Reasoning with Intervals on Granules

The formalizations of periods of time inside a linear model of Time are usually based on the notion of intervals, that may contain or may not their endpoints. This is not enought when the periods are written in terms of coarse granularities with respect to the event taken into account. For instance, how to express the inter-war period in terms of a {\em years} interval? This paper presents a new type of intervals, neither open ,nor closed or open-closed and the extension of operations on intervals of this new type, in order to reduce the gap between the discourse related to temporal relationship and its translation into a discretized model of Time

Proximal Deixis with Calendar Terms: Cross-linguistic Patterns of Temporal Reference

An analysis of deictic temporal reference using major calendar units (day, year, week, month) and their divisions (days of the week, parts of day). Our analysis shows systematic inter-linguistic tendencies et indicates that each type of unit encodes different information, affecting their capacity to function independently as temporal markers, in the absence of additional linguistic or extra-linguistic elements.Cette étude analyse la référence temporelle déictique avec des segments fondamentales du calendrier (jours, années, semaines, mois) et leurs divisions (jours de la semaine, certaines parties de la journée). Notre analyse montre des tendances inter-linguistiques systématiques et indique que chaque type encode des informations différentes qui affectent leur capacité de fonctionner indépendamment en tant que marqueurs temporels en l'absence d'autres éléments linguistiques et extra-linguistiques

Représentation mathématique du temps : après Reichenbach

Article à paraître dans la revue Tranel.La plupart des modèles formels du temps pour la linguistique assimilent in fine « la ligne métaphorique du temps » à la droite numérique des nombres réels. Pourtant, beaucoup de linguistes ont adopté une approche relationnelle de la temporalité, se fondant sur les travaux de Reichenbach (1947). Nous montrons ici qu'il existe un modèle mathématique qui suit de manière naturelle cette approche relationnelle. Il s'agit du modèle des S-langages, fondé sur la théorie des langages formels. En effet, ce modèle (i) capte les deux relations temporelles fondamentales de précédence et de simultanéité, (ii) permet de représenter à la fois les propriétés de discrétion et de continuité des objets linguistiques, (iii) fournit les opérateurs algébriques nécessaires au raisonnement temporel sans recours au temps défini par une théorie logique

A rough set-based association rule approach implemented on exploring beverages product spectrum

[[abstract]]When items are classified according to whether they have more or less of a characteristic, the scale used is referred to as an ordinal scale. The main characteristic of the ordinal scale is that the categories have a logical or ordered relationship to each other. Thus, the ordinal scale data processing is very common in marketing, satisfaction and attitudinal research. This study proposes a new data mining method, using a rough set-based association rule, to analyze ordinal scale data, which has the ability to handle uncertainty in the data classification/sorting process. The induction of rough-set rules is presented as method of dealing with data uncertainty, while creating predictive if—then rules that generalize data values, for the beverage market in Taiwan. Empirical evaluation reveals that the proposed Rough Set Associational Rule (RSAR), combined with rough set theory, is superior to existing methods of data classification and can more effectively address the problems associated with ordinal scale data, for exploration of a beverage product spectrum.[[notice]]補正完畢[[incitationindex]]SCI[[booktype]]紙本[[booktype]]電子

Semantic Similarity of Spatial Scenes

The formalization of similarity in spatial information systems can unleash their functionality and contribute technology not only useful, but also desirable by broad groups of users. As a paradigm for information retrieval, similarity supersedes tedious querying techniques and unveils novel ways for user-system interaction by naturally supporting modalities such as speech and sketching. As a tool within the scope of a broader objective, it can facilitate such diverse tasks as data integration, landmark determination, and prediction making. This potential motivated the development of several similarity models within the geospatial and computer science communities. Despite the merit of these studies, their cognitive plausibility can be limited due to neglect of well-established psychological principles about properties and behaviors of similarity. Moreover, such approaches are typically guided by experience, intuition, and observation, thereby often relying on more narrow perspectives or restrictive assumptions that produce inflexible and incompatible measures. This thesis consolidates such fragmentary efforts and integrates them along with novel formalisms into a scalable, comprehensive, and cognitively-sensitive framework for similarity queries in spatial information systems. Three conceptually different similarity queries at the levels of attributes, objects, and scenes are distinguished. An analysis of the relationship between similarity and change provides a unifying basis for the approach and a theoretical foundation for measures satisfying important similarity properties such as asymmetry and context dependence. The classification of attributes into categories with common structural and cognitive characteristics drives the implementation of a small core of generic functions, able to perform any type of attribute value assessment. Appropriate techniques combine such atomic assessments to compute similarities at the object level and to handle more complex inquiries with multiple constraints. These techniques, along with a solid graph-theoretical methodology adapted to the particularities of the geospatial domain, provide the foundation for reasoning about scene similarity queries. Provisions are made so that all methods comply with major psychological findings about people’s perceptions of similarity. An experimental evaluation supplies the main result of this thesis, which separates psychological findings with a major impact on the results from those that can be safely incorporated into the framework through computationally simpler alternatives

The Syntax of Colophons

The present volume focuses on the colophons found in several pothi manuscripts from Central, South and South East Asia. Its contributions discuss the colophons’ defining features, thus exposing their ‘syntax’, focusing particularly on the tracing of recurring patterns. The information extrapolated from colophons is further analysed to obtain a better understanding of these distinct manuscript cultures

The Syntax of Colophons

The present volume focuses on the colophons found in several pothi manuscripts from Central, South and South East Asia. Its contributions discuss the colophons’ defining features, thus exposing their ‘syntax’, focusing particularly on the tracing of recurring patterns. The information extrapolated from colophons is further analysed to obtain a better understanding of these distinct manuscript cultures

Infinite Hermeneutics: Events, Globalization, and the Human Condition

Thesis advisor: Patrick H. ByrneIt has been held in philosophical practice that some matters of reflection have more import than others, and that some are so significant that they may be termed "first philosophy." In contemporary Continental philosophy, the term "event" has become a watchword for a profound change in the orientation of philosophic thought. Indeed, one may say that the discourse surrounding events marks the first decisive development in philosophy since Martin Heidegger penned Being and Time. This is not to say, however, that any consensus has emerged concerning either the character of events, or more importantly what they entail for the meaning of human historical consciousness. To provide such statements, ones that have at least a relative superiority with respect to their rivals, might thus be considered the basic task for first philosophy today. It is to accomplish this double aim that the present work is devoted. These two tasks, articulating the character of events and their significance for human historical consciousness, are here assayed by a movement that is itself double, by a movement of suspicion and affirmation. In the specific case, the present work undertakes a retrieval of Heidegger's understanding of "Ereignis" (or event) after passing through a hermeneutics of suspicion, posed by the criticisms of the contemporary French philosopher Alain Badiou, and returning to an articulation of "Emergence" as a complementary hermeneutics of affirmation. The method by which I undertake this inquiry is what may be called an "infinite hermeneutics," which I intend to be opposed to "finite hermeneutics." By this latter program, "finite hermeneutics," I mean any form of philosophical hermeneutics that is committed to the thesis that human understanding (Verstehen) is finite, or that the objective of inquiry itself is finite, or both of these points. The thesis that human understanding is finite may be found in Kant's proposal that human knowing is distinct from divine knowledge in the respect that human knowing is dependent on receptive intuition, and thus finite, while infinite knowledge is founded on a productive intuition. In the relevant sense, I argue, it may also be found in Heidegger's own thought. One of the major points of the present investigation is to demonstrate in what way a commitment to finitude is highly problematic, and that human knowing, human comprehension, and even the very character of what is known is not finite in any relevant sense. The motivation for such a departure is provided by the criticisms of Badiou, which are here treated as a moment of suspicion. I begin the work with a "Prolegomenon," which reviews in detail the specific challenge Badiou has posed for phenomenological hermeneutics, or any other philosophical position that is committed to the notion that human thought or understanding is finite. As a "Prolegomenon," however, nothing positive for my own position is accomplished there; instead the net result of the study is to produce: (a) an argument against Heideggerian finite hermeneutics, (b) a summary critique of the Badiou's own position, and (c) a clear statement on the eight separate tasks that I set out to accomplish in the argument that follows. The positive aspect of the text, the beginning of the movement of affirmation, thus occurs in "Part I: Infinite Hermeneutics," in which I present a defense of phenomenological hermeneutics as a viable philosophical method. In chapter three I begin by drawing on the work of Paul Ricoeur. My argument is that he is both the very first philosopher to articulate an infinite hermeneutics, and that this account, suitably elaborated throughout his career, is able to meet most of the specific challenges Badiou poses. There does remain, however, three separate points that Ricoeur's thought does not fully explore. In order to remedy those deficiencies, and in order to demonstrate the relative advantage of my hermeneutical position with respect to its competitors, I thus move to produce a new model for hermeneutical thought. Articulating the conditions for this model is the task for chapter four. My task here resolves into three parts. First, I argue for a Galoisian Revolution in phenomenological study, which sets forth a new between hermeneutics and phenomenology study. This relation, second, requires a rearticulation of phenomenological method such that it is "impersonal," as Jean-Paul Sartre's early work suggests. Additionally this relation, third, requires that one be attentive to the structures of consciousness, which is what completes the Galoisian Revolution. In order to support my account of an impersonal phenomenology I engage the contemporary Anglo-American discussions in the philosophy of mind concerning the character of first-person consciousness. In order to specify what is intended by a structure of first-person consciousness, provide a provisional phenomenology of eros. In chapter five I move to articulate the structure of consciousness that serves as the third model for phenomenological hermeneutics. It is at this point that I engage with the work of Bernard Lonergan. My central contention in chapter five is that it is possible to retrieve Longergan's work on cognitional structure as a phenomenology of inquiry for hermeneutical purposes. Taken together, these points, the Ricoeurean defense of hermeneutics, the development of an impersonal phenomenology, and the retrieval of a phenomenology of inquiry, form the hard core of my proposal for infinite hermeneutics. "Part II: On Worlds" concerns the fruits that I can reap from the harvest sown in Part I. In particular, I aim to develop an ecological sense of worlds in response to Badiou's category-theoretic and Heidegger's (early) existential world. My argument moves from an ecological account of natural worlds (chapter six), through a signifying account human worlds (chapter seven), to an account of human historical consciousness and a consideration of catastrophes such as the Shoah and the Encounter (chapter eight). In each of these chapters I focus on developing an account of different kinds of Events, with the aim not only of providing a more serviceable account than my rivals, but also with the hopes of providing a new and better picture of world process. The final section, "Part III: The Metaphysics of Excess" expresses the central Metaphysical claims of the work, especially those concerning Events and the peculiar form I call Emergence. This chapter, in short, constitutes the moment of affirmation in response to the moment of suspicion occasioned by Badiou's criticism of phenomenological hermeneutics. Additionally, however, I produce an argument for the intelligible relation of cosmic space and time with human (lived) space and time, a statement on the new forms of causation entailed by the possibility of Events, and a new account of Truth (to rival Badiou and Heidegger's). The work closes with a summary review of what I have achieved and what yet remains to be accomplished. Though as the title of the conclusion suggests, its main aim is to provide a new statement on the world-view that I work to articulate over the course of the investigation. That world-view, and this is the justification for the subtitle of the present work, is the trans-modern condition, which articulates the existential character of our modern globalized world.Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2011.Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.Discipline: Philosophy