of Nash equilibria both subject to warfare are possible depending on the perceived cost of war. In a symmetric war game with equal cyber capabilities and a low cost of war, hostile countries choose to invest an equal amount of resources in their militaries. A higher cost of war leads to increased armament. However, asymmetric access to cyber technology limits the international arms race with conventional weapons when the cost of war is small while it - again - intensifies the arms race when the cost of war is greater. In all cases, access to cyber technology makes wars with conventional weapons more likely. Heterogeneity in the success of cyber programs creates a first-mover advantage for a superior country in terms of a possibility for a pre-emptive strike