What is a Good Plan? Cultural Variations in Expert Planners’ Concepts of Plan Quality

This article presents the results of a field research study examining commonalities and differences between American and British operational planners’ mental models of planning. We conducted Cultural Network Analysis (CNA) interviews with 14 experienced operational planners in the US and UK. Our results demonstrate the existence of fundamental differences between the way American and British expert planners conceive of a high quality plan. Our results revealed that the American planners’ model focused on specification of action to achieve synchronization, providing little autonomy at the level of execution, and included the belief that increasing contingencies reduces risk. The British planners’ model stressed the internal coherence of the plan, to support shared situational awareness and thereby flexibility at the level of execution. The British model also emphasized the belief that reducing the number of assumptions decreases risk. Overall, the American ideal plan serves a controlling function, whereas the British ideal plan supports an enabling function. Interestingly, both the US and UK would view the other’s ideal plan as riskier than their own. The implications of cultural models of plans and planning are described for establishing performance measures and designing systems to support multinational planning teams

Philosophical Dialogue and Military Decision Making

Abstract: The military establishment plays an important role in society, not only because it is pivotal in securing the state from external and internal threats but also because the conduct of soldiers affect the fortunes of the state both fiscally and morally. Early in their career, soldiers are trained to be irreproachable in their loyalty, unquestioning in their obedience and unthinking in their pursuit of military objective. This, however changes as they move up into command positions and are required to decide on objectives as well as give orders for others to obey. For many officers, this is usually a difficult transition to make even though Staff School training is supposed to enable them to make this transition. This paper is based on an attempt to introduce philosophical dialogue to student officers of a military academy to help them make this difficult transition. It discusses the use of philosophical dialogue in facilitating officers’ understanding of important issues in the military, including military decision making. It highlights the procedure, difficulties and dangers of facilitating philosophical dialogue between soldiers especially as it relates to the corporate unity and command structure of the military. The paper also reflects on the efficacy and desirability of involving soldiers in a dialogue process. Keywords: Decision making, Military training, MDMP (Military Decision Making Process), Philosophical Dialogue, Resumen: La institución militar y juega un papel importante en la sociedad, no sólo porque es una base crucial para la seguridad del estado frente a amenazas internas y externas sino porque la conducta de los soldados afecta al destino del estado tan física como moralmente. Al comienzo de sus carreras, los soldados son entrenados en el desarrollo de una lealtad indubitable, evitando el cuestionamiento y la crítica para incentivar el desarrollo de los objetivos militares. Esta situación cambia cuando asciende a posiciones superiores, donde se requiere que decidan sobre la consecución de ciertos objetivos y que den órdenes a otros. Para muchos oficiales, esto supone una difícil transición a pesar de que la escuela de oficiales se supone que los capacita para realizar esta transición. Este artículo pretende explicar cómo introducir el diálogo filosófico a los estudiantes que se preparan para ser oficiales en la academia militar, actividad que les ayudará a desenvolver esta complicada transición. El trabajo discute el uso del diálogo filosófico para facilitar a los oficiales la comprensión de los asuntos militares importantes, lo cual abarca la toma de decisión militar. Subrayará, el procedimiento, las dificultades y los peligros de facilitar un diálogo filosófico entre los soldados, particularmente cuando se dirige a la unidad militar y a la estructura de órdenes delejército. Además, esta investigación reflexiona sobre la eficacia y deseabilidad de incorporar a los soldados en un proceso dialógico. Palabras clave: Toma de decisión, entrenamiento militar, Proceso de toma de decisión militar (PTDM), diálogo filosófico

'Sense and respond' and 'autonomic' logistics: a review of US and UK developments

Until recently, platform-based, logistics applications required data to be physically downloaded and transferred between systems so that analysis could estimate the status of key components. In both the Sense and Respond Logistics (S&RL) and Autonomic Logistics (AL) systems, prognostics have been added to monitoring functions, effectively extending the reach of Combat Service Support (CSS). The scope the supply chain has also been expanded with the potential inclusion of some classes of supply within the AL approach. The real time and predictive aspects are relatively new logistics developments facilitated by the real-time communication of data while platforms are in operation. While the (Australian) Military Integrated Logistics Information System (MILIS) proposes to extend the reach of supply chain information to sub-unit level, it falls short of crossing the gap to link Health and Usage Monitoring System (HUMS), platform-based, data into the logistics continuum to provide end-to-end visibility, a foxhole-to-factory-to-foxhole perspective, of the supply chain. This paper will review developments in recent military applications of Autonomic Logistics and Sense & Respond Logistics in the United States Defense Forces and the military in the UK while also considering a selection of Australian Defence Force programs. It will state the case for application of Autonomic Logistics and Sense & Respond Logistics to the ASLAV and Bushmaster platforms, in a similar fashion to those employed in the US and the UK, as a source of accurate and up-to-date CSS information for the various levels of command

Intelligence within BAOR and NATO's Northern Army Group

During the Cold War the UK's principal military role was its commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) through the British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), together with wartime command of NATO's Northern Army Group. The possibility of a surprise attack by the numerically superior Warsaw Pact forces ensured that great importance was attached to intelligence, warning and rapid mobilisation. As yet we know very little about the intelligence dimension of BAOR and its interface with NATO allies. This article attempts to address these neglected issues, ending with the impact of the 1973 Yom Kippur War upon NATO thinking about warning and surprise in the mid-1970s. It concludes that the arrangements made by Whitehall for support to BAOR from national assets during crisis or transition to war were - at best - improbable. Accordingly, over the years, BAOR developed its own unique assets in the realm of both intelligence collection and special operations in order to prepare for the possible outbreak of conflict

Franco-British naval cooperation at the Dardanelles, 1914-1916, new friends, old enemies, eternal rivals?

This paper considers the factors needed for a success to have been made of joint Franco-British naval operations during the Dardanelles campaign of 1915 and 1916. It does so by examining the importance of: joint decision making at all levels of the coalition; effective communications within the coalition at both the strategic and operational level; and a mutual respect for the contribution and capability of all members of the coalition

Assessment of crisis readiness to move a patient from the airport with suspected Ebola

The aim of this article is to verify the readiness of patient transport from the airport with symptoms for Ebola disease by the rescue services of the Integrated Rescue System of the Czech Republic. Detection of possible risks and causes of risks during patient transport. In one part of the article, the part is devoted to the current legislation regulating the cooperation of IRS, economic measures for crisis situations, functions of state material reserves management, material security of selected IRS components and the work of BIOHAZARD TEAM. The main part of the article describes the course of the extraordinary event. There is a chapter devoted to the analysis and evaluation of risks during transport. It also deals with the issues of transport, risks and problems that may be encountered by the intervening members of the IRS units. In conclusion, the proposed measures to help minimize risks in the transport of infected patient

Post-Westgate SWAT : C4ISTAR Architectural Framework for Autonomous Network Integrated Multifaceted Warfighting Solutions Version 1.0 : A Peer-Reviewed Monograph

Police SWAT teams and Military Special Forces face mounting pressure and challenges from adversaries that can only be resolved by way of ever more sophisticated inputs into tactical operations. Lethal Autonomy provides constrained military/security forces with a viable option, but only if implementation has got proper empirically supported foundations. Autonomous weapon systems can be designed and developed to conduct ground, air and naval operations. This monograph offers some insights into the challenges of developing legal, reliable and ethical forms of autonomous weapons, that address the gap between Police or Law Enforcement and Military operations that is growing exponentially small. National adversaries are today in many instances hybrid threats, that manifest criminal and military traits, these often require deployment of hybrid-capability autonomous weapons imbued with the capability to taken on both Military and/or Security objectives. The Westgate Terrorist Attack of 21st September 2013 in the Westlands suburb of Nairobi, Kenya is a very clear manifestation of the hybrid combat scenario that required military response and police investigations against a fighting cell of the Somalia based globally networked Al Shabaab terrorist group.Comment: 52 pages, 6 Figures, over 40 references, reviewed by a reade

21st Army Group in Normandy: Towards a New Balance Sheet

The purpose of this article is to offer further evidence in support of the view that the combat performance of the Anglo-Canadian armies in Normandy has been greatly underrated and the effectiveness of the German forces vastly overrated. This argument informs my study of the Canadians in Normandy, published under the title Fields of Fire, but the intention here is to consider questions about combat between British and German units in Normandy

An Analysis of Factors Affecting the Royal Air Force Contribution to the Raid on Dieppe, 1942

This paper seeks to explain the limited options available to Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory when planning the Royal Air Force (RAF) portion of the combined operation raid on Dieppe in 1942. It proposes that a number of constraining influences, some self-imposed, reduced the air support options, so that only an air umbrella over the attacking forces could be provided. It argues that these influences were a consequence of the RAF’s cultural and conceptual environment, which perpetuated Trenchardian notions of offensive spirit in RAF doctrine, together with the refusal to consider options to extend the range of its fighter aircraft. The paper rejects claims that the RAF’s effort at Dieppe was the natural evolution of combined operations doctrine and demonstrates that preemptive bombing of Dieppe was politically unacceptable