5,033 research outputs found
Rational Multiparty Computation
The field of rational cryptography considers the design of cryptographic protocols in the presence of rational agents seeking to maximize local utility functions. This departs from the standard secure multiparty computation setting, where players are assumed to be either honest or malicious. ^ We detail the construction of both a two-party and a multiparty game theoretic framework for constructing rational cryptographic protocols. Our framework specifies the utility function assumptions necessary to realize the privacy, correctness, and fairness guarantees for protocols. We demonstrate that our framework correctly models cryptographic protocols, such as rational secret sharing, where existing work considers equilibrium concepts that yield unreasonable equilibria. Similarly, we demonstrate that cryptography may be applied to the game theoretic domain, constructing an auction market not realizable in the original formulation. Additionally, we demonstrate that modeling players as rational agents allows us to design a protocol that destabilizes coalitions. Thus, we establish a mutual benefit from combining the two fields, while demonstrating the applicability of our framework to real-world market environments.^ We also give an application of game theory to adversarial interactions where cryptography is not necessary. Specifically, we consider adversarial machine learning, where the adversary is rational and reacts to the presence of a data miner. We give a general extension to classification algorithms that returns greater expected utility for the data miner than existing classification methods
Round-Preserving Parallel Composition of Probabilistic-Termination Protocols
An important benchmark for multi-party computation protocols (MPC) is their round complexity. For several important MPC tasks, (tight) lower bounds on the round complexity are known. However, for some of these tasks, such as broadcast, the lower bounds can be circumvented when the termination round of every party is not a priori known, and simultaneous termination is not guaranteed. Protocols with this property are called probabilistic-termination (PT) protocols.
Running PT protocols in parallel affects the round complexity of the resulting protocol in somewhat unexpected ways. For instance, an execution of m protocols with constant expected round complexity might take O(log m) rounds to complete. In a seminal work, Ben-Or and El-Yaniv (Distributed Computing \u2703) developed a technique for parallel execution of arbitrarily many broadcast protocols, while preserving expected round complexity. More recently, Cohen et al. (CRYPTO \u2716) devised a framework for universal composition of PT protocols, and provided the first composable parallel-broadcast protocol with a simulation-based proof. These constructions crucially rely on the fact that broadcast is ``privacy free,\u27\u27 and do not generalize to arbitrary protocols in a straightforward way. This raises the question of whether it is possible to execute arbitrary PT protocols in parallel, without increasing the round complexity.
In this paper we tackle this question and provide both feasibility and infeasibility results. We construct a round-preserving protocol compiler, secure against a dishonest minority of actively corrupted parties, that compiles arbitrary protocols into a protocol realizing their parallel composition, while having a black-box access to the underlying protocols. Furthermore, we prove that the same cannot be achieved, using known techniques, given only black-box access to the functionalities realized by the protocols, unless merely security against semi-honest corruptions is required, for which case we provide a protocol
ARPA Whitepaper
We propose a secure computation solution for blockchain networks. The
correctness of computation is verifiable even under malicious majority
condition using information-theoretic Message Authentication Code (MAC), and
the privacy is preserved using Secret-Sharing. With state-of-the-art multiparty
computation protocol and a layer2 solution, our privacy-preserving computation
guarantees data security on blockchain, cryptographically, while reducing the
heavy-lifting computation job to a few nodes. This breakthrough has several
implications on the future of decentralized networks. First, secure computation
can be used to support Private Smart Contracts, where consensus is reached
without exposing the information in the public contract. Second, it enables
data to be shared and used in trustless network, without disclosing the raw
data during data-at-use, where data ownership and data usage is safely
separated. Last but not least, computation and verification processes are
separated, which can be perceived as computational sharding, this effectively
makes the transaction processing speed linear to the number of participating
nodes. Our objective is to deploy our secure computation network as an layer2
solution to any blockchain system. Smart Contracts\cite{smartcontract} will be
used as bridge to link the blockchain and computation networks. Additionally,
they will be used as verifier to ensure that outsourced computation is
completed correctly. In order to achieve this, we first develop a general MPC
network with advanced features, such as: 1) Secure Computation, 2) Off-chain
Computation, 3) Verifiable Computation, and 4)Support dApps' needs like
privacy-preserving data exchange
Efficient Secure Computation with Garbled Circuits
Abstract. Secure two-party computation enables applications in which partic-ipants compute the output of a function that depends on their private inputs, without revealing those inputs or relying on any trusted third party. In this pa-per, we show the potential of building privacy-preserving applications using gar-bled circuits, a generic technique that until recently was believed to be too ineffi-cient to scale to realistic problems. We present a Java-based framework that uses pipelining and circuit-level optimizations to build efficient and scalable privacy-preserving applications. Although the standard garbled circuit protocol assumes a very week, honest-but-curious adversary, techniques are available for convert-ing such protocols to resist stronger adversaries, including fully malicious adver-saries. We summarize approaches to producing malicious-resistant secure com-putations that reduce the costs of transforming a protocol to be secure against stronger adversaries. In addition, we summarize results on ensuring fairness, the property that either both parties receive the result or neither party does. Several open problems remain, but as theory and pragmatism advance, secure computa-tion is approaching the point where it offers practical solutions for a wide variety of important problems.
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Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
We provide a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret sharing scheme, and prove that it is fair when executed with many rational parties together with a small minority of honest parties. That is, all parties will learn the secret with high probability when the honest parties follow the protocol and the rational parties act in their own self-interest (as captured by a set-Nash analogue of trembling hand perfect equilibrium). The protocol only requires a standard (synchronous) broadcast channel, tolerates both early stopping and incorrectly computed messages, and only requires 2 rounds of communication.
Previous protocols for this problem in the cryptographic or economic models have either required an honest majority, used strong communication channels that enable simultaneous exchange of information, or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria. They all also required a nonconstant number of rounds of communication.Engineering and Applied Science
08491 Abstracts Collection -- Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security
From 30.11. to 05.12.2008, the Dagstuhl Seminar 08491 ``Theoretical Foundations of Practical Information Security \u27\u27 was held in Schloss Dagstuhl~--~Leibniz Center for Informatics.
During the seminar, several participants presented their current
research, and ongoing work and open problems were discussed. Abstracts of
the presentations given during the seminar as well as abstracts of
seminar results and ideas are put together in this paper. The first section
describes the seminar topics and goals in general.
Links to extended abstracts or full papers are provided, if available
Secure Auctions in the Presence of Rational Adversaries
Sealed bid auctions are used to allocate a resource among a set of interested parties. Traditionally, auctions need the presence of a trusted auctioneer to whom the bidders provide their private bid values. Existence of such a trusted party is not an assumption easily realized in practice. Generic secure computation protocols can be used to remove a trusted party. However, generic techniques result in inefficient protocols, and typically do not provide fairness - that is, a corrupt party can learn the output and abort the protocol thereby preventing other parties from learning the output.
At CRYPTO 2009, Miltersen, Nielsen and Triandopoulos [MNT09], introduced the problem of building auctions that are secure against rational bidders. Such parties are modeled as self-interested agents who care more about maximizing their utility than about learning information about bids of other agents. To realize this, they put forth a novel notion of information utility and introduce a game-theoretic framework that helps analyse protocols while taking into account both information utility as well as monetary utility. Unfortunately, their construction makes use a of generic MPC protocol and, consequently, the authors do not analyze the concrete efficiency of their protocol.
In this work, we construct the first concretely efficient and provably secure protocol for First Price Auctions in the rational setting. Our protocol guarantees privacy and fairness. Inspired by [MNT09], we put forth a solution concept that we call Privacy Enhanced Computational Weakly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium that captures parties\u27 privacy and monetary concerns in the game theoretic context, and show that our protocol realizes this. We believe this notion to be of independent interest.
Our protocol is crafted specifically for the use case of auctions, is simple, using off-the-shelf cryptographic components. Executing our auction protocol on commodity hardware with 10 bidders, with bids of length 10, our protocol runs to completion in 0.141s and has total communication of 30KB
Rational cryptography: novel constructions, automated verification and unified definitions
Rational cryptography has recently emerged as a very promising field of research by combining notions and techniques from cryptography and game theory, because it offers an alternative to the rather inflexible traditional cryptographic model. In contrast to the classical view of cryptography where protocol participants are considered either honest or arbitrarily malicious, rational cryptography models participants as rational players that try to maximize their benefit and thus deviate from the protocol only if they gain an advantage by doing so.
The main research goals for rational cryptography are the design of more efficient protocols when players adhere to a rational model, the design and implementation of automated proofs for rational security notions and the study of the intrinsic connections between game theoretic and cryptographic notions. In this thesis, we address all these issues.
First we present the mathematical model and the design for a new rational file sharing protocol which we call RatFish. Next, we develop a general method for automated verification for rational cryptographic protocols and we show how to apply our technique in order to automatically derive the rational security property for RatFish. Finally, we study the intrinsic connections between game theory and cryptography by defining a new game theoretic notion, which we call game universal implementation, and by showing its equivalence with the notion of weak stand-alone security.Rationale Kryptographie ist kĂŒrzlich als ein vielversprechender Bereich der Forschung durch die Kombination von Begriffen und Techniken aus der Kryptographie und der Spieltheorie entstanden, weil es eine Alternative zu dem eher unflexiblen traditionellen kryptographischen Modell bietet. Im Gegensatz zur klassischen Ansicht der Kryptographie, nach der Protokollteilnehmer entweder als ehrlich oder willkĂŒrlich bösartig angesehen werden, modelliert rationale Kryptografie die Protokollteilnehmer als rationale Akteure, die versuchen ihren Vorteil zu maximieren und damit nur vom Protokoll abweichen, wenn sie dadurch einen Vorteil erlangen.
Die wichtigsten Forschungsziele rationaler Kryptographie sind: das Design effizienterer Protokolle, wenn die Spieler ein rationale Modell folgen, das Design und die Implementierung von automatisierten Beweisen rationaler Sicherheitsbegriffe und die Untersuchung der intrinsischen Verbindungen zwischen spieltheoretischen und kryptographischen Begriffen. In dieser Arbeit beschÀftigen wir uns mit all diesen Fragen.
ZunĂ€chst prĂ€sentieren wir das mathematische Modell und das Design fĂŒr RatFish, ein neues rationales Filesharing-Protokoll. Dann entwickeln wir eine allgemeine Methode zur automatischen Verifikation rationaler kryptographischer Protokolle und wir zeigen, wie man unsere Technik nutzen kann, um die rationale Sicherheitseigenschaft von RatFish automatisch abzuleiten. AbschlieĂend untersuchen wir die intrinsische Verbindungen zwischen Spieltheorie und Kryptographie durch die Definition von game universal implementation, einem neuen spieltheoretischen Begriff, und wir zeigen die Ăquivalenz von game universal implementation und weak stand-alone security
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