13 research outputs found
From Private Simultaneous Messages to Zero-Information Arthur-Merlin Protocols and Back
Göös, Pitassi and Watson (ITCS, 2015) have recently introduced the notion of \emph{Zero-Information Arthur-Merlin Protocols} (ZAM). In this model, which can be viewed as a private version of the standard Arthur-Merlin communication complexity game, Alice and Bob are holding a pair of inputs and respectively, and Merlin, the prover, attempts to convince them that some public function evaluates to 1 on . In addition to standard completeness and soundness, Göös et al., require an additional ``zero-knowledge\u27\u27 property which asserts that on each yes-input, the distribution of Merlin\u27s proof leaks no information about the inputs to an external observer.
In this paper, we relate this new notion to the well-studied model of \emph{Private Simultaneous Messages} (PSM) that was originally suggested by Feige, Naor and Kilian (STOC, 1994). Roughly speaking, we show that the randomness complexity of ZAM essentially corresponds to the communication complexity of PSM, and that the communication complexity of ZAM essentially corresponds to the randomness complexity of PSM. This relation works in both directions where different variants of PSM are being used. Consequently, we derive better upper-bounds on the communication-complexity of ZAM for arbitrary functions. As a secondary contribution, we reveal new connections between different variants of PSM protocols which we believe to be of independent interest
Placing Conditional Disclosure of Secrets in the Communication Complexity Universe
In the conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS) problem (Gertner et al., J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2000) Alice and Bob, who hold n-bit inputs x and y respectively, wish to release a common secret z to Carol (who knows both x and y) if and only if the input (x,y) satisfies some predefined predicate f. Alice and Bob are allowed to send a single message to Carol which may depend on their inputs and some shared randomness, and the goal is to minimize the communication complexity while providing information-theoretic security.
Despite the growing interest in this model, very few lower-bounds are known. In this paper, we relate the CDS complexity of a predicate f to its communication complexity under various communication games. For several basic predicates our results yield tight, or almost tight, lower-bounds of Omega(n) or Omega(n^{1-epsilon}), providing an exponential improvement over previous logarithmic lower-bounds.
We also define new communication complexity classes that correspond to different variants of the CDS model and study the relations between them and their complements. Notably, we show that allowing for imperfect correctness can significantly reduce communication - a seemingly new phenomenon in the context of information-theoretic cryptography. Finally, our results show that proving explicit super-logarithmic lower-bounds for imperfect CDS protocols is a necessary step towards proving explicit lower-bounds against the class AM, or even AM cap coAM - a well known open problem in the theory of communication complexity. Thus imperfect CDS forms a new minimal class which is placed just beyond the boundaries of the "civilized" part of the communication complexity world for which explicit lower-bounds are known
Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Proximity
Interactive proofs of proximity (IPPs) are interactive proofs in which the verifier runs in time sub-linear in the input length. Since the verifier cannot even read the entire input, following the property testing literature, we only require that the verifier reject inputs that are far from the language (and, as usual, accept inputs that are in the language).
In this work, we initiate the study of zero-knowledge proofs of proximity (ZKPP). A ZKPP convinces a sub-linear time verifier that the input is close to the language (similarly to an IPP) while simultaneously guaranteeing a natural zero-knowledge property. Specifically, the verifier learns nothing beyond (1) the fact that the input is in the language, and (2) what it could additionally infer by reading a few bits of the input.
Our main focus is the setting of statistical zero-knowledge where we show that the following hold unconditionally (where N denotes the input length):
- Statistical ZKPPs can be sub-exponentially more efficient than property testers (or even non-interactive IPPs): We show a natural property which has a statistical ZKPP with a polylog(N) time verifier, but requires Omega(sqrt(N)) queries (and hence also runtime) for every property tester.
- Statistical ZKPPs can be sub-exponentially less efficient than IPPs: We show a property which has an IPP with a polylog(N) time verifier, but cannot have a statistical ZKPP with even an N^(o(1)) time verifier.
- Statistical ZKPPs for some graph-based properties such as promise versions of expansion and bipartiteness, in the bounded degree graph model, with polylog(N) time verifiers exist.
Lastly, we also consider the computational setting where we show that:
- Assuming the existence of one-way functions, every language computable either in (logspace uniform) NC or in SC, has a computational ZKPP with a (roughly) sqrt(N) time verifier.
- Assuming the existence of collision-resistant hash functions, every language in NP has a statistical zero-knowledge argument of proximity with a polylog(N) time verifier
From Private Simultaneous Messages to Zero-Information Arthur–Merlin Protocols and Back
Göös, Pitassi and Watson (ITCS, 2015) have recently introduced the notion of \emph{Zero-Information Arthur-Merlin Protocols} (ZAM). In this model, which can be viewed as a private version of the standard Arthur-Merlin communication complexity game, Alice and Bob are holding a pair of inputs and respectively, and Merlin, the prover, attempts to convince them that some public function evaluates to 1 on . In addition to standard completeness and soundness, Göös et al., require an additional ``zero-knowledge\u27\u27 property which asserts that on each yes-input, the distribution of Merlin\u27s proof leaks no information about the inputs to an external observer.
In this paper, we relate this new notion to the well-studied model of \emph{Private Simultaneous Messages} (PSM) that was originally suggested by Feige, Naor and Kilian (STOC, 1994). Roughly speaking, we show that the randomness complexity of ZAM essentially corresponds to the communication complexity of PSM, and that the communication complexity of ZAM essentially corresponds to the randomness complexity of PSM. This relation works in both directions where different variants of PSM are being used. Consequently, we derive better upper-bounds on the communication-complexity of ZAM for arbitrary functions. As a secondary contribution, we reveal new connections between different variants of PSM protocols which we believe to be of independent interest
Predicate Encryption from Bilinear Maps and One-Sided Probabilistic Rank
In predicate encryption for a function , an authority can create ciphertexts and secret keys which are associated with `attributes\u27. A user with decryption key corresponding to attribute can decrypt a ciphertext corresponding to a message and attribute if and only if . Furthermore, the attribute remains hidden to the user if .
We construct predicate encryption from assumptions on bilinear maps for a large class of new functions, including sparse set disjointness, Hamming distance at most , inner product mod 2, and any function with an efficient Arthur-Merlin communication protocol. Our construction uses a new probabilistic representation of Boolean functions we call `one-sided probabilistic rank,\u27 and combines it with known constructions of inner product encryption in a novel way
On the Relationship between Statistical Zero-Knowledge and Statistical Randomized Encodings
\emph{Statistical Zero-knowledge proofs} (Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff, SICOMP 1989) allow a computationally-unbounded server to convince a computationally-limited client that an input is in a language without revealing any additional information about that the client cannot compute by herself. \emph{Randomized encoding} (RE) of functions (Ishai and Kushilevitz, FOCS 2000) allows a computationally-limited client to publish a single (randomized) message, \enc(x), from which the server learns whether is in and nothing else.
It is known that , the class of problems that admit statistically private randomized encoding with polynomial-time client and computationally-unbounded server, is contained in the class of problems that have statistical zero-knowledge proof. However, the exact relation between these two classes, and, in particular, the possibility of equivalence was left as an open problem.
In this paper, we explore the relationship between \SRE and \SZK, and derive the following results:
* In a non-uniform setting, statistical randomized encoding with one-side privacy () is equivalent to non-interactive statistical zero-knowledge (). These variants were studied in the past as natural relaxation/strengthening of the original notions. Our theorem shows that proving is equivalent to showing that and . The latter is a well-known open problem (Goldreich, Sahai, Vadhan, CRYPTO 1999).
* If is non-trivial (not in ), then infinitely-often one-way functions exist. The analog hypothesis for yields only \emph{auxiliary-input} one-way functions (Ostrovsky, Structure in Complexity Theory, 1991), which is believed to be a significantly weaker implication.
* If there exists an average-case hard language with \emph{perfect randomized encoding}, then collision-resistance hash functions (CRH) exist. Again, a similar assumption for implies only constant-round statistically-hiding commitments, a primitive which seems weaker than CRH.
We believe that our results sharpen the relationship between and and illuminates the core differences between these two classes
Relating non-local quantum computation to information theoretic cryptography
Non-local quantum computation (NLQC) is a cheating strategy for
position-verification schemes, and has appeared in the context of the AdS/CFT
correspondence. Here, we connect NLQC to the wider context of information
theoretic cryptography by relating it to a number of other cryptographic
primitives. We show one special case of NLQC, known as -routing, is
equivalent to the quantum analogue of the conditional disclosure of secrets
(CDS) primitive, where by equivalent we mean that a protocol for one task gives
a protocol for the other with only small overhead in resource costs. We further
consider another special case of position verification, which we call coherent
function evaluation (CFE), and show CFE protocols induce similarly efficient
protocols for the private simultaneous message passing (PSM) scenario. By
relating position-verification to these cryptographic primitives, a number of
results in the cryptography literature give new implications for NLQC, and vice
versa. These include the first sub-exponential upper bounds on the worst case
cost of -routing of entanglement, the first example
of an efficient -routing strategy for a problem believed to be outside
, linear lower bounds on entanglement for CDS in the quantum setting,
linear lower bounds on communication cost of CFE, and efficient protocols for
CDS in the quantum setting for functions that can be computed with quantum
circuits of low depth
Ad Hoc PSM Protocols: Secure Computation Without Coordination
We study the notion of {\em ad hoc secure computation}, recently introduced by Beimel et al. (ITCS 2016),
in the context of the {\em Private Simultaneous Messages} (PSM) model of Feige et al.\ (STOC 2004).
In ad hoc secure computation we have parties that may potentially participate in a protocol but, at the actual time of execution, only of them, whose identity is {\em not} known in advance, actually participate. This situation is particularly challenging in the PSM setting, where protocols are non-interactive (a single message from each participating party to a special output party) and where the parties rely on pre-distributed, correlated randomness (that in the ad-hoc setting will have to take into account all possible sets of participants).
We present several different constructions of \apsm\ protocols from standard PSM protocols. These constructions imply, in particular, that efficient information-theoretic \apsm\ protocols exist for NC1 and different classes of log-space computation, and efficient computationally-secure \apsm\ protocols for polynomial-time computable functions can be based on a one-way function. As an application, we obtain an information-theoretic implementation of {\em order-revealing encryption} whose security holds for two messages.
We also consider the case where the actual number of participating parties may be larger than the minimal for which the protocol is designed to work. In this case, it is unavoidable that the output party learns the output corresponding to each subset of out of the participants. Therefore, a ``best possible security\u27\u27 notion, requiring that this will be the {\em only} information that the output party learns, is needed. We present connections between this notion and the previously studied notion of {\em -robust PSM} (also known as ``non-interactive MPC\u27\u27).
We show that constructions in this setting for even simple functions (like AND or threshold) can be translated into non-trivial instances of program obfuscation (such as {\em point function obfuscation} and {\em fuzzy point function obfuscation}, respectively). We view these results as a negative indication that protocols with ``best possible security\u27\u27 are impossible to realize efficiently in the information-theoretic setting or require strong assumptions in the computational setting
Conditional Disclosure of Secrets: Amplification, Closure, Amortization, Lower-bounds, and Separations
In the \emph{conditional disclosure of secrets} problem (Gertner et al., J. Comput. Syst. Sci., 2000) Alice and Bob, who hold inputs and respectively, wish to release a common secret to Carol (who knows both and ) if only if the input satisfies some predefined predicate . Alice and Bob are allowed to send a single message to Carol which may depend on their inputs and some joint randomness and the goal is to minimize the communication complexity while providing information-theoretic security.
Following Gay, Kerenidis, and Wee (Crypto 2015), we study the communication complexity of CDS protocols and derive the following positive and negative results.
1. *Closure* A CDS for can be turned into a CDS for its complement with only a minor blow-up in complexity. More generally, for a (possibly non-monotone) predicate , we obtain a CDS for whose cost is essentially linear in the formula size of and polynomial in the CDS complexity of .
2. *Amplification* It is possible to reduce the privacy and correctness error of a CDS from constant to with a multiplicative overhead of . Moreover, this overhead can be amortized over -bit secrets.
3. *Amortization* Every predicate over -bit inputs admits a CDS for multi-bit secrets whose amortized communication complexity per secret bit grows linearly with the input length for sufficiently long secrets. In contrast, the best known upper-bound for single-bit secrets is exponential in .
4. *Lower-bounds* There exists a (non-explicit) predicate over -bit inputs for which any perfect (single-bit) CDS requires communication of at least . This is an exponential improvement over the previously known lower-bound.
5. *Separations* There exists an (explicit) predicate whose CDS complexity is exponentially smaller than its randomized communication complexity. This matches a lower-bound of Gay et. al., and, combined with another result of theirs, yields an exponential separation between the communication complexity of linear CDS and non-linear CDS. This is the first provable gap between the communication complexity of linear CDS (which captures most known protocols) and non-linear CDS
The Complexity of Multiparty PSM Protocols and Related Models
We study the efficiency of computing arbitrary k-argument functions in the Private Simultaneous Messages (PSM) model of (Feige et al. STOC\u2794, Ishai and Kushilevitz ISTCS\u2797). This question was recently studied by (Beimel et al. TCC\u2714), in the two-party case (k = 2). We tackle this question in the general case of PSM protocols for k > 2 parties. Our motivation is two-fold: On one hand, there are various applications (old and new) of PSM protocols for constructing other cryptographic primitives, where obtaining more efficient PSM protocols imply more efficient primitives. On the other hand, improved PSM protocols are an interesting goal on its own. In particular, we pay a careful attention to the case of small number of parties (e.g., k = 3,4, 5), which may be especially interesting in practice, and optimize our protocols for those cases.
Our new upper bounds include a k-party PSM protocol, for any k > 2 and any function f : [N]^k --> {0; 1}, of complexity O(poly(k) N^{k/2}) (compared to the previous upper bound of O(poly(k) N^{k-1})), and even better bounds for small values of k; e.g., an O(N) PSM protocol for the case k = 3. We also handle the more involved case where different parties have inputs of different sizes, which is useful both in practice and for applications.
As applications, we obtain more efficient Non-Interactive secure Multi-Party (NIMPC) protocols (a variant of PSM, where some of the parties may collude with the referee (Beimel et al. CRYPTO\u2714)), improved ad-hoc PSM protocols (another variant of PSM, where the subset of participating parties is not known in advance (Beimel et al. ITCS\u2716, Beimel et al. EUROCRYPT\u2717)), secret-sharing schemes for strongly-homogeneous access structures with smaller share size than previously known, and better homogeneous distribution designs (Beimel et al. ITCS\u2716), a primitive with many cryptographic applications on its own