Technological change and regional restructuring in Boston's route 128 area

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies During the 1980s and early 1990s, the importance of small firm growth and industrial districts in Italy became the focus of a large number of regional development studies. According to this literature, successful industrial districts are characterized by intensive cooperation and market producer-user interaction between small and medium-sized, flexibly specialized firms (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Scott, 1988). In addition, specialized local labor markets develop which are complemented by a variety of supportive institutions and a tradition of collaboration based on trust relations (Amin and Robins, 1990; Amin and Thrift, 1995). It has also been emphasized that industrial districts are deeply embedded into the socio-institutional structures within their particular regions (Grabher, 1993). Many case studies have attempted to find evidence that the regional patterns identified in Italy are a reflection of a general trend in industrial development rather than just being historical exceptions. Silicon Valley, which is focused on high technology production, has been identified as being one such production complex similar to those in Italy (see, for instance, Hayter, 1997). However, some remarkable differences do exist in the institutional context of this region, as well as its particular social division of labor (Markusen, 1996). Even though critics, such as Amin and Robins (1990), emphasized quite early that the Italian experience could not easily be applied to other socio-cultural settings, many studies have classified other high technology regions in the U.S. as being industrial districts, such as Boston s Route 128 area. Too much attention has been paid to the performance of small and medium-sized firms and the regional level of industrial production in the ill-fated debate regarding industrial districts (Martinelli and Schoenberger, 1991). Harrison (1997) has provided substantial evidence that large firms continue to dominate the global economy. This does not, however, imply that a de-territorialization of economic growth is necessarily taking place as globalization tendencies continue (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). In the case of Boston, it has been misleading to define its regional economy as being an industrial district. Neither have small and medium-sized firms been decisive in the development of the Route 128 area nor has the region developed a tradition of close communication between vertically-disintegrated firms (Dorfman, 1983; Bathelt, 1991a). Saxenian (1994) found that Boston s economy contrasted sharply with that of an industrial district. Specifically, the region has been dominated by large, vertically-integrated high technology firms which are reliant on proprietary technologies and autarkic firm structures. Several studies have tried to compare the development of the Route 128 region to Silicon Valley. These studies have shown that both regions developed into major 2 agglomerations of high technology industries in the post-World War II period. Due to their different traditions, structures and practices, Silicon Valley and Route 128 have followed divergent development paths which have resulted in a different regional specialization (Dorfman, 1983; Saxenian, 1985; Kenney and von Burg, 1999). In the mid 1970s, both regions were almost equally important in terms of the size of their high technology sectors. Since then, however, Silicon Valley has become more important and has now the largest agglomeration of leading-edge technologies in the U.S. (Saxenian, 1994). Saxenian (1994) argues that the superior performance of high technology industries in Silicon Valley over those in Boston is based on different organizational patterns and manufacturing cultures which are embedded in those socio-institutional traditions which are particular to each region. Despite the fact that Saxenian (1994) has been criticized for basing her conclusions on weak empirical research (i.e. Harrison, 1997; Markusen, 1998), she offers a convincing explanation as to why the development paths of both regions have differed.1 Saxenian s (1994) study does not, however, identify which structures and processes have enabled both regions to overcome economic crises. In the case of the Boston economy, high technology industries have proven that they are capable of readjusting and rejuvenating their product and process structures in such a way that further innovation and growth is stimulated. This is also exemplified by the region s recent economic development. In the late 1980s, Boston experienced an economic decline when the minicomputer industry lost its competitive basis and defense expenditures were drastically reduced. The number of high technology manufacturing jobs decreased by more than 45,000 between 1987 and 1995. By the mid 1990s, however, the regional economy began to recover. The rapidly growing software sector compensated for some of the losses experienced in manufacturing. In this paper, I aim to identify the forces behind this economic recovery. I will investigate whether high technology firms have uncovered new ways to overcome the crisis and the extent to which they have given up their focus on self-reliance and autarkic structures. The empirical findings will also be discussed in the context of the recent debate about the importance of regional competence and collective learning (Storper, 1997; Maskell and Malmberg, 1998). There is a growing body of literature which suggests that some regional economies an develop into learning economies which are based on intra-regional production linkages, interactive technological learning processes, flexibility and proximity (Storper, 1992; Lundvall and Johnson, 1994; Gregersen and Johnson, 1997). In the next section of this paper, I will discuss some of the theoretical issues regarding localized learning processes, learning economies and learning regions (see, also, Bathelt, 1999). I will then describe the methodology used. What follows is a brief overview of how Boston s economy has specialized in high technology production. The main part of the paper will then focus on recent trends in Boston s high technology industries. It will be shown that the high technology economy consists of different subsectors which are not tied to a single technological development path. The various subsectors are, at least partially, dependent on different forces and unrelated processes. There is, however, tentative evidence which suggests that cooperative behavior and collective learning in supplierproducer- user relations have become important factors in securing reproductivity in the regional structure. The importance of these trends will be discussed in the conclusions

The revolution in data gathering systems

Data acquisition systems used in NASA's wind tunnels from the 1950's through the present time are summarized as a baseline for assessing the impact of minicomputers and microcomputers on data acquisition and data processing. Emphasis is placed on the cyclic evolution in computer technology which transformed the central computer system, and finally the distributed computer system. Other developments discussed include: medium scale integration, large scale integration, combining the functions of data acquisition and control, and micro and minicomputers

Escort: A data acquisition and display system to support research testing

Primarily designed to acquire data at steady state test conditions, the system can also monitor slow transients such as those generated in moving to a new test condition. The system configuration makes use of a microcomputer at the test site which acts as a communications multiplexer between the measurement and display devices and a centrally located minicomputer. A variety of measurement and display devices are supported using a modular approach. This allows each system to be configured with the proper combination of devices to meet the specific test requirements, while still leaving the option to add special interfaces when needed. Centralization of the minicomputer improves utilization through sharing. The creation of a pool of minis to provide data acquisition and display services to a variable number of running tests also offers other important advantages

A NASA family of minicomputer systems, Appendix A

This investigation was undertaken to establish sufficient specifications, or standards, for minicomputer hardware and software to provide NASA with realizable economics in quantity purchases, interchangeability of minicomputers, software, storage and peripherals, and a uniformly high quality. The standards will define minicomputer system component types, each specialized to its intended NASA application, in as many levels of capacity as required

Early computing and data processing in Malta

Malta has been a heavy user of computers only since the 1980s, following the availability of the personal computer. Before that date, the diffusion of computers in Malta was slow. This paper describes the supply and application of computers from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. The state of computing and the slow take-up of computers is analysed and explained. The paper concludes with an explanation for 'fake off' in the 1980s.peer-reviewe

Applications of computer graphics to aircraft synthesis

The history of the development of an aircraft configuration synthesis program using interactive computer graphics was described. A system based on time-sharing was compared to two different concepts based on distributed computing

Firm Capabilities, Competition and Industrial Policies in a History-Friendly Model of the Computer Industry

In this paper, we explore some problems that industrial policy faces in industries characterized by dynamic increasing returns on the basis of a 'history friendly model' of the evolution of the computer industry. How does policy affect industry structure over the course of industry evolution? Is the timing of the intervention important? Do policy interventions have indirect and perhaps unintended consequences on different markets at different times? We focus on two sets of policies: antitrust and interventions aiming at supporting the entry of new forms in the industry. The results of our simulations show that, if strong dynamic increasing returns are operative, both through technological capabilities and through customer tendency to stick with a brand, there is little that antitrust and entry policy could have done to avert the rise of a dominant firm in mainframes. On the other hand, if the customer lock in effect had been smaller, either by chance or through policies that discouraged efforts of firms to lock in their customers, the situation might have been somewhat different. In the first place, even in the absence of antitrust or entry encouraging policies, market concentration would have been lower, albeit a dominant firm would emerge anyhow. Second, antitrust and entry encouraging policies would have been more effective in assuring that concentration would decrease. The leading firm would continue to dominate the market, but its relative power would be reduced. © Elsevier Science B.V

The Microcomputer Catalyst

Microcomputer it is a word many of us first heard only a couple of years ago. Yet the technology this word represents holds promise of tremendous change. The changes catalyzed by microcomputing and its associated technologies may alter the fundamental nature of information handling in all its forms. This, of course, means that libraries and information centers will be profoundly affected by this new technology. This paper attempts to indicate some possible directions of the changes prompted by microcomputing technology. However, these ideas are offered only with the disclaimer that technology in this area is developing so rapidly that no one involved in computing can fully understand its implications. Hardware designers and software engineers involved in microcomputing are themselves still attempting to discern the values and possible uses of microcomputers. The only "given" most would agree upon is the recognition that microcomputers will alter the basic manner in which computers are used and viewed in our society.published or submitted for publicatio

Communication Standards for Online Interchange of Library Information

published or submitted for publicatio

Mark 3 interactive data analysis system

The interactive data analysis system, a major subset of the total Mark 3 very long baseline interferometry (VLBI) software system is described. The system consists of two major and a number of small programs. These programs provide for the scientific analysis of the observed values of delay and delay rate generated by the VLBI data reduction programs and product the geophysical and astrometric parameters which are among the ultimate products of VLBI. The two major programs are CALC and SOLVE. CALC generates the theoretical values of VLBI delay rate as well as partial derivatives based on apriori values of the geophysical and astronometric parameters. SOLVE is a least squares parameters estimation program which yields the geophysical and astrometric parameters using the observed values by the data processing system and theoretical values and partial derivatives provided by CALC. SOLVE is a highly interactive program in which the user selects the exact form of the recovered parameters and the data to be accepted into the solution