281 research outputs found
Testing for Collusion in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions
This paper proposes fully nonparametric tests to detect possible collusion in first-price procurement (auctions). The aim of the tests is to detect possible collusion before knowing whether or not bidders are colluding. Thus we do not rely on data on anti-competitive hearing, and in that sense is âex-anteâ. We propose a two steps (model selection) procedure: First, we use a reduced form test of independence and symmetry to shortlist bidders whose bidding behavior is at-odds with competitive bidding, and Second, the recovered (latent) cost for these bidders must be higher under collusion than under competition, because collusion dwarfs competition, hence detecting collusion boils down to testing if the estimated cost distribution under collusion first order stochastically dominates that under competition. We propose rank based and Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) tests. We implement the tests for Highway Procurement data in California and conclude that there is no evidence of collusion even though the reduced form test supports collusion.
Detecting collusion in timber auctions : an application to Romania
Romania was one of the first transition countries in Europe to introduce auctions for allocating standing timber (stumpage) in public forests. In comparison with the former system in the country-administrative allocation at set prices-timber auctions offer several potential advantages: greater revenue generation for the government, a higher probability that tracts will be allocated to the firms that value them most highly, and stronger incentives for technological change within industry and efficiency gains in the public sector. Competition is the key to realizing these advantages. Unfortunately, collusion among bidders often limits competition in timber auctions, including in well-established market economies such as the United States. The result is that tracts sell below their fair market value, which undermines the advantages of auctions. This paper examines the Romanian auction system, with a focus on the use of econometric methods to detect collusion. It begins by describing the historical development of the system and the principal steps in the auction process. It then discusses the qualitative impacts of various economic and institutional factors, including collusion, on winning bids in different regions of the country. This discussion draws on information from a combination of sources, including unstructured interviews conducted with government officials and company representatives during 2003. Next, the paper summarizes key findings from the broader research literature on auctions, with an emphasis on empirical studies that have developed econometric methods for detecting collusion. It then presents an application of such methods to timber auction data from two forest directorates in Romania, Neamt and Suceava. This application confirms that data from Romanian timber auctions can be used to determine the likelihood of collusion, and it suggests that collusion reduced winning bids in Suceava in 2002 and perhaps also in Neamt. The paper concludes with a discussion of actions that the government can take to reduce the incidence of collusion and minimize its impact on auction outcomes.Forestry,Wildlife Resources,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Technology Industry
Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan
We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation of potential "outsiders." Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose winless period is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.
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Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering
Recent developments in the area of Bid Tender Forecasting have enabled bidders to implement new types of easy-to-use tools for increasing their chances of winning contracts. Although these new tools (such as iso-Score Curve Graphs, Scoring Probability Graphs, and Position Probability Graphs) are designed for bidders in capped tendering (tenders with an upper price limit), some of their principles can also be applied by a Contracting Authority to detect which bidders do not follow a standard pattern, that is, their bids are extremely high or low. Since a collusive bid generally needs to be sufficiently high or low to make an impact on the bid distribution, any person in charge of supervising capped tenders can be alerted to any bidder that might be involved in a cartel after identifying the same abnormal behavior in a series of tenders through simple calculations and a new type of graph
Bidding Markets
The existence of a âbidding marketâ is commonly cited as a reason to tolerate the creation or maintenance of highly concentrated markets. We discuss three erroneous arguments to that effect: the âconsultantsâ fallacyâ that âmarket power is impossibleâ, the âacademicsâ fallacyâ that (often) âmarket power does not matterâ, and the âregulatorsâ fallacyâ that âintervention against pernicious market power is unnecessaryâ, in markets characterized by auctions or bidding processes. Furthermore we argue that the term âbidding marketâ as it is widely used in antitrust is unhelpful or misleading. Auctions and bidding processes do have some special featuresâincluding their price formation processes, common-values behaviour, and bid-taker powerâbut the significance of these features has been overemphasized, and they often imply a need for stricter rather than more lenient competition policy.Bidding Markets, Auctions, Antitrust, Competition Policy, Bidding, Market Power, Private Values, Common Values, Anti-trust
Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions
Collusion in auctions can take different forms, one of which is refraining from bidding. Such behavior may be overt or tacit.Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted by the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet from 2005 to 2007. We analyze both the bid participation decision and the pricing decision. We include variables that affect firmâsâ costs as well as variables that capture competitive and strategic effects. Most importantly, we determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and use that information to determine the potential bidders for each paving project. We find that, in geographic markets with only a few feasible suppliers, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firmsâ decisions whether and how much to bid
Machine learning with screens for detecting bid-rigging cartels
We combine machine learning techniques with statistical screens computed from the distribution of bids in tenders within the Swiss construction sector to predict collusion through bid-rigging cartels. We assess the out of sample performance of this approach and find it to correctly classify more than 80% of the total of bidding processes as collusive or non-collusive. As the correct classification rate, however, differs across truly non-collusive and collusive processes, we also investigate tradeoffs in reducing false positive vs. false negative predictions. Finally, we discuss policy implications of our method for competition agencies aiming at detecting bid- rigging cartel
Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan
We present an econometric approach to the problem of detecting bid rigging in procurement auctions using bidding data for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic price wars are caused by the participation of potential goutsiders.h Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive in the absence of these outsiders, we estimate the rule by which the ring selects the winner. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose time elapsed from the last winning is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.Bid rigging, repeated auction.
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Quick abnormal-bid-detection method for construction contract auctions
Noncompetitive bids have recently become a major concern in both public and private sector construction contract auctions. Consequently, several models have been developed to help identify bidders potentially involved in collusive practices. However, most of these models require complex calculations and extensive information that is difficult to obtain. The aim of this paper is to utilize recent developments for detecting abnormal bids in capped auctions (auctions with an upper bid limit set by the auctioner) and extend them to the more conventional uncapped auctions (where no such limits are set). To accomplish this, a new method is developed for estimating the values of bid distribution supports by using the solution to what has become known as the German Tank problem. The model is then demonstrated and tested on a sample of real construction bid data, and shown to detect cover bids with high accuracy. This paper contributes to an improved understanding of abnormal bid behavior as an aid to detecting and monitoring potential collusive bid practices
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