202 research outputs found
Fast Protection-Domain Crossing in the CHERI Capability-System Architecture
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) supplement the conventional memory management unit (MMU) with instruction-set architecture (ISA) extensions that implement a capability system model in the address space. CHERI can also underpin a hardware-software object-capability model for scalable application compartmentalization that can mitigate broader classes of attack. This article describes ISA additions to CHERI that support fast protection-domain switching, not only in terms of low cycle count, but also efficient memory sharing with mutual distrust. The authors propose ISA support for sealed capabilities, hardware-assisted checking during protection-domain switching, a lightweight capability flow-control model, and fast register clearing, while retaining the flexibility of a software-defined protection-domain transition model. They validate this approach through a full-system experimental design, including ISA extensions, a field-programmable gate array prototype (implemented in Bluespec SystemVerilog), and a software stack including an OS (based on FreeBSD), compiler (based on LLVM), software compartmentalization model, and open-source applications.This work is part of the CTSRD and MRC2 projects sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 and FA8750-11-C-0249. We also acknowledge the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) REMS Programme Grant [EP/K008528/1], the EPSRC Impact Acceleration Account [EP/K503757/1], EPSRC/ARM iCASE studentship [13220009], Microsoft studentship [MRS2011-031], the Isaac Newton Trust, the UK Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), Thales E-Security, and Google, Inc.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version of the article can be found at: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7723791
Recommended from our members
CheriRTOS: A Capability Model for Embedded Devices
Embedded systems are deployed ubiquitously
among various sectors including automotive, medical, robotics
and avionics. As these devices become increasingly connected,
the attack surface also increases tremendously; new mechanisms
must be deployed to defend against more sophisticated attacks
while not violating resource constraints. In this paper we present
CheriRTOS on CHERI-64, a hardware-software platform atop
Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions (CHERI) for
embedded systems.
Our system provides efficient and scalable task isolation,
fast and secure inter-task communication, fine-grained memory
safety, and real-time guarantees, using hardware capabilities as
the sole protection mechanism. We summarize state-of-the-art se-
curity and memory safety for embedded systems for comparison
with our platform, illustrating the superior substrate provided
by CHERI’s capabilities. Finally, our evaluations show that a
capability system can be implemented within the constraints of
embedded systems
Recommended from our members
Capability Memory Protection for Embedded Systems
This dissertation explores the use of capability security hardware and software in real-time and latency-sensitive embedded systems, to address existing memory safety and task isolation problems as well as providing new means to design a secure and scalable real-time system.
In addition, this dissertation looks into how practical and high-performance temporal memory safety can be achieved under a capability architecture.
State-of-the-art memory protection schemes for embedded systems typically present limited and inflexible solutions to memory protection and isolation, and fail to scale as embedded devices become more capable and ubiquitous.
I investigate whether a capability architecture is able to provide new angles to address memory safety issues in an embedded scenario.
Previous CHERI capability research focuses on 64-bit architectures in UNIX operating systems, which does not translate to typical 32-bit embedded processors with low-latency and real-time requirements.
I propose and implement the CHERI CC-64 encoding and the CHERI-64 coprocessor to construct a feasible capability-enabled 32-bit CPU.
In addition, I implement a real-time kernel for embedded systems atop CHERI-64.
On this hardware and software platform, I focus on exploring scalable task isolation and fine-grained memory protection enabled by capabilities in a single flat physical address space, which are otherwise difficult or impossible to achieve via state-of-the-art approaches.
Later, I present the evaluation of the hardware implementation and the software run-time overhead and real-time performance.
Even with capability support, CHERI-64 as well as other CHERI processors still expose major attack surfaces through temporal vulnerabilities like use-after-free.
A naive approach that sweeps memory to invalidate stale capabilities is inefficient and incurs significant cycle overhead and DRAM traffic.
To make sweeping revocation feasible, I introduce new architectural mechanisms and micro-architectural optimisations to substantially reduce the cost of memory sweeping and capability revocation.
Another factor of the cost is the frequency of memory sweeping.
I explore tradeoffs of memory allocator designs that use quarantine buffers and shadow space tags to prevent frequent unnecessary sweeping.
The evaluation shows that the optimisations and new allocator designs reduce the cost of capability sweeping revocation by orders of magnitude, making it already practical for most applications to adopt temporal safety under CHERI.CSC Cambridge Scholarshi
CHERI: A hybrid capability-system architecture for scalable software compartmentalization
CHERI extends a conventional RISC Instruction-
Set Architecture, compiler, and operating system to support
fine-grained, capability-based memory protection to mitigate
memory-related vulnerabilities in C-language TCBs. We describe
how CHERI capabilities can also underpin a hardware-software
object-capability model for application compartmentalization
that can mitigate broader classes of attack. Prototyped as an
extension to the open-source 64-bit BERI RISC FPGA softcore
processor, FreeBSD operating system, and LLVM compiler,
we demonstrate multiple orders-of-magnitude improvement in
scalability, simplified programmability, and resulting tangible
security benefits as compared to compartmentalization based on
pure Memory-Management Unit (MMU) designs. We evaluate
incrementally deployable CHERI-based compartmentalization
using several real-world UNIX libraries and applications.We thank our colleagues Ross Anderson, Ruslan Bukin,
Gregory Chadwick, Steve Hand, Alexandre Joannou, Chris
Kitching, Wojciech Koszek, Bob Laddaga, Patrick Lincoln,
Ilias Marinos, A Theodore Markettos, Ed Maste, Andrew W.
Moore, Alan Mujumdar, Prashanth Mundkur, Colin Rothwell,
Philip Paeps, Jeunese Payne, Hassen Saidi, Howie Shrobe, and
Bjoern Zeeb, our anonymous reviewers, and shepherd Frank
Piessens, for their feedback and assistance. This work is part of
the CTSRD and MRC2 projects sponsored by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force
Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-
0237 and FA8750-11-C-0249. The views, opinions, and/or
findings contained in this paper are those of the authors and
should not be interpreted as representing the official views
or policies, either expressed or implied, of the Department
of Defense or the U.S. Government. We acknowledge the EPSRC
REMS Programme Grant [EP/K008528/1], Isaac Newton
Trust, UK Higher Education Innovation Fund (HEIF), Thales
E-Security, and Google, Inc.This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/SP.2015.
Recommended from our members
Pointer Provenance in a Capability Architecture
We design and implement a framework for tracking pointer
provenance, using our CHERI fat-pointer capability architec-
ture to facilitate analysis of security implications of program
pointer flows in both user and privileged code, with mini-
mal instrumentation. CHERI enforces pointer provenance
validity at the architectural level, in the presence of complex
pointer arithmetic and type casting. CHERI present new op-
portunities for provenance research: we discuss use cases
and highlight lessons and open questions from our work.DARPA/AFRL FA8750-10-C-0237, Google Chrome University Research Program Awar
CapablePtrs: Securely Compiling Partial Programs using the Pointers-as-Capabilities Principle
Capability machines such as CHERI provide memory capabilities that can be
used by compilers to provide security benefits for compiled code (e.g., memory
safety). The C to CHERI compiler, for example, achieves memory safety by
following a principle called "pointers as capabilities" (PAC). Informally, PAC
says that a compiler should represent a source language pointer as a machine
code capability. But the security properties of PAC compilers are not yet well
understood. We show that memory safety is only one aspect, and that PAC
compilers can provide significant additional security guarantees for partial
programs: the compiler can provide guarantees for a compilation unit, even if
that compilation unit is later linked to attacker-controlled machine code. This
paper is the first to study the security of PAC compilers for partial programs
formally. We prove for a model of such a compiler that it is fully abstract.
The proof uses a novel proof technique (dubbed TrICL, read trickle), which is
of broad interest because it reuses and extends the compiler correctness
relation in a natural way, as we demonstrate. We implement our compiler on top
of the CHERI platform and show that it can compile legacy C code with minimal
code changes. We provide performance benchmarks that show how performance
overhead is proportional to the number of cross-compilation-unit function
calls
Rigorous engineering for hardware security: Formal modelling and proof in the CHERI design and implementation process
The root causes of many security vulnerabilities include a pernicious combination of two problems, often regarded as inescapable aspects of computing. First, the protection mechanisms provided by the mainstream processor architecture and C/C++ language abstractions, dating back to the 1970s and before, provide only coarse-grain virtual-memory-based protection. Second, mainstream system engineering relies almost exclusively on test-and-debug methods, with (at best) prose specifications. These methods have historically sufficed commercially for much of the computer industry, but they fail to prevent large numbers of exploitable bugs, and the security problems that this causes are becoming ever more acute.
In this paper we show how more rigorous engineering methods can be applied to the development of a new security-enhanced processor architecture, with its accompanying hardware implementation and software stack. We use formal models of the complete instruction-set architecture (ISA) at the heart of the design and engineering process, both in lightweight ways that support and improve normal engineering practice -- as documentation, in emulators used as a test oracle for hardware and for running software, and for test generation -- and for formal verification. We formalise key intended security properties of the design, and establish that these hold with mechanised proof. This is for the same complete ISA models (complete enough to boot operating systems), without idealisation.
We do this for CHERI, an architecture with \emph{hardware capabilities} that supports fine-grained memory protection and scalable secure compartmentalisation, while offering a smooth adoption path for existing software. CHERI is a maturing research architecture, developed since 2010, with work now underway on an Arm industrial prototype to explore its possible adoption in mass-market commercial processors. The rigorous engineering work described here has been an integral part of its development to date, enabling more rapid and confident experimentation, and boosting confidence in the design.This work was supported by EPSRC programme grant EP/K008528/1 (REMS: Rigorous Engineering for Mainstream Systems).
This work was supported by a Gates studentship (Nienhuis).
This project has received funding from the European Research Council
(ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme (grant agreement 789108, ELVER).
This work was supported by the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research
Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 (CTSRD),
HR0011-18-C-0016 (ECATS),
and FA8650-18-C-7809 (CIFV)
Direct Inter-Process Communication (dIPC): Repurposing the CODOMs architecture to accelerate IPC
In current architectures, page tables are the fundamental mechanism that allows contemporary OSs to isolate user processes, binding each thread to a specific page table. A thread cannot therefore directly call another process's function or access its data; instead, the OS kernel provides data communication primitives and mediates process synchronization through inter-process communication (IPC) channels, which impede system performance. Alternatively, the recently proposed CODOMs architecture provides memory protection across software modules. Threads can cross module protection boundaries inside the same process using simple procedure calls, while preserving memory isolation. We present dIPC (for "direct IPC"), an OS extension that repurposes and extends the CODOMs architecture to allow threads to cross process boundaries. It maps processes into a shared address space, and eliminates the OS kernel from the critical path of inter-process communication. dIPC is 64.12× faster than local remote procedure calls (RPCs), and 8.87× faster than IPC in the L4 microkernel. We show that applying dIPC to a multi-tier OLTP web server improves performance by up to 5.12× (2.13× on average), and reaches over 94% of the ideal system efficiency.We thank Diego Marr´on for helping with MariaDB, the anonymous reviewers for their feedback and, especially, Andrew Baumann for helping us improve the paper. This research was partially funded by HiPEAC through a collaboration grant for LluÃs Vilanova (agreement number 687698 for
the EU’s Horizon2020 research and innovation programme), the Israel Science Fundation (ISF grant 769/12) and the Israeli Ministry of Science, Technology and Space.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft
Recommended from our members
Balancing Disruption and Deployability in the CHERI Instruction-Set Architecture (ISA)
For over two-and-a-half decades, dating to the first widespread commercial deployment of the Internet, commodity processor architectures have failed to provide robust and secure foundations for communication and commerce. This is in large part due to the omission of architectural features allowing efficient implementation of the Principle of Least Privilege, which dictates that software runs only with the rights it requires to operate [19, 20]. Without this support, the impact of inevitable vulnerabilities is multiplied as successful attackers gain easy access to unnecessary rights – and often, all rights – in software systems
Recommended from our members
CheriABI: Enforcing Valid Pointer Provenance and Minimizing Pointer Privilege in the POSIX C Run-time Environment
The CHERI architecture allows pointers to be implemented as capabilities (rather than integer virtual addresses) in a manner that is compatible with, and strengthens, the semantics of the C language. In addition to the spatial protections offered by conventional fat pointers, CHERI capabilities offer strong integrity, enforced provenance validity, and access monotonicity. The stronger guarantees of these architectural capabilities must be reconciled with the real-world behavior of operating systems, run-time environments, and applications. When the process model, user-kernel interactions, dynamic linking, and memory management are all considered, we observe that simple derivation of architectural capabilities is insufficient to describe appropriate access to memory. We bridge this conceptual gap with a notional \emph{abstract capability} that describes the accesses that should be allowed at a given point in execution, whether in the kernel or userspace. To investigate this notion at scale, we describe the first adaptation of a full C-language operating system (FreeBSD) with an enterprise database (PostgreSQL) for complete spatial and referential memory safety. We show that awareness of abstract capabilities, coupled with CHERI architectural capabilities, can provide more complete protection, strong compatibility, and acceptable performance overhead compared with the pre-CHERI baseline and software-only approaches. Our observations also have potentially significant implications for other mitigation techniques.This work was supported by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), under contracts FA8750-10-C-0237 (``CTSRD'') and HR0011-18-C-0016 (``ECATS''). The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official views or policies of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. We also acknowledge the EPSRC REMS Programme Grant (EP/K008528/1), the ERC ELVER Advanced Grant (789108), Arm Limited, HP Enterprise, and Google, Inc. Approved for Public Release, Distribution Unlimited
- …