Two faces of perceptual awareness during the attentional blink:Gradual and discrete

In a series of experiments, the nature of perceptual awareness during the attentional blink was investigated. Previous work has considered the attentional blink as a discrete, all-or-none phenomenon, indicative of general access to conscious awareness. Using continuous report measures in combination with mixture modeling, the outcomes showed that perceptual awareness during the attentional blink can be a gradual phenomenon. Awareness was not exclusively discrete, but also exhibited a gradual characteristic whenever the spatial extent of attention induced by the first target spanned more than a single location. Under these circumstances, mental representations of blinked targets were impoverished, but did approach the actual identities of the targets. Conversely, when the focus of attention covered only a single location, there was no evidence for any partial knowledge of blinked targets. These two different faces of awareness during the attentional blink challenge current theories of both awareness and temporal attention, which cannot explain the existence of gradual awareness of targets during the attentional blink. To account for the current outcomes, an adaptive gating model is proposed that casts awareness on a continuum between gradual and discrete, rather than as being of either single kind

the Emotional Attentional Blink: A Review and Research Agenda

The Emotional Attentional Blink (EAB) refers to a temporary impairment in the ability to identify a single target when that target is preceded by an emotionally salient distractor, such as a disgusting, violent or erotic image (Most, Smith, Cooter, Levy, & Zald, 2007; Ciesielski, Armstrong, Zald, & Olatunji, 2010). The EAB represents a failure to perform an endogenous target discrimination task as a result of exogenous attentional capture by an emotional image, making it an effective medium through which to study the intersection of these two attentional systems. The present review seeks to relate existing models of the EAB to models of emotion (Tamietto & de Gelder, 2010) as well as endogenous and exogenous attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Taylor & Fragopanagos, 2005) in order to demonstrate the EAB’s utility in these research fields. Accompanying this review will be a brief research agenda and pilot experiment meant to address a few of the most integral questions to the study of attention and emotion, utilizing the EAB paradigm. A review of relevant literature as well as the aforementioned pilot study support the notion that the EAB may be a powerful tool in uncovering answer to the bigger questions in attention and emotion research

An Attentionless Account of the Attentional Blink

Theories of the attentional blink (AB) – a deficit in responding to the second of two temporally proximal stimuli (within 500 ms; Raymond et al., 1992) – generally explain the deficit as resulting from either the dynamics in top-down and bottom-up attentional process, or limitations in the capacity of the hypothesized attentional process. Extensive basic research has been conducted on the neural correlates of top-down and bottom-up attention as well as on the capacity limitations of attention; however, rather than leading to a single definition, the variety and complexity of results has led several taxonomies which differ systematically with the experimental procedures supposed to evidence them. This lack of consensus is a problem for research attempting to explain specific phenomena such as the AB in terms of the proposed attentional process. This dissertation critically reviews the methods and conclusions of research on attention. In Chapter 2, two prominent conceptualizations of attention are discussed within their historical context and some definitional issues are highlighted. In Chapter 3, research on and theories of the AB are discussed in terms of existing taxonomies of attention. An argument is developed that dynamics in attention, as commonly conceptualized, is not necessarily the mechanism eliciting the AB and data from a series of pilot experiments are interpreted within this hypothesis. In Chapters 4 and 5, two cognitive behavioral experiments are discussed which test whether the AB arises due to localized competition within visual processing areas of the brain. Results from experiment 1 demonstrated a different patter of errors during the AB when the second target appeared in the same stimulus stream as the first target than when they switched streams, suggesting that the mechanisms of the AB are different for this condition. Results from experiment 2 demonstrated the typical AB effect and pattern of errors when target letters were defined by the color of a compound stimulus presented behind the letter stream, but a floor effect when the shape of that compound stimulus defined the targets. Although not definitive, these data might be best interpreted within a localized inhibition account of the AB and are less consistent with the prevailing idea of a late-stage attentional bottleneck

Neural Dynamics of Autistic Behaviors: Cognitive, Emotional, and Timing Substrates

What brain mechanisms underlie autism and how do they give rise to autistic behavioral symptoms? This article describes a neural model, called the iSTART model, which proposes how cognitive, emotional, timing, and motor processes may interact together to create and perpetuate autistic symptoms. These model processes were originally developed to explain data concerning how the brain controls normal behaviors. The iSTART model shows how autistic behavioral symptoms may arise from prescribed breakdowns in these brain processes.Air Force Office of Scientific Research (F49620-01-1-0397); Office of Naval Research (N00014-01-1-0624

Dissociating attention effects from categorical perception with ERP functional microstates

The research was supported by a University of Stirling Research Impact Fellowship awarded to B.D.When faces appear in our visual environment we naturally attend to them, possibly to the detriment of other visual information. Evidence from behavioural studies suggests that faces capture attention because they are more salient than other types of visual stimuli, reflecting a category-dependent modulation of attention. By contrast, neuroimaging data has led to a domain-specific account of face perception that rules out the direct contribution of attention, suggesting a dedicated neural network for face perception. Here we sought to dissociate effects of attention from categorical perception using Event Related Potentials. Participants viewed physically matched face and butterfly images, with each category acting as a target stimulus during different blocks in an oddball paradigm. Using a data-driven approach based on functional microstates, we show that the locus of endogenous attention effects with ERPs occurs in the N1 time range. Earlier categorical effects were also found around the level of the P1, reflecting either an exogenous increase in attention towards face stimuli, or a putative face-selective measure. Both category and attention effects were dissociable from one another hinting at the role that faces may play in early capturing of attention before top-down control of attention is observed. Our data support the conclusion that certain object categories, in this experiment, faces, may capture attention before top-down voluntary control of attention is initiated.Publisher PDFPeer reviewe

Distilling the neural correlates of conscious somatosensory perception

The ability to consciously perceive the world profoundly defines our lives as human beings. Somehow, our brains process information in a way that allows us to become aware of the images, sounds, touches, smells, and tastes surrounding us. Yet our understanding of the neurobiological processes that generate perceptual awareness is very limited. One of the most contested questions in the neuroscientific study of conscious perception is whether awareness arises from the activity of early sensory brain regions, or instead requires later processing in widespread supramodal networks. It has been suggested that the conflicting evidence supporting these two perspectives may be the result of methodological confounds in classical experimental tasks. In order to infer participants’ perceptual awareness in these tasks, they need to report the contents of their perception. This means that the neural signals underlying the emergence of perceptual awareness often cannot be dissociated from pre- and postperceptual processes. Consequently, some of the previously observed effects may not be correlates of awareness after all but instead may have resulted from task requirements. In this thesis, I investigate this possibility in the somatosensory modality. To scrutinise the task dependence of the neural correlates of somatosensory awareness, I developed an experimental paradigm that controls for the most common experimental confounds. In a somatosensory-visual matching task, participants were required to detect electrical target stimuli at ten different intensity levels. Instead of reporting their perception directly, they compared their somatosensory percepts to simultaneously presented visual cues that signalled stimulus presence or absence and then reported a match or mismatch accordingly. As a result, target detection was decorrelated from working memory and reports, the behavioural relevance of detected and undetected stimuli was equated, the influence of attentional processes was mitigated, and perceptual uncertainty was varied in a controlled manner. Results from a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study and an electroencephalography (EEG) study showed that, when controlled for task demands, the neural correlates of somatosensory awareness were restricted to relatively early activity (~150 ms) in secondary somatosensory regions. In contrast, late activity (>300 ms) indicative of processing in frontoparietal networks occurred irrespective of stimulus awareness, and activity in anterior insular, anterior cingulate, and supplementary motor cortex was associated with processing perceptual uncertainty and reports. These results add novel evidence to the early-local vs. late-global debate and favour the view that perceptual awareness emerges at the level of modality-specific sensory cortices.Die Fähigkeit zur bewussten Wahrnehmung bestimmt maßgeblich unser Selbstbild als Menschen. Unser Gehirn verarbeitet Informationen auf eine Weise, die es uns ermöglicht, uns der Bilder, Töne, Berührungen, Gerüche und Geschmäcker, die uns umgeben, bewusst zu werden. Unser Verständnis davon, wie neurobiologische Prozesse diese bewusste Wahrnehmung erzeugen, ist jedoch noch sehr begrenzt. Eine der umstrittensten Fragen in der neurowissenschaftlichen Erforschung des perzeptuellen Bewusstseins besteht darin, ob die bewusste Wahrnehmung aus der Aktivität früher sensorischer Hirnregionen entsteht, oder aber die spätere Prozessierung in ausgedehnten supramodalen Netzwerken erfordert. Eine mögliche Erklärung für die widersprüchlichen Ergebnisse, die diesen beiden Perspektiven zugrunde liegen, wird in methodologischen Störfaktoren vermutet, die in klassischen experimentellen Paradigmen auftreten können. Um auf die Wahrnehmung der Versuchspersonen schließen zu können, müssen diese den Inhalt ihrer Wahrnehmung berichten. Das führt dazu, dass neuronale Korrelate bewusster Wahrnehmung häufig nicht sauber von prä- und postperzeptuellen Prozessen getrennt werden können. Folglich könnten einige der zuvor beobachteten Effekte, anstatt tatsächlich bewusste Wahrnehmung widerzuspiegeln, aus den Anforderungen experimenteller Paradigmen entstanden sein. In dieser Arbeit untersuche ich diese Möglichkeit in der somatosensorischen Modalität. Um zu überprüfen, inwiefern neuronale Korrelate bewusster somatosensorischer Wahrnehmung von den Anforderungen experimenteller Aufgaben abhängen, habe ich ein Paradigma entwickelt, dass die häufigsten experimentellen Störfaktoren kontrolliert. In einer somatosensorisch-visuellen Vergleichsaufgabe mussten die Versuchspersonen elektrische Zielreize in zehn verschiedenen Intensitätsstufen detektieren. Anstatt diese jedoch direkt zu berichten, sollten sie ihre somatosensorischen Perzepte mit gleichzeitig präsentierten visuellen Symbolen vergleichen, die entweder Reizanwesenheit oder -abwesenheit signalisierten. Entsprechend wurde dann eine Übereinstimmung oder Nichtübereinstimmung berichtet. Dadurch wurde die Reizwahrnehmung von Arbeitsgedächtnis und Berichterstattung dekorreliert, die Verhaltensrelevanz detektierter und nicht detektierter Reize gleichgesetzt, der Einfluss von Aufmerksamkeitsprozessen reduziert und die mit der Detektion verbundene Unsicherheit auf kontrollierte Weise variiert. Die Ergebnisse aus einer funktionellen Magnetresonanztomographie (fMRT)-Studie und einer Elektroenzephalographie (EEG)-Studie zeigen, dass die neuronalen Korrelate bewusster somatosensorischer Wahrnehmung auf relativ frühe Aktivität (~150 ms) in sekundären somatosensorischen Regionen beschränkt sind, wenn experimentelle Störfaktoren kontrolliert werden. Im Gegensatz dazu trat späte Aktivität (>300 ms), die auf die Verarbeitung in frontoparietalen Netzwerken hindeutet, unabhängig von der Reizwahrnehmung auf, und Aktivität im anterioren insulären, anterioren cingulären und supplementär-motorischen Kortex war mit der Verarbeitung von Detektionsunsicherheit und der Berichterstattung verbunden. Diese Ergebnisse liefern neue Erkenntnisse zur Debatte um die Relevanz früher, lokaler vs. später, globaler Hirnaktivität und unterstützen die Ansicht, dass perzeptuelles Bewusstsein in modalitätsspezifischen sensorischen Kortizes entsteht