401 research outputs found
Can smart cards reduce payments fraud and identity theft?
In the United States, when a consumer presents a payment to a merchant, the merchant typically makes a request for authorization before accepting the payment. Personal information, such as an account number, address, or telephone number, are often enough to initiate a payment. A serious weakness of this system is that criminals who obtain the correct personal information can impersonate an honest consumer and commit payments fraud. ; A key to improving security-and reducing payments fraud-might be payment smart cards. Payment smart cards have an embedded computer chip that encrypts messages to aid authorization. If properly configured, payment smart cards could provide direct benefits to consumers, merchants, banks, and others. These groups would be less vulnerable to the effects of fraud and the cost of fraud prevention would fall. Smart cards could also provide indirect benefits to society by allowing a more efficient payment system. Smart cards have already been adopted in other countries, allowing a more secure payments process and a more efficient payments system. ; Sullivan explores why smart cards have the potential to provide strong payment authorization and thus put a substantial dent into the problems of payments fraud and identity theft. But adopting smart cards in the United States faces some significant challenges. First, the industry must adopt payment smart cards and their new security standards. Second, card issuers and others in the payments industry must agree on the specific forms of security protocols used in smart cards. In both steps the industry must overcome market incentives that can impede the adoption of payment smart cards or limit the strength of their security.
e-EMV: Emulating EMV for Internet payments using Trusted Computing technology v-2
The introduction of EMV-compliant payment cards, with their
improved cardholder verification and card authentication capabilities,
has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the levels of fraud seen at
Point of Sale (PoS) terminals across Europe. However, this reduction
has been accompanied by an alarming increase in the level of fraud
associated with Internet-based Card Not Present (CNP) transactions.
This increase is largely attributable to the weaker authentication pro-
cedures involved in CNP transactions. This paper shows how the
functionality associated with EMV-compliant payment cards can be
securely emulated in software on platforms supporting Trusted Com-
puting technology. We describe a detailed system architecture encom-
passing user enrollment, card deployment (in the form of software),
card activation, and subsequent transaction processing. Our proposal
is compatible with the existing EMV transaction processing architec-
ture, and thus integrates fully and naturally with already deployed
EMV infrastructure. We show that our proposal, which effectively
makes available the full security of PoS transactions for Internet-based
CNP transactions, has the potential to significantly reduce the oppor-
tunity for fraudulent CNP transactions
Analysis and evaluation of security developments in electronic payment methods
This master thesis with the name "Analysis and Evaluation of Security Developments in Electronic Payment Methods," aims to make a compendium of the technologies and standards used on today's payment card transactions since there is no such compendium available today. This thesis also evaluates the security of the technologies used and the amount of effort required by merchants for the compliance of the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). With the results of these evaluations, it was possible to make recommendations to the merchants using payment cards as a form of payment and to the manufacturers of payment cards. Recommendations that its intention is to increase the security of the card payment transactions
A Chip off the Old Block or a New Direction for Payment Card Security? The Law and Economics of the U.S. Transition to EMV
Article published in the Michigan State Law Review
One-Time Code Cardholder Verification Method in Electronic Funds Transfer Transactions
Card payments are getting more and more popular across the world. The dominantstandard used for Electronic Funds Transfer transaction is EMV. It is widely used across Europeand Canada, and currently it is being introduced in the USA. The most frequently used CardholderVerification Method in EMV transaction is PIN, which requires from the payment terminal to beequipped with pinpad - which increases the cost of the whole payment device. In this article I presentan alternative Cardholder Verification Method (CVM) that can be used instead of traditional PIN.The key advantage of the presented mechanism is that it can be easily implemented in currentlyutilized authorization protocols, it does not affect rules of EMV specification and may decrease timeof transaction processing
POS Terminal Authentication Protocol to Protect EMV Contactless Payment Cards
The original EMV protocol was designed to operate in a situation where the card holder removes their card from their wallet and insert the card into a Point of Sale (POS) terminal. The protocol operates predominantly in plaintext which was not a problem because the attackers needed to tamper with the POS to gain access to the information on the card. The introduction of contactless EMV cards exposes the mainly plaintext EMV protocol to a wireless interface. This allows attackers to use an off-the-shelf NFC reader to access the card without the cardholders knowledge and potentially whilst the card is still in their wallet. Research has demonstrated that contactless EMV cards are vulnerable to various attacks carried out using off-the- shelf equipment which is both cheap and easy to obtain. The proposed solution addresses these issues by having the card request that any NFC reader, attempting to initiate communication, must authenticate itself as a genuine bank issued POS. The POS does this using a Bank issued private key to sign a nonce provided by the card
Provably Unlinkable Smart Card-based Payments
The most prevalent smart card-based payment method, EMV, currently offers no
privacy to its users. Transaction details and the card number are sent in
cleartext, enabling the profiling and tracking of cardholders. Since public
awareness of privacy issues is growing and legislation, such as GDPR, is
emerging, we believe it is necessary to investigate the possibility of making
payments anonymous and unlinkable without compromising essential security
guarantees and functional properties of EMV. This paper draws attention to
trade-offs between functional and privacy requirements in the design of such a
protocol. We present the UTX protocol - an enhanced payment protocol satisfying
such requirements, and we formally certify key security and privacy properties
using techniques based on the applied pi-calculus
- …