Conceptual Modelling of Complex Network Management Systems

Society, as we know it today, is completely dependent on computer networks, Internet and distributed systems, which place at our disposal the necessary services to perform our daily tasks. Moreover, and unconsciously, all services and distributed systems require network management systems. These systems allow us to, in general, maintain, manage, configure, scale, adapt, modify, edit, protect or improve the main distributed systems. Their role is secondary and is unknown and transparent to the users. They provide the necessary support to maintain the distributed systems whose services we use every day. If we don’t consider network management systems during the development stage of main distributed systems, then there could be serious consequences or even total failures in the development of the distributed systems. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the management of the systems within the design of distributed systems and systematize their conception to minimize the impact of the management of networks within the project of distributed systems. In this paper, we present a formalization method of the conceptual modelling for design of a network management system through the use of formal modelling tools, thus allowing from the definition of processes to identify those responsible for these. Finally we will propose a use case to design a conceptual model intrusion detection system in network.This work was performed as part of the Smart University Project financed by the University of Alicante

Conceptual Modelling of Complex Network Management Systems

Society, as we know it today, is completely dependent on computer networks, Internet and distributed systems, which place at our disposal the necessary services to perform our daily tasks. Moreover, and unconsciously, all services and distributed systems require network management systems. These systems allow us to, in general, maintain, manage, configure, scale, adapt, modify, edit, protect or improve the main distributed systems. Their role is secondary and is unknown and transparent to the users. They provide the necessary support to maintain the distributed systems whose services we use every day. If we don’t consider network management systems during the development stage of main distributed systems, then there could be serious consequences or even total failures in the development of the distributed systems. It is necessary, therefore, to consider the management of the systems within the design of distributed systems and systematize their conception to minimize the impact of the management of networks within the project of distributed systems. In this paper, we present a formalization method of the conceptual modelling for design of a network management system through the use of formal modelling tools, thus allowing from the definition of processes to identify those responsible for these. Finally we will propose a use case to design a conceptual model intrusion detection system in network.This work was performed as part of the Smart University Project financed by the University of Alicante

Unsupervised Anomaly-based Malware Detection using Hardware Features

Recent works have shown promise in using microarchitectural execution patterns to detect malware programs. These detectors belong to a class of detectors known as signature-based detectors as they catch malware by comparing a program's execution pattern (signature) to execution patterns of known malware programs. In this work, we propose a new class of detectors - anomaly-based hardware malware detectors - that do not require signatures for malware detection, and thus can catch a wider range of malware including potentially novel ones. We use unsupervised machine learning to build profiles of normal program execution based on data from performance counters, and use these profiles to detect significant deviations in program behavior that occur as a result of malware exploitation. We show that real-world exploitation of popular programs such as IE and Adobe PDF Reader on a Windows/x86 platform can be detected with nearly perfect certainty. We also examine the limits and challenges in implementing this approach in face of a sophisticated adversary attempting to evade anomaly-based detection. The proposed detector is complementary to previously proposed signature-based detectors and can be used together to improve security.Comment: 1 page, Latex; added description for feature selection in Section 4, results unchange

Shellzer: a tool for the dynamic analysis of malicious shellcode

Abstract. Shellcode is malicious binary code whose execution is triggered after the exploitation of a vulnerability. The automated analysis of malicious shellcode is a challenging task, since encryption and evasion techniques are often used. This paper introduces Shellzer, a novel dynamic shellcode analyzer that generates a complete list of the API functions called by the shellcode, and, in addition, returns the binaries retrieved at run-time by the shellcode. The tool is able to modify on-thefly the arguments and the return values of certain API functions in order to simulate specific execution contexts and the availability of the external resources needed by the shellcode. This tool has been tested with over 24,000 real-world samples, extracted from both web-based driveby-download attacks and malicious PDF documents. The results of the analysis show that Shellzer is able to successfully analyze 98 % of the shellcode samples

Defending Browsers against Drive-by Downloads: Mitigating Heap-Spraying Code Injection Attacks

Abstract. Drive-by download attacks are among the most common methods for spreading malware today. These attacks typically exploit memory corruption vul-nerabilities in web browsers and browser plug-ins to execute shellcode, and in consequence, gain control of a victim’s computer. Compromised machines are then used to carry out various malicious activities, such as joining botnets, send-ing spam emails, or participating in distributed denial of service attacks. To counter drive-by downloads, we propose a technique that relies on x86 instruc-tion emulation to identify JavaScript string buffers that contain shellcode. Our de-tection is integrated into the browser, and performed before control is transfered to the shellcode, thus, effectively thwarting the attack. The solution maintains fair performance by avoiding unnecessary invocations of the emulator, while ensur-ing that every buffer with potential shellcode is checked. We have implemented a prototype of our system, and evaluated it over thousands of malicious and le-gitimate web sites. Our results demonstrate that the system performs accurate detection with no false positives

Shadow Honeypots

We present Shadow Honeypots, a novel hybrid architecture that combines the best features of honeypots and anomaly detection. At a high level, we use a variety of anomaly detectors to monitor all traffic to a protected network or service. Traffic that is considered anomalous is processed by a "shadow honeypot" to determine the accuracy of the anomaly prediction. The shadow is an instance of the protected software that shares all internal state with a regular ("production") instance of the application, and is instrumented to detect potential attacks. Attacks against the shadow are caught, and any incurred state changes are discarded. Legitimate traffic that was misclassified will be validated by the shadow and will be handled correctly by the system transparently to the end user. The outcome of processing a request by the shadow is used to filter future attack instances and could be used to update the anomaly detector. Our architecture allows system designers to fine-tune systems for performance, since false positives will be filtered by the shadow. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach in a proof-of-concept implementation of the Shadow Honeypot architecture for the Apache web server and the Mozilla Firefox browser. We show that despite a considerable overhead in the instrumentation of the shadow honeypot (up to 20% for Apache), the overall impact on the system is diminished by the ability to minimize the rate of false-positives

APTs way: evading Your EBNIDS

APTs and government-supported attackers use a broad arsenal of techniques to avoid having their exploits detected by IDSes. Signature Based IDSes are not efficient against nation-state-sponsored attackers which use custom shellcode encoders in an exploit. Emulation Based NIDSes (EBNIDS) have been proposed as a solution to mitigate such attacks. EBNISes detect a suspicious network stream (pre-processing) and after converting them to emulate-able byte sequences run it in an instrumented environment (Emulation), finally matching the behavior with certain heuristics (Heuristics Detection). In this talk, we will present novel ways that an APT might use to circumvente the Pre-Processing, Emulation and Heuristic Detection steps of EBNIDSes by employing a wide range of evasion techniques

A systematic analysis of defenses against code reuse attacks

Thesis: M. Eng., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (pages 85-88).In this thesis, we developed a systematic model of the code reuse attack space where facts about attacks and defenses were represented as propositional statements in boolean logic and the possibility of deploying malware was a satisfiability instance. We use the model to analyze the space in two ways: we analyze the defense configurations of a real-world system and we reason about hypothetical defense bypasses. We construct attacks based on the hypothetical defense bypasses. Next, we investigate the control flow graphs enforced by proposed control flow integrity (CFI) systems. We model the behavior of these systems using a graph search. We also develop several code reuse payloads that work within the control flow graph enforced by one proposed CFI defense. Our findings illustrate that the defenses we investigated are not effective in preventing real world attacks.by Kelly Casteel.M. Eng

Emulation-based Detection of Non-self-contained Polymorphic Shellcode

Abstract. Network-level emulation has recently been proposed as a method for the accurate detection of previously unknown polymorphic code injection attacks. In this paper, we extend network-level emulation along two lines. First, we present an improved execution behavior heuristic that enables the detection of a certain class of non-self-contained polymorphic shellcodes that are currently missed by existing emulation-based approaches. Second, we present two generic algorithmic optimizations that improve the runtime performance of the detector. We have implemented a prototype of the proposed technique and evaluated it using off-the-shelf non-self-contained polymorphic shellcode engines and benign data. The detector achieves a modest processing throughput, which however is enough for decent runtime performance on actual deployments, while it has not produced any false positives. Finally, we report attack activity statistics from a seven-month deployment of our prototype in a production network, which demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of our approach.