Global Tobacco Control and Economic Norms: An Analysis of Normative Commitments in Kenya, Malawi And Zambia

Tobacco control norms have gained momentum over the past decade. To date 43 of 47 Sub-Saharan African countries are party to the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC). The near universal adoption of the FCTC illustrates the increasing strength of these norms, although the level of commitment to implement the provisions varies widely. However, tobacco control is enmeshed in a web of international norms that has bearing on how governments implement and strengthen tobacco control measures. Given that economic arguments in favor of tobacco production remain a prominent barrier to tobacco control efforts, there is a continued need to examine how economic sectors frame and mobilize their policy commitments to tobacco production. This study explores the proposition that divergence of international norms fosters policy divergence within governments. This study was conducted in three African countries: Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia. These countries represent a continuum of tobacco control policy, whereby Kenya is one of the most advanced countries in Africa in this respect, whereas Malawi is one of the few countries that is not a party to the FCTC and has implemented few measures. We conducted 55 key informant interviews (Zambia = 23; Kenya = 17; Malawi = 15). Data analysis involved deductive coding of interview transcripts and notes to identify reference to international norms (i.e. commitments, agreements, institutions), coupled with an inductive analysis that sought to interpret the meaning participants ascribe to these norms. Our analysis suggests that commitments to tobacco control have yet to penetrate non-health sectors, who perceive tobacco control as largely in conflict with international economic norms. The reasons for this perceived conflict seems to include: (1) an entrenched and narrow conceptualization of economic development norms, (2) the power of economic interests to shape policy discourses, and (3) a structural divide between sectors in the form of bureaucratic silos

Unification Strategies in Cognitive Science

Cognitive science is an interdisciplinary conglomerate of various research fields and disciplines, which increases the risk of fragmentation of cognitive theories. However, while most previous work has focused on theoretical integration, some kinds of integration may turn out to be monstrous, or result in superficially lumped and unrelated bodies of knowledge. In this paper, I distinguish theoretical integration from theoretical unification, and propose some analyses of theoretical unification dimensions. Moreover, two research strategies that are supposed to lead to unification are analyzed in terms of the mechanistic account of explanation. Finally, I argue that theoretical unification is not an absolute requirement from the mechanistic perspective, and that strategies aiming at unification may be premature in fields where there are multiple conflicting explanatory models

CONVERGENCES AND CONTROVERSY ON THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

The standardization issue starts with the accounting theories and the interface between them and accounting practices. The plural of accounting theories is explained by the fact that literature defines several theories, which differ both in their content and their origin and genesis . Although it seems an extravagant expression, the notion of accounting theory underlying the accounting literature, particularly the Anglo-Saxon one and less the Continental one, is true. The accounting theory is described by J. F. Imke as an organized group of knowledge, characterized by order, motivations, connections, objectives and methods used in accounting. A classification of accounting theories addresses the following classes: descriptive theories, regulatory theories and explanatory theories.financial statements, harmonization, convergences

Using Norms To Control Open Multi-Agent Systems

Internet es, tal vez, el avance científico más relevante de nuestros días. Entre otras cosas, Internet ha permitido la evolución de los paradigmas de computación tradicionales hacia el paradigma de computaciónn distribuida, que se caracteriza por utilizar una red abierta de ordenadores. Los sistemas multiagente (SMA) son una tecnolog a adecuada para abordar los retos motivados por estos sistemas abiertos distribuidos. Los SMA son aplicaciones formadas por agentes heterog eneos y aut onomos que pueden haber sido dise~nados de forma independiente de acuerdo con objetivos y motivaciones diferentes. Por lo tanto, no es posible realizar ninguna hip otesis a priori sobre el comportamiento de los agentes. Por este motivo, los SMA necesitan de mecanismos de coordinaci on y cooperaci on, como las normas, para garantizar el orden social y evitar la aparici on de conictos. El t ermino norma cubre dos dimensiones diferentes: i) las normas como un instrumento que gu a a los ciudadanos a la hora de realizar acciones y actividades, por lo que las normas de nen los procedimientos y/o los protocolos que se deben seguir en una situaci on concreta, y ii) las normas como ordenes o prohibiciones respaldadas por un sistema de sanciones, por lo que las normas son medios para prevenir o castigar ciertas acciones. En el area de los SMA, las normas se vienen utilizando como una especi caci on formal de lo que est a permitido, obligado y prohibido dentro de una sociedad. De este modo, las normas permiten regular la vida de los agentes software y las interacciones entre ellos. La motivaci on principal de esta tesis es permitir a los dise~nadores de los SMA utilizar normas como un mecanismo para controlar y coordinar SMA abiertos. Nuestro objetivo es elaborar mecanismos normativos a dos niveles: a nivel de agente y a nivel de infraestructura. Por lo tanto, en esta tesis se aborda primero el problema de la de nici on de agentes normativos aut onomos que sean capaces de deliberar acercaCriado Pacheco, N. (2012). Using Norms To Control Open Multi-Agent Systems [Tesis doctoral no publicada]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/17800Palanci

Scientific Realism, Adaptationism and the Problem of the Criterion

Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called ‘epistemic gap’ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains

What Determines User Attitudes in IS Research? A Meta-analytic Structural Equation Modeling Approach

While research in general has extensively studied the coherence between attitude and behavior, Information Systems (IS) research has paid little attention to the antecedents of attitude. Using the elaboration likelihood model (ELM) as theoretical basis, we focus on the factors that determine attitudes in IS research. We apply a meta-analytic structural equation model based on major IS-adoption models that focuses on classifying the antecedents of attitude in the studies of our meta-analysis according to the central and peripheral route of information processing proposed by the ELM. The results indicate that affect and cognition as representatives for the central route are less important as attitudinal antecedents in the IS context compared to external factors that represent the peripheral route of information processing

Instrumental Justification of Epistemic Coherence Requirements

Why think that our doxastic states should obey norms of formal coherence? One sort of answer to this question attempts to justify coherence in instrumental terms, arguing that only by being coherent can we achieve some more fundamental goal, such as true belief. Here I consider apparent counterexamples to this instrumental strategy: cases in which being incoherent seems like the best way of achieving epistemic goals. Although the cases differ considerably in their surface structure, I provide a common diagnosis, claiming that the cases implicitly depend on contentious assumptions about the range of possible states that count as relevant alternatives to be considered in pursuing our epistemic goals. I suggest that, by substituting a range of such states that is independently better motivated, we may preserve the viability of the instrumental strategy.Master of Art

The Disenchantment of Logically Formal Legal Rationality, or Max Weber\u27s Sociology in the Genealogy of the Contemporary Mode of Western Legal Thought

Max Weber began his sociology of law with a description of the then present of Western legal thought, along with a brief summary of its previous stages. Professor Kennedy\u27s appreciation of Weber\u27s sociology of law begins with a summary description of the Western legal thought of Weber\u27s time as it looks from our present one hundred years later, emphasizing the contrast between the mainstream of his time, now called Classical Legal Thought, and its critics in the social current. He then presents Weber\u27s sociology of law, comparing and contrasting his approach with that of the social current. According to Professor Kennedy, the most striking thing about Weber\u27s sociology of law, from the perspective of legal theory a century after he wrote, is his ambivalent endorsement of legal formalism. This entailed rejection of the social current\u27s critique, a critique that is close to universally accepted today. Professor Kennedy explains Weber\u27s attitude toward legal formalism as motivated by the internal requirements of his theory of domination, in which, after the demise of all earlier modes of legitimation, the Iron Cage of modernity is held together by bureaucrats defined by their adherence to that mode of legal reasoning. He then argues that Weber\u27s approach was inconsistent with the irrationalist and decisionist strands in his own theory of modernity, a theory that helps in understanding the current situation of legal thought, if we take the un-Weberian step of applying it to legal formalism. Finally, Professor Kennedy offers an interpretation of the contemporary mode of legal thought as an episode in the sequences of disenchantment and reenchantment suggested by Weber\u27s philosophy of history, and uses Weberian elements to construct a distinct contemporary ideal type of legal thought. The very brief conclusion suggests the strong affiliation between Weber (read as above) and one of the sects of modern legal theory, namely critical legal studies