A Non-Cooperative Game Theoretical Approach For Power Control In Virtual MIMO Wireless Sensor Network

Power management is one of the vital issue in wireless sensor networks, where the lifetime of the network relies on battery powered nodes. Transmitting at high power reduces the lifetime of both the nodes and the network. One efficient way of power management is to control the power at which the nodes transmit. In this paper, a virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network (VMIMO-WSN)communication architecture is considered and the power control of sensor nodes based on the approach of game theory is formulated. The use of game theory has proliferated, with a broad range of applications in wireless sensor networking. Approaches from game theory can be used to optimize node level as well as network wide performance. The game here is categorized as an incomplete information game, in which the nodes do not have complete information about the strategies taken by other nodes. For virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network architecture considered, the Nash equilibrium is used to decide the optimal power level at which a node needs to transmit, to maximize its utility. Outcome shows that the game theoretic approach considered for VMIMO-WSN architecture achieves the best utility, by consuming less power.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201

Stochastic modelling of energy harvesting for low power sensor nodes

Battery lifetime is a key impediment to long-lasting low power sensor nodes. Energy or power harvesting mitigates the ependency on battery power, by converting ambient energy into electrical energy. This energy can then be used by the device for data collection and transmission. This paper proposes and analyses a queueing model to assess performance of such an energy harvesting sensor node. Accounting for energy harvesting, data collection and data transmission opportunities, the sensor node is modelled as a paired queueing system. The system has two queues, one representing accumulated energy and the other being the data queue. By means of some numerical examples, we investigate the energy-information trade-off

Applications of Repeated Games in Wireless Networks: A Survey

A repeated game is an effective tool to model interactions and conflicts for players aiming to achieve their objectives in a long-term basis. Contrary to static noncooperative games that model an interaction among players in only one period, in repeated games, interactions of players repeat for multiple periods; and thus the players become aware of other players' past behaviors and their future benefits, and will adapt their behavior accordingly. In wireless networks, conflicts among wireless nodes can lead to selfish behaviors, resulting in poor network performances and detrimental individual payoffs. In this paper, we survey the applications of repeated games in different wireless networks. The main goal is to demonstrate the use of repeated games to encourage wireless nodes to cooperate, thereby improving network performances and avoiding network disruption due to selfish behaviors. Furthermore, various problems in wireless networks and variations of repeated game models together with the corresponding solutions are discussed in this survey. Finally, we outline some open issues and future research directions.Comment: 32 pages, 15 figures, 5 tables, 168 reference

Multi-Layer Cyber-Physical Security and Resilience for Smart Grid

The smart grid is a large-scale complex system that integrates communication technologies with the physical layer operation of the energy systems. Security and resilience mechanisms by design are important to provide guarantee operations for the system. This chapter provides a layered perspective of the smart grid security and discusses game and decision theory as a tool to model the interactions among system components and the interaction between attackers and the system. We discuss game-theoretic applications and challenges in the design of cross-layer robust and resilient controller, secure network routing protocol at the data communication and networking layers, and the challenges of the information security at the management layer of the grid. The chapter will discuss the future directions of using game-theoretic tools in addressing multi-layer security issues in the smart grid.Comment: 16 page

Cross-layer distributed power control: A repeated games formulation to improve the sum energy-efficiency

The main objective of this work is to improve the energy-efficiency (EE) of a multiple access channel (MAC) system, through power control, in a distributed manner. In contrast with many existing works on energy-efficient power control, which ignore the possible presence of a queue at the transmitter, we consider a new generalized cross-layer EE metric. This approach is relevant when the transmitters have a non-zero energy cost even when the radiated power is zero and takes into account the presence of a finite packet buffer and packet arrival at the transmitter. As the Nash equilibrium (NE) is an energy-inefficient solution, the present work aims at overcoming this deficit by improving the global energy-efficiency. Indeed, as the considered system has multiple agencies each with their own interest, the performance metric reflecting the individual interest of each decision maker is the global energy-efficiency defined then as the sum over individual energy-efficiencies. Repeated games (RG) are investigated through the study of two dynamic games (finite RG and discounted RG), whose equilibrium is defined when introducing a new operating point (OP), Pareto-dominating the NE and relying only on individual channel state information (CSI). Accordingly, closed-form expressions of the minimum number of stages of the game for finite RG (FRG) and the maximum discount factor of the discounted RG (DRG) were established. The cross-layer model in the RG formulation leads to achieving a shorter minimum number of stages in the FRG even for higher number of users. In addition, the social welfare (sum of utilities) in the DRG decreases slightly with the cross-layer model when the number of users increases while it is reduced considerably with the Goodman model. Finally, we show that in real systems with random packet arrivals, the cross-layer power control algorithm outperforms the Goodman algorithm.Comment: 36 pages, single column draft forma