Candrakīrti on Deflated Episodic Memory: Response to Endel Tulving's Challenge

ABSTRACTIn my response to Ganeri's [2018] paper, I take Buddhagosha's deflationary account of episodic memory one step further through the analysis of the Madhyamaka philosopher Candrakīrti who, like Buddhagosha, explicitly defends episodic memory as a recollection of the objects experienced in the past, rather than subjective experience. However, unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakīrti deflates episodic memory by showing the incoherence of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra's thesis that episodic memory requires the admission of reflexive awareness. Also unlike Buddhagosha, Candrakīrti shows the incoherence of the Mimāṁsāka-Naiyāyika's self-implication requirement thesis, therefore directly countering Tulving's challenge to the Buddhist philosophers, by arguing that episodic memory is capable of mental time travel without any reference to the operation of enduring self. I will thus suggest that Candrakīrti may have even greater success in deflating the self-implication requirement of episodic memory

Bilingual episodic memory: an introduction

Our current models of bilingual memory are essentially accounts of semantic memory whose goal is to explain bilingual lexical access to underlying imagistic and conceptual referents. While this research has included episodic memory, it has focused largely on recall for words, phrases, and sentences in the service of understanding the structure of semantic memory. Building on the four papers in this special issue, this article focuses on larger units of episodic memory(from quotidian events with simple narrative form to complex autobiographical memories) in service of developing a model of bilingual episodic memory. This requires integrating theory and research on how culture-specific narrative traditions inform encoding and retrieval with theory and research on the relation between(monolingual) semantic and episodic memory(Schank, 1982; Schank & Abelson, 1995; Tulving, 2002). Then, taking a cue from memory-based text processing studies in psycholinguistics(McKoon & Ratcliff, 1998), we suggest that as language forms surface in the progressive retrieval of features of an event, they trigger further forms within the same language serving to guide a within-language/ within-culture retrieval

Contrasting prefrontal cortex contributions to episodic memory dysfunction in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia and alzheimer's disease

Recent evidence has questioned the integrity of episodic memory in behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), where recall performance is impaired to the same extent as in Alzheimer's disease (AD). While these deficits appear to be mediated by divergent patterns of brain atrophy, there is evidence to suggest that certain prefrontal regions are implicated across both patient groups. In this study we sought to further elucidate the dorsolateral (DLPFC) and ventromedial (VMPFC) prefrontal contributions to episodic memory impairment in bvFTD and AD. Performance on episodic memory tasks and neuropsychological measures typically tapping into either DLPFC or VMPFC functions was assessed in 22 bvFTD, 32 AD patients and 35 age- and education-matched controls. Behaviourally, patient groups did not differ on measures of episodic memory recall or DLPFC-mediated executive functions. BvFTD patients were significantly more impaired on measures of VMPFC-mediated executive functions. Composite measures of the recall, DLPFC and VMPFC task scores were covaried against the T1 MRI scans of all participants to identify regions of atrophy correlating with performance on these tasks. Imaging analysis showed that impaired recall performance is associated with divergent patterns of PFC atrophy in bvFTD and AD. Whereas in bvFTD, PFC atrophy covariates for recall encompassed both DLPFC and VMPFC regions, only the DLPFC was implicated in AD. Our results suggest that episodic memory deficits in bvFTD and AD are underpinned by divergent prefrontal mechanisms. Moreover, we argue that these differences are not adequately captured by existing neuropsychological measures

Subjective experience of episodic memory and metacognition: a neurodevelopmental approach.

Episodic retrieval is characterized by the subjective experience of remembering. This experience enables the co-ordination of memory retrieval processes and can be acted on metacognitively. In successful retrieval, the feeling of remembering may be accompanied by recall of important contextual information. On the other hand, when people fail (or struggle) to retrieve information, other feelings, thoughts, and information may come to mind. In this review, we examine the subjective and metacognitive basis of episodic memory function from a neurodevelopmental perspective, looking at recollection paradigms (such as source memory, and the report of recollective experience) and metacognitive paradigms such as the feeling of knowing). We start by considering healthy development, and provide a brief review of the development of episodic memory, with a particular focus on the ability of children to report first-person experiences of remembering. We then consider neurodevelopmental disorders (NDDs) such as amnesia acquired in infancy, autism, Williams syndrome, Down syndrome, or 22q11.2 deletion syndrome. This review shows that different episodic processes develop at different rates, and that across a broad set of different NDDs there are various types of episodic memory impairment, each with possibly a different character. This literature is in agreement with the idea that episodic memory is a multifaceted process

Aphantasia, SDAM, and Episodic Memory

Episodic memory (EM) involves re-experiencing past experiences by means of mental imagery. Aphantasics (who lack mental imagery) and people with severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) lack the ability to re-experience, which would imply that they don't have EM. However, aphantasics and people with SDAM have personal and affective memories, which are other defining aspects of EM (in addition to re-experiencing). This suggests that these supposed aspects of EM really are independent faculties or modules of memory, and that EM is a composite faculty rather than a natural kind. Apparent varieties of (normal and "defective") EM (as well as some closely related kinds of memory) are different combinations of these modules, and the EM construct itself adds little if any explanatory value to these modules

Memory and cognition in schizophrenia.

Episodic memory deficits are consistently documented as a core aspect of cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia patients, present from the onset of the illness and strongly associated with functional disability. Over the past decade, research using approaches from experimental cognitive neuroscience revealed disproportionate episodic memory impairments in schizophrenia (Sz) under high cognitive demand relational encoding conditions and relatively unimpaired performance under item-specific encoding conditions. These specific deficits in component processes of episodic memory reflect impaired activation and connectivity within specific elements of frontal-medial temporal lobe circuits, with a central role for the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), relatively intact function of ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and variable results in the hippocampus. We propose that memory deficits can be understood within the broader context of cognitive deficits in Sz, where impaired DLPFC-related cognitive control has a broad impact across multiple cognitive domains. The therapeutic implications of these findings are discussed