An American Advantage? How American and Swiss Criminal Defense Attorneys Evaluate Forensic DNA Evidence

AbstractCritics of the American system of justice sometimes perceive “inquisitorialism” as an attractive alternative. In this article we will report a comparative study investigating the way forensic DNA evidence is handled in criminal prosecutions in the Swiss and American systems, focusing particularly on the behavior of criminal defense lawyers. We will argue that the successes and failures of American and Swiss lawyers in this context offer important insights into the relative strengths and limitations of adversarial and non-adversarial legal systems

Tracing the ‘Messy’ History of Forensic DNA Analysis in Canada

This paper explores the history of scientific controversy surrounding forensic DNA analysis in the Canadian legal system. It focuses on DNA analysis and its introduction to legal cases of sexual assault. Drawing on Actor-Network Theory, this paper explores the scientific and legal controversies that proceeded the ‘black boxing’ of DNA analysis in the medicolegal system. This paper begins by outlining some the important contributors to the invention of DNA analysis and the Sexual Assault Evidence Kit (SAEK), a tool involved in collecting forensic DNA evidence. It then traces critiques from feminists, legal professionals, and scientists, who all raised objections to the introduction of forensic DNA analysis. The paper concludes by considering whether forensic DNA evidence has been successfully ‘black boxed’ in the Canadian medicolegal system.Key words: DNA Analysis; Actor-Network Theory; Canadian legal syste

Scientific Validity and Error Rates: A Short Response to the PCAST Report

This Article was prepared as a companion to the Fordham Law Review Reed Symposium on Forensic Expert Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, held on October 27, 2017, at Boston College School of Law. The Symposium took place under the sponsorship of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. For an overview of the Symposium, see Daniel J. Capra, Foreword: Symposium on Forensic Testimony, Daubert, and Rule 702, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 1459 (2018)

A response to “Likelihood ratio as weight of evidence: a closer look” by Lund and Iyer

Recently, Lund and Iyer (L&I) raised an argument regarding the use of likelihood ratios in court. In our view, their argument is based on a lack of understanding of the paradigm. L&I argue that the decision maker should not accept the expert’s likelihood ratio without further consideration. This is agreed by all parties. In normal practice, there is often considerable and proper exploration in court of the basis for any probabilistic statement. We conclude that L&I argue against a practice that does not exist and which no one advocates. Further we conclude that the most informative summary of evidential weight is the likelihood ratio. We state that this is the summary that should be presented to a court in every scientific assessment of evidential weight with supporting information about how it was constructed and on what it was based

Post-Conviction Access to a State\u27s Forensic DNA Evidence for Probative Testing: Not a Freestanding Constitutional Right

In District Attorney\u27s Office v. Osborne, the United States Supreme Court addressed the central issue of whether Respondent William Osborne should have a freestanding and far-reaching constitutional right of access to the State\u27s deoxyribonucleic acid ( DNA ) evidence for the purpose of post-conviction relief. Osborne asserted this constitutional right of access under the federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, rather than proceeding through a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially dismissed the respondent\u27s claims, holding that an application for habeas corpus constituted the proper mechanism for applicants attempting to invalidate their criminal conviction. In its decision to reverse, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that Osborne was procedurally warranted in invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 under the specific circumstances of his case. On remand, the district court granted Osborne summary judgment, stating that the respondent had a very limited constitutional right to access the State\u27s forensic DNA evidence for new testing. The district court based its decision on three factors: (1) the unavailability of the more precise technique of shorttandem- repeat ( STR ) DNA analysis at the time of Osborne\u27s criminal trial; (2) the low cost to the State of permitting such testing; and (3) the likelihood that the results from such an analysis would be material to Osborne\u27s conviction

Make Research Data Public? -- Not Always so Simple: A Dialogue for Statisticians and Science Editors

Putting data into the public domain is not the same thing as making those data accessible for intelligent analysis. A distinguished group of editors and experts who were already engaged in one way or another with the issues inherent in making research data public came together with statisticians to initiate a dialogue about policies and practicalities of requiring published research to be accompanied by publication of the research data. This dialogue carried beyond the broad issues of the advisability, the intellectual integrity, the scientific exigencies to the relevance of these issues to statistics as a discipline and the relevance of statistics, from inference to modeling to data exploration, to science and social science policies on these issues.Comment: Published in at http://dx.doi.org/10.1214/10-STS320 the Statistical Science (http://www.imstat.org/sts/) by the Institute of Mathematical Statistics (http://www.imstat.org