Interpersonal and Ideological Kindness: A Biocultural Approach

In accordance with Richard Dawkins’ materialist “selfish gene” theory of human behavior, altruism is a subject matter that is treated conservatively by biologists, whose understanding of the human version of altruism tends toward mutualistic and sometimes reputation-based explanations of charity, kindness, and helping. Trivers (1971) first stated that non-kin altruism could evolve if altruistic behavior is balanced between partners over time, implicating a strictly mutualistic domain for kindness. But kindness herein is defined, beyond mere mutualism or reciprocity, as “the quality of being friendly, generous, and considerate.” Further, kindness tends to have an action-oriented dimension, as in Goetz et al.’s (2010) definition of compassion, denoting helpfulness, the reduction of another’s suffering, or self-sacrifice. In this paper, I will employ a biocultural approach in exploring the psychological and neuroscientific data on the evolutionary aspect of social behavior as it pertains to kindness. First, I will draw on evolutionary theories of cooperation in suggesting that an individual and ideological ethos of kindness could have evolved as an adaptive orientation that, in a Durkheimian sense, preempted ostracism and cemented alliances as a beneficial balance to the fitness risks inherent in altruism. Then, consulting data on the neurochemical profiles of dopamine and oxytocin, I will describe the sort of human psychological variation that would reveal a complimentary continuum of evolved social proclivities, from selfish to giving. In proposing that non-reciprocal kindness indeed exists, however, I argue that its presence in human societies is statistically rare, as assumptions about human biology suggest. This study thus concludes with a cautious message about the human condition: while the rareness of kindness should have a profoundly fundamental explanatory value in social analysis, scientific confirmation of its fragility would recommend further scholarship designed to highlight its exceptional biological position vis-à-vis the selfish gene

A lineage explanation of human normative guidance: the coadaptive model of instrumental rationality and shared intentionality.

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance

Mental states as emergent properties : from walking to consciousness

In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon under examination. Using a neural architecture that shows the abilities of autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested in a robot-control system. we do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious in the first place. on the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control behavior. only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent descriptions of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be applied to such an artificial system. originally these phenomena are necessarily defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. a functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested, for example, in a quantitative simulation. it is important to note that we are not concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of mental phenomena. this approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information concerning the possible function of these phenomena. in other words, we assume that phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacognition (or reflexive consciousness). following these arguments, we claim that our network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level; it also shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness can be observed, too. concerning consciousness, we argue that properties assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our network, including the property of global availability, which means that elements of the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current context. further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness

Non-pharmaceutical Interventions and Social Distancing as Intersubjective Care and Collective Protection

The paper discusses non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) as a collective form of protection that, in terms of health justice, benefits groups at risk, allowing them to engage in social life and activities during health crises. More specifically, the paper asserts that NPIs that realize social distancing are justifiable insofar as they are constitutive of a type of social protection that allows everyone, especially social disadvantaged agents, to access the public health sphere and other fundamental social spheres, such as the family and civil society.publishedVersionPeer reviewe

A hexapod walker using a heterarchical architecture for action selection

Schilling M, Paskarbeit J, Hoinville T, et al. A hexapod walker using a heterarchical architecture for action selection. Frontiers in Computational Neuroscience. 2013;7:126.Moving in a cluttered environment with a six-legged walking machine that has additional body actuators, therefore controlling 22 DoFs, is not a trivial task. Already simple forward walking on a flat plane requires the system to select between different internal states. The orchestration of these states depends on walking velocity and on external disturbances. Such disturbances occur continuously, for example due to irregular up-and-down movements of the body or slipping of the legs, even on flat surfaces, in particular when negotiating tight curves. The number of possible states is further increased when the system is allowed to walk backward or when front legs are used as grippers and cannot contribute to walking. Further states are necessary for expansion that allow for navigation. Here we demonstrate a solution for the selection and sequencing of different (attractor) states required to control different behaviors as are forward walking at different speeds, backward walking, as well as negotiation of tight curves. This selection is made by a recurrent neural network (RNN) of motivation units, controlling a bank of decentralized memory elements in combination with the feedback through the environment. The underlying heterarchical architecture of the network allows to select various combinations of these elements. This modular approach representing an example of neural reuse of a limited number of procedures allows for adaptation to different internal and external conditions. A way is sketched as to how this approach may be expanded to form a cognitive system being able to plan ahead. This architecture is characterized by different types of modules being arranged in layers and columns, but the complete network can also be considered as a holistic system showing emergent properties which cannot be attributed to a specific module

Mental states as emergent properties. From walking to consciousness

Cruse H, Schilling M. Mental states as emergent properties. From walking to consciousness. In: Metzinger T, Windt J, eds. Open Mind. Frankfurt/M.: MIND Group Frankfurt/M.; 2015.In this article we propose a bottom-up approach to higher-level mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness. The idea behind this bottom-up approach is that higher-level properties may arise as emergent properties, i.e., occur without requiring explicit implementation of the phenomenon under examination. Using a neural architecture that shows the abilities of autonomous agents, we want to come up with quantitative hypotheses concerning cognitive mechanisms, i.e., to come up with testable predictions concerning the underlying structure and functioning of an autonomous system that can be tested in a robot-control system. We do not want to build an artificial system that is, for example, conscious in the first place. On the contrary, we want to construct a system able to control behavior. Only then will this system be used as a tool to test to what extent descriptions of mental phenomena used in psychology or philosophy of mind may be applied to such an artificial system. Originally these phenomena are necessarily defined using verbal formulations that allow for interpreting them differently. A functional definition, in contrast, does not suffer from being ambiguous, because it can be expressed explicitly using mathematical formulations that can be tested, for example, in a quantitative simulation. It is important to note that we are not concerned with the “hard” problem of consciousness, i.e., the subjective aspect of mental phenomena. This approach is possible because, adopting a monist view, we assume that we can circumvent the “hard” problem without losing information concerning the possible function of these phenomena. In other words, we assume that phenomenality is an inherent property of both access consciousness and metacognition (or reflexive consciousness). Following these arguments, we claim that our network does not only show emergent properties on the reactive level; it also shows that mental states, such as emotions, attention, intention, volition, or consciousness can be observed, too. Concerning consciousness, we argue that properties assumed to partially constitute access consciousness are present in our network, including the property of global availability, which means that elements of the procedural memory can be addressed even if they do not belong to the current context. Further expansions are discussed that may allow for the recognition of properties attributed to metacognition or reflexive consciousness

A Lineage Explanation of Human Normative Guidance: The Coadaptive Model of Instrumental Rationality and Shared Intentionality

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance

Bonobo Cognition and Behaviour

This volume includes twelve novel empirical papers focusing on the behaviour and cognition of both captive and wild bonobos (''Pan paniscus''). Overall it demonstrates how anyone interested in understanding humans or chimpanzees must also know bonobos

Political Narratives and the Language of 'Communitarianism': A comparison of the SNP and Labour Party in Scotland, 1999-2011

This thesis argues that the language of communitarianism was evident in the political narratives adopted by the SNP and Labour Party in Scotland during the period 1999 - 2011. It offers a critique of communitarian philosophy and analysis of the primarily implicit role that this branch of political thought played in shaping the ideas, policies and manifestos of both parties during the first twelve yeas in which a measure of legislative and executive power was devolved from London to Edinburgh. It contends that, whilst adopting divergent strategies, each was inspired by communitarian theories; albeit in rather different ways. Both however, took what may be perceived as a 'communitarian turn' in their respective political narratives, in order to cope with the distinct challenges that each faced