Using fMRI in experimental philosophy: Exploring the prospects

This chapter analyses the prospects of using neuroimaging methods, in particular functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for philosophical purposes. To do so, it will use two case studies from the field of emotion research: Greene et al. (2001) used fMRI to uncover the mental processes underlying moral intuitions, while Lindquist et al. (2012) used fMRI to inform the debate around the nature of a specific mental process, namely, emotion. These studies illustrate two main approaches in cognitive neuroscience: Reverse inference and ontology testing, respectively. With regards to Greene et al.’s study, the use of Neurosynth (Yarkoni 2011) will show that the available formulations of reverse inference, although viable a priori, seem to be of limited use in practice. On the other hand, the discussion of Lindquist et al.’s study will present the so far neglected potential of ontology-testing approaches to inform philosophical questions

Towards a constructionist approach to emotions : verification of the three-dimensional model of affect with EEG-independent component analysis

The locationist model of affect, which assumes separate brain structures devoted to particular discrete emotions, is currently being questioned as it has not received enough convincing experimental support. An alternative, constructionist approach suggests that our emotional states emerge from the interaction between brain functional networks, which are related to more general, continuous affective categories. In the study, we tested whether the three-dimensional model of affect based on valence, arousal, and dominance (VAD) can reflect brain activity in a more coherent way than the traditional locationist approach. Independent components of brain activity were derived from spontaneous EEG recordings and localized using the DIPFIT method. The correspondence between the spectral power of the revealed brain sources and a mood self-report quantified on the VAD space was analysed. Activation of four (out of nine) clusters of independent brain sources could be successfully explained by the specific combination of three VAD dimensions. The results support the constructionist theory of emotions

Neural Reuse and the Nature of Evolutionary Constraints

In humans, the reuse of neural structure is particularly pronounced at short, task-relevant timescales. Here, an argument is developed for the claim that facts about neural reuse at task-relevant timescales conflict with at least one characterization of neural reuse at an evolutionary timescale. It is then argued that, in order to resolve the conflict, we must conceptualize evolutionary-scale reuse more abstractly than has been generally recognized. The final section of the paper explores the relationship between neural reuse and human nature. It is argued that neural reuse is not well-described as a process that constrains our present cognitive capacities. Instead, it liberates those capacities from the ancestral tethers that might otherwise have constrained them

Beyond componential constitution in the brain : starburst amacrine cells and enabling constraints

Componential mechanism (Craver 2008) is an increasingly influential framework for understanding the norms of good explanation in neuroscience and beyond. Componential mechanism “construes explanation as a matter of decomposing systems into their parts and showing how those parts are organized together in such a way as to exhibit the explanandum phenomenon” (Craver 2008, p. 109). Although this clearly describes some instances of successful explanation, I argue here that as currently formulated the framework is too narrow to capture the full range of good mechanistic explanations in the neurosciences. The centerpiece of this essay is a case study of Starburst Amacrine Cells —a type of motion-sensitive cell in mammalian retina —for which function emerges from structure in a way that appears to violate the conditions specified by componential mechanism as currently conceived. I argue that the case of Starburst Amacrine Cells should move us to replace the notion of mechanistic componential constitution with a more general notion of enabling constraint. Introducing enabling constraints as a conceptual tool will allow us to capture and appropriately characterize a wider class of structure-function relationships in the brain and elsewhere

Identifying animal complex cognition requires natural complexity

The search for human cognitive uniqueness often relied on low ecological tests with subjects experiencing unnatural ontogeny. Recently, neuroscience demonstrated the significance of a rich environment on the development of brain structures and cognitive abilities. This stresses the importance to consider the prior knowledge that subjects bring in any experiment. Second, recent developments in multivariate statistics control precisely for a number of factors and their interactions. Making controls in natural observations equivalent and sometimes superior to captive experimental studies without the drawbacks of the latter methods. Thus, we can now investigate complex cognition by accounting for many different factors, as required when solving tasks in nature. Combining both progresses allow us to move towards an “experience-specific cognition”, recognizing that cognition vary extensively in nature as individuals adapt to the precise challenges they experience in life. Such cognitive specialization makes cross-species comparisons more complex, while potentially identifying human cognitive uniqueness

Critical integration in neural and cognitive systems: beyond power-law scaling as the hallmark of soft assembly

Inspired by models of self-organized criticality, a family of measures quantifies long-range correlations in neural and behavioral activity in the form of self-similar (e.g., power-law scaled) patterns across a range of scales. Long-range correlations are often taken as evidence that a system is near a critical transition, suggesting interaction-dominant, softly assembled relations between its parts. Psychologists and neuroscientists frequently use power-law scaling as evidence of critical regimes and soft assembly in neural and cognitive activity. Critics, however, argue that this methodology operates at most at the level of an analogy between cognitive and other natural phenomena. This is because power-laws do not provide information about a particular system's organization or what makes it specifically cognitive. We respond to this criticism using recent work in Integrated Information Theory. We propose a more principled understanding of criticality as a system's susceptibility to changes in its own integration, a property cognitive agents are expected to manifest. We contrast critical integration with power-law measures and find the former more informative about the underlying processes

Why multiple intelligences theory is a neuromyth

A neuromyth is a commonly accepted but unscientific claim about brain function. Many researchers have claimed Howard Gardner’s multiple intelligences (MI) theory is a neuromyth because they have seen no evidence supporting his proposal for independent brain-based intelligences for different types of cognitive abilities. Although Gardner has made claims that there are dedicated neural networks or modules for each of the intelligences, nonetheless Gardner has stated his theory could not be a neuromyth because he never claimed it was a neurological theory. This paper explains the lack of evidence to support MI theory. Most important, no researcher has directly looked for a brain basis for the intelligences. Moreover, factor studies have not shown the intelligences to be independent, and studies of MI teaching effects have not explored alternate causes for positive effects and have not been conducted by standard scientific methods. Gardner’s MI theory was not a neuromyth initially because it was based on theories of the 1980s of brain modularity for cognition, and few researchers then were concerned by the lack of validating brain studies. However, in the past 40 years neuroscience research has shown that the brain is not organized in separate modules dedicated to specific forms of cognition. Despite the lack of empirical support for Gardner’s theory, MI teaching strategies are widely used in classrooms all over the world. Crucially, belief in MI and use of MI in the classroom limit the effort to find evidence-based teaching methods. Studies of possible interventions to try to change student and teacher belief in neuromyths are currently being undertaken. Intervention results are variable: One research group found that teachers who knew more about the brain still believed education neuromyths. Teachers need to learn to detect and reject neuromyths. Widespread belief in a neuromyth does not make a theory legitimate. Theories must be based on sound empirical evidence. It is now time for MI theory to be rejected, once and for all, and for educators to turn to evidence-based teaching strategies