5 research outputs found
ΠΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΊΠ° Π²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΡΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ² Π² ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎ-ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ°Ρ ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π°ΠΌΠΈ
The paper comprises a technique of information flow verification for information and telecommunication systems with embedded devices. The goal of the technique is to evaluate the security level of the constructed system and check the compliance between real information flows and the set policies. The conducted verification is based on model checking with the use of SPIN tool. Implementation of such verification is fulfilled at initial design stages and provides earlier detection of contradictions in the used security policy and inconsistencies between the network topology and requirements of the information system.Π ΡΠ°Π±ΠΎΡΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ°Π²Π»Π΅Π½Π° ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΊΠ° Π²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠ΅Π²ΡΡ
ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎ-ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌ ΡΠΎ Π²ΡΡΡΠΎΠ΅Π½Π½ΡΠΌΠΈ ΡΡΡΡΠΎΠΉΡΡΠ²Π°ΠΌΠΈ. Π¦Π΅Π»Ρ ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΊΠΈ β ΠΎΡΠ΅Π½ΠΊΠ° Π·Π°ΡΠΈΡΠ΅Π½Π½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΡΠ°Π·ΡΠ°Π±Π°ΡΡΠ²Π°Π΅ΠΌΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ ΠΈ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠΊΠ° ΡΠΎΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΡΠ²ΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ² Π² ΡΠ΅Π°Π»ΡΠ½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΠ΅ Π·Π°Π΄Π°Π½Π½ΡΠΌ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΠΌ. ΠΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΠΌΠ°Ρ Π²Π΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΡ Π±Π°Π·ΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΡΡΡ Π½Π° ΠΌΠ΅ΡΠΎΠ΄Π΅ Β«ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²Π΅ΡΠΊΠΈ Π½Π° ΠΌΠΎΠ΄Π΅Π»ΠΈΒ» Ρ ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΠ΅ΠΌ ΠΏΡΠΎΠ³ΡΠ°ΠΌΠΌΠ½ΠΎΠ³ΠΎ ΡΡΠ΅Π΄ΡΡΠ²Π° SPIN. ΠΠ΅ΡΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΡ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΡΡ
ΠΏΠΎΡΠΎΠΊΠΎΠ² ΠΏΡΠΎΠ²ΠΎΠ΄ΠΈΡΡΡ Π½Π° Π½Π°ΡΠ°Π»ΡΠ½ΡΡ
ΡΡΠ°ΠΏΠ°Ρ
ΠΏΡΠΎΠ΅ΠΊΡΠΈΡΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡ ΠΈ ΠΎΠ±Π΅ΡΠΏΠ΅ΡΠΈΠ²Π°Π΅Ρ Π±ΠΎΠ»Π΅Π΅ ΡΠ°Π½Π½Π΅Π΅ ΠΎΠ±Π½Π°ΡΡΠΆΠ΅Π½ΠΈΠ΅ ΠΏΡΠΎΡΠΈΠ²ΠΎΡΠ΅ΡΠΈΠΉ Π² ΠΈΡΠΏΠΎΠ»ΡΠ·ΡΠ΅ΠΌΠΎΠΉ ΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΈΡΠΈΠΊΠ΅ Π±Π΅Π·ΠΎΠΏΠ°ΡΠ½ΠΎΡΡΠΈ ΠΈ Π½Π΅ΡΠΎΠΎΡΠ²Π΅ΡΡΡΠ²ΠΈΠΉ ΡΠΎΠΏΠΎΠ»ΠΎΠ³ΠΈΠΈ ΡΠ΅ΡΠΈ ΡΡΠ΅Π±ΠΎΠ²Π°Π½ΠΈΡΠΌ ΠΈΠ½ΡΠΎΡΠΌΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎ-ΡΠ΅Π»Π΅ΠΊΠΎΠΌΠΌΡΠ½ΠΈΠΊΠ°ΡΠΈΠΎΠ½Π½ΠΎΠΉ ΡΠΈΡΡΠ΅ΠΌΡ
DDoS Attacks with Randomized Traffic Innovation: Botnet Identification Challenges and Strategies
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are usually launched through the
, an "army" of compromised nodes hidden in the network. Inferential
tools for DDoS mitigation should accordingly enable an early and reliable
discrimination of the normal users from the compromised ones. Unfortunately,
the recent emergence of attacks performed at the application layer has
multiplied the number of possibilities that a botnet can exploit to conceal its
malicious activities. New challenges arise, which cannot be addressed by simply
borrowing the tools that have been successfully applied so far to earlier DDoS
paradigms. In this work, we offer basically three contributions: we
introduce an abstract model for the aforementioned class of attacks, where the
botnet emulates normal traffic by continually learning admissible patterns from
the environment; we devise an inference algorithm that is shown to
provide a consistent (i.e., converging to the true solution as time progresses)
estimate of the botnet possibly hidden in the network; and we verify the
validity of the proposed inferential strategy over network traces.Comment: Submitted for publicatio
The Embedding Capacity of Information Flows Under Renewal Traffic
Given two independent point processes and a certain rule for matching points
between them, what is the fraction of matched points over infinitely long
streams? In many application contexts, e.g., secure networking, a meaningful
matching rule is that of a maximum causal delay, and the problem is related to
embedding a flow of packets in cover traffic such that no traffic analysis can
detect it. We study the best undetectable embedding policy and the
corresponding maximum flow rate ---that we call the embedding capacity--- under
the assumption that the cover traffic can be modeled as arbitrary renewal
processes. We find that computing the embedding capacity requires the inversion
of very structured linear systems that, for a broad range of renewal models
encountered in practice, admits a fully analytical expression in terms of the
renewal function of the processes. Our main theoretical contribution is a
simple closed form of such relationship. This result enables us to explore
properties of the embedding capacity, obtaining closed-form solutions for
selected distribution families and a suite of sufficient conditions on the
capacity ordering. We evaluate our solution on real network traces, which shows
a noticeable match for tight delay constraints. A gap between the predicted and
the actual embedding capacities appears for looser constraints, and further
investigation reveals that it is caused by inaccuracy of the renewal traffic
model rather than of the solution itself.Comment: Sumbitted to IEEE Trans. on Information Theory on March 10, 201
Distributed Detection of Multi-Hop Information Flows With Fusion Capacity Constraints
The problem of detecting multihop information flows subject to communication constraints is considered. In a distributed detection scheme, eavesdroppers are deployed near nodes in a network, each able to measure the transmission timestamps of a single node. The eavesdroppers must then compress the information and transmit it to a fusion center, which then decides whether a sequence of monitored nodes are transmitting an information flow. A performance measure is defined based on the maximum fraction of chaff packets under which flows are still detectable. The performance of a detector becomes a function of the communication constraints and the number of nodes in the sequence. Achievability results are obtained by designing a practical distributed detection scheme, including a new flow finding algorithm that has vanishing error probabilities for a limited fraction of chaff packets. Converse results are obtained by characterizing the fraction of chaff packets sufficient for an information flow to mimic the distributions of independent traffic under the proposed compression scheme.National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Grant No. CCF-0635070)United States. Office of Naval Research (MURI W911NF-08-1-0238