32,571 research outputs found
Decentralized Job Matching
This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.Two-sided matching ; job market ; subgame perfect equilibrium ; irreversibilities
Decentralized job matching
This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents’ actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching
PrivateJobMatch: A Privacy-Oriented Deferred Multi-Match Recommender System for Stable Employment
Coordination failure reduces match quality among employers and candidates in
the job market, resulting in a large number of unfilled positions and/or
unstable, short-term employment. Centralized job search engines provide a
platform that connects directly employers with job-seekers. However, they
require users to disclose a significant amount of personal data, i.e., build a
user profile, in order to provide meaningful recommendations. In this paper, we
present PrivateJobMatch -- a privacy-oriented deferred multi-match recommender
system -- which generates stable pairings while requiring users to provide only
a partial ranking of their preferences. PrivateJobMatch explores a series of
adaptations of the game-theoretic Gale-Shapley deferred-acceptance algorithm
which combine the flexibility of decentralized markets with the intelligence of
centralized matching. We identify the shortcomings of the original algorithm
when applied to a job market and propose novel solutions that rely on machine
learning techniques. Experimental results on real and synthetic data confirm
the benefits of the proposed algorithms across several quality measures. Over
the past year, we have implemented a PrivateJobMatch prototype and deployed it
in an active job market economy. Using the gathered real-user preference data,
we find that the match-recommendations are superior to a typical decentralized
job market---while requiring only a partial ranking of the user preferences.Comment: 45 pages, 28 figures, RecSys 201
Matching Markets with Signals
A costless signaling mechanism has been proposed as a device to improve welfare in decentralized two-sided matching markets. An example of such an environment is a job market for new Ph.D. economists. We study a market game of incomplete information between firms and workers and show that costless signaling is actually harmful in some matching markets. Specifically, if agents have very similar preferences, signaling lessens the total number of matches and the welfare of firms, as well as it affects ambiguously the welfare of workers. These results run contrary to previous findings that costless signaling facilitates match formation.Matching Markets, Signaling
Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms act truthfully, every outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the gameinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio
Incentives in Decentralized Random Matching Markets
Decentralized markets are modeled by means of a sequential game where, starting from any matching situation, firms are randomly given the opportunity to make job offers. In this random context, we prove the existence of ordinal subgame perfect equilibria where firms act according to a list of preferences. Moreover, every such equilibrium preserves stability for a particular profile of preferences. In particular, when firms act truthfully, every outcome is stable for the true preferences. Conversely, when the initial matching is the empty matching, every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an ordinal equilibrium play of the game
Decentralized Market Processes to Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries
We analyze a decentralized trading process in a basic labor market where heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly, and negotiate salaries with each other over time. Firms and workers may not have a complete picture of the entire market and can thus behave myopically in the process. Our main result establishes that, starting from an arbitrary initial market state, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic (firm-worker) pair improvements, or bilateral trades, leading to a stable matching between firms and workers with a scheme of competitive salary offers. An important implication of this result is that a general random process where every possible bilateral trade is chosen with a positive probability converges with probability one to a competitive equilibrium of the market.Decentralized market, job matching, random path, competitive salary, stability
Does search boost efficiency?
Poaching externality, arising from job-to-job turnovers, implies that a planner should allocate fewer resources to costly job creations. However, these search efforts increase competition among employers, and this could in turn internalize the externality, whereas the congestion externality requires a unit-elastic matching function
For-Profit Search Platforms
We consider optimal pricing by a profit-maximizing platform running a dynamic search
and matching market. Buyers and sellers enter in cohorts over time, meet and bargain
under private information. The optimal centralized mechanism, which involves posting a
bid-ask spread, can be decentralized through participation fees charged by the intermediary
to both sides. The sum of buyers’ and sellers’ fees equals the sum of inverse hazard rates
of the marginal types and their ratio equals the ratio of buyers’ and sellers’ bargaining
weights. We also show that a monopolistic intermediary in a search market may be welfare
enhancing
Controlled Matching Game for Resource Allocation and User Association in WLANs
In multi-rate IEEE 802.11 WLANs, the traditional user association based on
the strongest received signal and the well known anomaly of the MAC protocol
can lead to overloaded Access Points (APs), and poor or heterogeneous
performance. Our goal is to propose an alternative game-theoretic approach for
association. We model the joint resource allocation and user association as a
matching game with complementarities and peer effects consisting of selfish
players solely interested in their individual throughputs. Using recent
game-theoretic results we first show that various resource sharing protocols
actually fall in the scope of the set of stability-inducing resource allocation
schemes. The game makes an extensive use of the Nash bargaining and some of its
related properties that allow to control the incentives of the players. We show
that the proposed mechanism can greatly improve the efficiency of 802.11 with
heterogeneous nodes and reduce the negative impact of peer effects such as its
MAC anomaly. The mechanism can be implemented as a virtual connectivity
management layer to achieve efficient APs-user associations without
modification of the MAC layer
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