A Comprehensive Survey of Potential Game Approaches to Wireless Networks

Potential games form a class of non-cooperative games where unilateral improvement dynamics are guaranteed to converge in many practical cases. The potential game approach has been applied to a wide range of wireless network problems, particularly to a variety of channel assignment problems. In this paper, the properties of potential games are introduced, and games in wireless networks that have been proven to be potential games are comprehensively discussed.Comment: 44 pages, 6 figures, to appear in IEICE Transactions on Communications, vol. E98-B, no. 9, Sept. 201

Network Lifetime Maximization With Node Admission in Wireless Multimedia Sensor Networks

Wireless multimedia sensor networks (WMSNs) are expected to support multimedia services such as delivery of video and audio streams. However, due to the relatively stringent quality-of-service (QoS) requirements of multimedia services (e.g., high transmission rates and timely delivery) and the limited wireless resources, it is possible that not all the potential sensor nodes can be admitted into the network. Thus, node admission is essential for WMSNs, which is the target of this paper. Specifically, we aim at the node admission and its interaction with power allocation and link scheduling. A cross-layer design is presented as a two-stage optimization problem, where at the first stage the number of admitted sensor nodes is maximized, and at the second stage the network lifetime is maximized. Interestingly, it is proved that the two-stage optimization problem can be converted to a one-stage optimization problem with a more compact and concise mathematical form. Numerical results demonstrate the effectiveness of the two-stage and one-stage optimization frameworks

A Non-Cooperative Game Theoretical Approach For Power Control In Virtual MIMO Wireless Sensor Network

Power management is one of the vital issue in wireless sensor networks, where the lifetime of the network relies on battery powered nodes. Transmitting at high power reduces the lifetime of both the nodes and the network. One efficient way of power management is to control the power at which the nodes transmit. In this paper, a virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network (VMIMO-WSN)communication architecture is considered and the power control of sensor nodes based on the approach of game theory is formulated. The use of game theory has proliferated, with a broad range of applications in wireless sensor networking. Approaches from game theory can be used to optimize node level as well as network wide performance. The game here is categorized as an incomplete information game, in which the nodes do not have complete information about the strategies taken by other nodes. For virtual multiple input multiple output wireless sensor network architecture considered, the Nash equilibrium is used to decide the optimal power level at which a node needs to transmit, to maximize its utility. Outcome shows that the game theoretic approach considered for VMIMO-WSN architecture achieves the best utility, by consuming less power.Comment: 12 pages, 8 figure

Cooperative task assignment for distributed deployment of applications in WSNs

Nodes in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are becoming more and more complex systems with the capabilities to run distributed structured applications. Which single task should be implemented by each WSN node needs to be decided by the application deployment strategy by taking into account both network lifetime and execution time requirements. In this paper, we propose an adaptive decentralised algorithm based on noncooperative game theory, where neighbouring nodes negotiate among each other to maximize their utility function. We then prove that an increment of the nodes utility corresponds to the same increment of the utility for the whole network. Simulation results show significant performance improvement with respect to existing algorithms

Information exchange in randomly deployed dense WSNs with wireless energy harvesting capabilities

©2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works.As large-scale dense and often randomly deployed wireless sensor networks (WSNs) become widespread, local information exchange between colocated sets of nodes may play a significant role in handling the excessive traffic volume. Moreover, to account for the limited life-span of the wireless devices, harvesting the energy of the network transmissions provides significant benefits to the lifetime of such networks. In this paper, we study the performance of communication in dense networks with wireless energy harvesting (WEH)-enabled sensor nodes. In particular, we examine two different communication scenarios (direct and cooperative) for data exchange and we provide theoretical expressions for the probability of successful communication. Then, considering the importance of lifetime in WSNs, we employ state-of-the-art WEH techniques and realistic energy converters, quantifying the potential energy gains that can be achieved in the network. Our analytical derivations, which are validated by extensive Monte-Carlo simulations, highlight the importance of WEH in dense networks and identify the tradeoffs between the direct and cooperative communication scenarios.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Incentive Mechanisms for Participatory Sensing: Survey and Research Challenges

Participatory sensing is a powerful paradigm which takes advantage of smartphones to collect and analyze data beyond the scale of what was previously possible. Given that participatory sensing systems rely completely on the users' willingness to submit up-to-date and accurate information, it is paramount to effectively incentivize users' active and reliable participation. In this paper, we survey existing literature on incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems. In particular, we present a taxonomy of existing incentive mechanisms for participatory sensing systems, which are subsequently discussed in depth by comparing and contrasting different approaches. Finally, we discuss an agenda of open research challenges in incentivizing users in participatory sensing.Comment: Updated version, 4/25/201