From Fine- to Coarse-Grained Dynamic Information Flow Control and Back, a Tutorial on Dynamic Information Flow

This tutorial provides a complete and homogeneous account of the latestadvances in fine- and coarse-grained dynamic information-flow control (IFC)security. Since the 70s, the programming language and the operating systemcommunities have proposed different IFC approaches. IFC operating systems trackinformation flows in a coarse-grained fashion, at the granularity of a process.In contrast, traditional language-based approaches to IFC are fine-grained:they track information flows at the granularity of program variables. Fordecades, researchers believed coarse-grained IFC to be strictly less permissivethan fine-grained IFC -- coarse-grained IFC systems seem inherently lessprecise because they track less information -- and so granularity appeared tobe a fundamental feature of IFC systems. We show that the granularity of thetracking system does not fundamentally restrict how precise or permissivedynamic IFC systems can be. To this end, we mechanize two mostly standardlanguages, one with a fine-grained dynamic IFC system and the other with acoarse-grained dynamic IFC system, and prove a semantics-preserving translationfrom each language to the other. In addition, we derive the standard securityproperty of non-interference of each language from that of the other via ourverified translation. These translations stand to have important implicationson the usability of IFC approaches. The coarse- to fine-grained direction canbe used to remove the label annotation burden that fine-grained systems imposeon developers, while the fine- to coarse-grained translation shows thatcoarse-grained systems -- which are easier to design and implement -- can trackinformation as precisely as fine-grained systems and provides an algorithm forautomatically retrofitting legacy applications to run on existingcoarse-grained systems.<br

The Dynamic Practice and Static Theory of Gradual Typing

We can tease apart the research on gradual types into two `lineages\u27: a pragmatic, implementation-oriented dynamic-first lineage and a formal, type-theoretic, static-first lineage. The dynamic-first lineage\u27s focus is on taming particular idioms - `pre-existing conditions\u27 in untyped programming languages. The static-first lineage\u27s focus is on interoperation and individual type system features, rather than the collection of features found in any particular language. Both appear in programming languages research under the name "gradual typing", and they are in active conversation with each other. What are these two lineages? What challenges and opportunities await the static-first lineage? What progress has been made so far

Semantics for Noninterference with Interaction Trees

Noninterference is the strong information-security property that a program does not leak secrets through publicly-visible behavior. In the presence of effects such as nontermination, state, and exceptions, reasoning about noninterference quickly becomes subtle. We advocate using interaction trees (ITrees) to provide compositional mechanized proofs of noninterference for multi-language, effectful, nonterminating programs, while retaining executability of the semantics. We develop important foundations for security analysis with ITrees: two indistinguishability relations, leading to two standard notions of noninterference with adversaries of different strength, along with metatheory libraries for reasoning about each. We demonstrate the utility of our results using a simple imperative language with embedded assembly, along with a compiler into that assembly language

From fine- to coarse-grained dynamic information flow control and back

We show that fine-grained and coarse-grained dynamic information-flow control (IFC) systems are equally expressive. To this end, we mechanize two mostly standard languages, one with a fine-grained dynamic IFC system and the other with a coarse-grained dynamic IFC system, and prove a semantics-preserving translation from each language to the other. In addition, we derive the standard security property of non-interference of each language from that of the other, via our verified translation. This result addresses a longstanding open problem in IFC: whether coarse-grained dynamic IFC techniques are less expressive than fine-grained dynamic IFC techniques (they are not!). The translations also stand to have important implications on the usability of IFC approaches. The coarse- to fine-grained direction can be used to remove the label annotation burden that fine-grained systems impose on developers, while the fine- to coarse-grained translation shows that coarse-grained systems---which are easier to design and implement---can track information as precisely as fine-grained systems and provides an algorithm for automatically retrofitting legacy applications to run on existing coarse-grained systems

Software Engineering with Incomplete Information

Information may be the common currency of the universe, the stuff of creation. As the physicist John Wheeler claimed, we get ``it from bit''. Measuring information, however, is a hard problem. Knowing the meaning of information is a hard problem. Directing the movement of information is a hard problem. This hardness comes when our information about information is incomplete. Yet we need to offer decision making guidance, to the computer or developer, when facing this incompleteness. This work addresses this insufficiency within the universe of software engineering. This thesis addresses the first problem by demonstrating that obtaining the relative magnitude of information flow is computationally less expensive than an exact measurement. We propose ranked information flow, or RIF, where different flows are ordered according to their FlowForward, a new measure designed for ease of ordering. To demonstrate the utility of FlowForward, we introduce information contour maps: heatmapped callgraphs of information flow within software. These maps serve multiple engineering uses, such as security and refactoring. By mixing a type system with RIF, we address the problem of meaning. Information security is a common concern in software engineering. We present OaST, the world's first gradual security type system that replaces dynamic monitoring with information theoretic risk assessment. OaST now contextualises FlowForward within a formally verified framework: secure program components communicate over insecure channels ranked by how much information flows through them. This context helps the developer interpret the flows and enables security policy discovery, adaptation and refactoring. Finally, we introduce safestrings, a type-based system for controlling how the information embedded within a string moves through a program. This takes a structural approach, whereby a string subtype is a more precise, information limited, subset of string, ie a string that contains an email address, rather than anything else

Verifying Information Flow Control Libraries

Information Flow Control (IFC) is a principled approach to protecting the confidentiality and integrity of data in software systems. Intuitively, IFC sys- tems associate data with security labels that track and restrict flows of information throughout a program in order to enforce security. Most IFC techniques require developers to use specific programming languages and tools that require substantial efforts to develop or to adopt. To avoid redundant work and lower the threshold for adopting secure languages, IFC has been embedded in general-purpose languages through software libraries that promote security-by-construction with their API.This thesis makes several contributions to state-of-the-art static (MAC) and dynamic IFC libraries (LIO) in three areas: expressive power, theoretical IFC foundations and protection against covert channels. Firstly, the thesis gives a functor algebraic structure to sensitive data, in a way that it can be processed through classic functional programming patterns that do not incur in security checks. Then, it establishes the formal security guarantees of MAC, using the standard proof technique of term erasure, enriched with two-steps erasure, a novel idea that simplifies reasoning about advanced programming features, such as exceptions, mutable references and concurrency. Secondly, the thesis demonstrates that the lightweight, but coarse-grained, enforcement of dynamic IFC libraries (e.g., LIO) can be as precise and permissive as the fine-grained, but heavyweight, approach of fully-fledged IFC languages. Lastly, the thesis contributes to the design of secure runtime systems that protect IFC libraries, and IFC languages as well, against internal- and external-timing covert channels that leak information through certain runtime system resources and features, such as lazy evaluation and parallelism.The results of this thesis are supported with extensive machine-checked proof scripts, consisting of 12,000 lines of code developed in the Agda proof assistant

Principles of Security and Trust

This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2019, which took place in Prague, Czech Republic, in April 2019, held as part of the European Joint Conference on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2019. The 10 papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 27 submissions. They deal with theoretical and foundational aspects of security and trust, including on new theoretical results, practical applications of existing foundational ideas, and innovative approaches stimulated by pressing practical problems

Principles of Security and Trust

This open access book constitutes the proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Principles of Security and Trust, POST 2019, which took place in Prague, Czech Republic, in April 2019, held as part of the European Joint Conference on Theory and Practice of Software, ETAPS 2019. The 10 papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 27 submissions. They deal with theoretical and foundational aspects of security and trust, including on new theoretical results, practical applications of existing foundational ideas, and innovative approaches stimulated by pressing practical problems